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 Introduction Chapter 1.
1.1 Tuna: A Rising Star 
Tuna is emerging as a key feature in dialogue around sustainable fisheries and sustainable 
seafood. Historically, fish have struggled to garner the same amount of attention and 
public empathy as more mediagenic animals like pandas, gorillas and rhinoceroses. While 
these animals do deserve attention, NGO campaigns are concurrently trying to boost the 
profile of fish like tuna. WWF for example have produced a campaign where tuna are 
shown wearing panda, rhino and gorilla masks, with questions like “Would you care more 
if I was a panda?” (Figure 1.1). While public consciousness around sustainability in 
relation to tuna has focused on the interaction between tuna and dolphins during the 
‘Dolphin Safe’, ‘Dolphin Friendly’ campaigns initiated in the 1980s, a shift is occurring 
and tuna is emerging as a ‘headline’ fish in the sustainable seafood movement.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 WWF “Would you care more if I was a…” campaign (Macleod 2011) 
In their report on the State of Aquaculture and Fisheries, the FAO (2012) found that in 
2009, among the principal tuna species, one-third were estimated to be overexploited, 
37.5 per cent were fully exploited, and only 29 per cent non-fully exploited. The current 
extent of overfishing (legal and illegal) and bycatch associated primarily with purse seine 
and longline fishing mean sustainable management is imperative. However, calls for 
restraint in the expansion of fishing effort and measures for bycatch mitigation in both 
longline and purse seine fisheries have largely gone unheard (e.g. Langley, Wright et al. 
2009). Thus, in the long term the status of tuna stocks (and consequently catches) and 
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bycatch species may further deteriorate unless there are significant improvements in their 
management. This will require strong governance frameworks. 
Traditionally, fisheries governance was the domain of state actors but often they failed to 
live up to expectations, leading scholars as well as other stakeholders to question their 
governance capacity (e.g. Allison 2001; Cole 2003). With states deemed unreliable actors 
in fisheries governance, other actors have moved forward into prominent positions (e.g. 
Kooiman 2005). This has resulted in new, innovative governance arrangements emerging 
that include and engage state, market and NGO actors.  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and understand the capacity of governance 
innovations to shape practices of production and consumption for tuna sustainability. The 
analysis is based on the understanding that governance innovations take as their starting 
point innovative instruments, which governance actors are designing and using for 
enhancing the sustainability of tuna production and consumption. Governance innovation 
should therefore be understood as the combinations of actors and instruments that are 
developed, taken up and implemented in aiming for sustainability. 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I will provide a 
background to global tuna fisheries and detail sustainability issues that have emerged with 
the globalisation of the tuna industry. Section 3 introduces the concept of a tuna global 
production network. Section 4 examines the theory behind governance innovations by 
introducing four dimensions of the governance innovation concept: sustainability 
framing, innovative instruments, the governance actors (state, market and civil society), 
and power dynamics. Based on this, Section 5 formulates the research objective of this 
thesis, followed by the thesis methodology, which also provides a discussion of the 
different cases chosen for analysis. The final section outlines the overall structure of the 
thesis. 
1.2 Tuna  
In trying to understand governance innovations concerning tuna production and 
consumption, it is essential to first understand the background to tuna fisheries, key 
sustainability issues and fisheries governance.  
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1.2.1 Tuna Fisheries 
Tuna are highly migratory fish caught in both temperate and tropical waters throughout 
the world’s oceans. The principal market species of tuna are skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus 
pelamis), albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga), yellowfin tuna (T. albacares), southern 
bluefin tuna (T. maccoyii), bigeye tuna (T. obesus), Pacific bluefin tuna (T. orientalis), 
and Atlantic bluefin tuna (T. thynnus). Industrial scale fishing of these fish started in the 
1940s. Japanese long line and US pole and line fleets were operating throughout the 
Pacific Ocean and by the late 1950s the European and Japanese fleets were also fishing in 
the Atlantic ocean, in particular off the coast of Africa (Bayliff, de Leiva Moreno et al. 
2005). These fishing operations continued to expand and by the 1960s, industrial 
exploitation of tuna fisheries was occurring worldwide engaging additional countries like 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia and Venezuela (Miyake, Guillotreau et 
al. 2010). At the end of the 1960s, exploitation of tuna fisheries expanded further through 
the introduction of purse seine vessels, which replaced many of the US and European 
pole and line vessels and now account for 62 per cent of world production (Van Zwieten 
2013). By the 1980s, fishing activities had spread to the western Indian Ocean (WIO) and 
the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Currently more than 80 nations have 
vessels engaged in tuna fishing (Joseph 2009). 
The expansion of tuna fisheries has seen an enormous increase in fish catch. Between 
1940 and the mid-1960s, the annual world catch of the principal market species of tuna 
rose from about 300,000 tonnes to about 1 million tonnes. Since then it has continued to 
rise to more than 4 million tonnes annually in 2009 (Joseph 2009), with a peak of 6.5 
million tonnes in 2007 (FAO 2010). Of these catches, 68 per cent are from the Pacific 
Ocean, 22 per cent from the Indian Ocean and the remaining 10 per cent from the Atlantic 
Ocean and Mediterranean Sea (Joseph 2009). 
This increase in catch has been to meet rising consumer demand. In the fresh/frozen tuna 
market, annual tuna supply to the global sashimi market is around 500,000 mt; more than 
80 per cent of which supplies the Japanese market. The fresh/frozen tuna market is also 
gaining in importance in EU and US markets. In the EU, the current estimated retail value 
of this tuna is US$1 billion. In the US, the import value of such tuna is US$200 million 
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(Hamilton, Lewis et al. 2011). However, canned tuna remains the largest of the tuna 
markets by volume. Annually, at least 2.5 million metric tonnes of the global tuna catch is 
destined for canning; the majority of which is caught by purse seine vessels (Ibid). 
Presently, the EU is the largest market for canned tuna, followed by the US (Figure 1.2). 
With expansion of the canned tuna processing industry from the US mainland, EU and 
Japan in the 1970s and 1980s to Southeast Asia and Central/Latin America and the Indian 
Ocean more recently, it is now a globalised industry. Fish are being caught, processed and 
delivered via large supermarket chains to consumers and as a result, fish processing 
companies, trade firms and retailers have replaced fishermen as the central agents in the 
supply chain (Oosterveer 2007).  
 
Figure 1.2 Global canned tuna consumption (Source: PEW 2012) 
1.2.2 Sustainability 
Before looking at governance for sustainability, it is important to understand what 
sustainability issues are arising around the production and consumption of tuna. This 
section will provide an overview of three key sustainability issues that are pertinent to the 
research in this thesis. The first concerns over-capacity of tuna fisheries. The second, 
issues associated with bycatch and the third, legality and the problem of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity.  
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The FAO has reported that the rate of increase in the world’s marine capture fisheries has 
slowed and is now approaching zero. Over the last decades, tuna fleets and their catches 
have been growing to the extent that some stocks are overexploited or are at risk of being 
overexploited (Levy 2011). The FAO (2012) reported that in 2009, among the principal 
tuna species, one-third were estimated to be overexploited, 37.5 per cent were fully 
exploited, and only 29 per cent non-fully exploited. Therefore, current levels of 
production will not be sustainable indefinitely.  
About 60 per cent of tuna catches are taken by purse seine vessels, 15 per cent by pole 
and line, 15 per cent by longline vessels and the remainder by a variety of other gear 
types (Allen, Joseph et al. 2010). Therefore, managing fleet capacity and fishing effort is 
on the agenda of every tuna RFMO, with a primary focus on two methods: purse seine 
fishing and longline fishing.  
Purse seines fisheries present sustainability concerns both because of their catch 
efficiency and thus risk to over-exploitation, and because of problems associated with 
bycatch, the second sustainability concern of relevance to this thesis. In terms of 
efficiency, when looking at the volume of fish caught per set,* while economically 
beneficial this also contributes to high exploitation rates of target stocks. Purse seine 
fisheries primarily target skipjack tuna, which currently are not in an overfished state. 
However, at the moment, it is not possible to sustainably increase catches of these ‘non-
fully exploited’ stocks without increasing the bycatch of other tuna species, including 
small bigeye and yellowfin tunas, and non-tuna organisms (Gilman 2011). The high level 
of bycatch associated with purse seining relates to the use of fish aggregating devices 
(FADs). Tuna, in particular smaller tuna like skipjack or juvenile yellowfin and bigeye 
show a tendency to associate with floating objects (e.g. logs), for reasons as yet unknown. 
Fishers throughout the world’s tropical and subtropical seas exploit this behaviour by 
deploying artificial floating objects – FADs – which they can subsequently fish around 
once a sufficient number have aggregated under them (Figure 1.3). FAD fishing is 
                                                 
*
 A purse seine set refers to the whole process of a fishing vessel dropping its net vertically in the water to 
encircle a school of tuna or a fish aggregating device (FAD). When the school is encircled, the end of the 
net is closed using a wire cable and the bottom is ‘pursed’ (this process of “pursing” is so named because it 
is similar to pulling the draw string of an old-fashioned purse). The net is then pulled aboard the purse 
seiner, completing one set.  
6 
 
increasingly efficient through rapid technological advances in their design. These 
advances have included the use of satellite beacons to enable fast location, and sonar to 
monitor the presence and size of tuna aggregations beneath them. One of the problems 
with the efficiency of FAD fisheries however is that approximately 10 per cent of the 
catch from a purse seine FAD set are non-target species (compared to 1-2 per cent on 
non-FAD (free-school) sets). These non-target, bycatch species include both undersized 
tuna and a wide variety of pelagic non-tuna species (Bromhead 2003).  
 
Figure 1.3 Graphic representation of purse seine fishing on a FAD, with an enlarged 
representation of the FAD with marine organisms aggregating under it. 
Longline fisheries have also generated bycatch concerns. While not dependent on FADs 
like purse seine fisheries, longline fisheries use baited hooks (Figure 1.4) that attract non-
target organisms like sharks, swordfish, turtles and seabirds. With between 2500 and 
3000 hooks set over a total distance of about 100 km on industrial longliners (FAO 2003), 
the potential for catching non-target organisms is high. This is particularly the case when 
hook rates for target species are low. In Indonesia for example, industrial longliners have 
reported the tuna hook rate has declined from 0.05 in 2006 to about 0.027 in 2011, 
meaning that only 2 or 3 in 100 hooks will be hauled with tuna. The other 98 hooks are 
hauled either empty, or with non-target species (Bailey Forthcoming).  
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Figure 1.4 Tuna longline with associated bycatch 
The third issue for the sustainability of tuna stocks comes from widespread IUU fishing. 
Globally, the economic value of IUU fishing activities has been estimated to be between 
US$10-23.5 billion each year (Agnew, Pearce et al. 2009). In the WCPO, the largest tuna 
fisheries in the world, the loss from IUU fishing has been estimated to be in the vicinity 
of 21-46 per cent of reported catch and is valued at US$0.7-1.5 billion (Havice 2010). As 
45 per cent of the total catch is from the exclusive economic zones of Pacific Island 
countries, the value of IUU fish from these countries is between US$300-700 million, 
representing a considerable loss of foreign earnings (Havice and Campling 2010).  
Illegal fishing takes place where vessels operate in violation of the laws of a fishery. This 
can apply to fisheries that are under the jurisdiction of a coastal state or to high seas 
fisheries regulated by regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). Unreported 
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fishing is fishing that has been unreported or misreported to the relevant national 
authority or regional organisation, contravening applicable laws and regulations. 
Unregulated fishing generally refers to fishing by vessels without nationality or vessels 
flying the flag of a country that is not party to the regional organisation governing that 
fishing area or species, known as flying ‘flags of convenience’. The FAO estimates that 
17 per cent of the world’s fishing vessels use flags of convenience. IUU fishing affects 
fisheries within the jurisdiction of coastal states (particularly developing coastal states), 
within the areas of responsibility of regional fisheries bodies, and on the high seas, and 
has serious consequences. It not only leads to depletion of fishing stocks, but it also 
deprives often poor communities of their livelihoods and can cost governments millions 
of dollars in lost revenues. 
1.2.3 Tuna Fisheries Governance 
The global regulatory framework developed to tackle these sustainability issues comes 
from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Formalised in 
1982, it is the strongest and most comprehensive global agreement, setting forth the rights 
and obligations of states regarding the use of the oceans, their resources, and the 
protection of the marine and coastal environment. Perhaps the most significant portion of 
the UNCLOS agreement is the formalisation of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). This granted coastal states rights to the natural resources located in a zone 
extending 200 nautical miles from their coastal baseline. The introduction of the EEZ 
brought an end to open access to the global marine commons by giving coastal states the 
legal authority to exclude fishing vessels and thus manage their fishery resources for their 
own economic benefit. 
Due to the industrialisation and expansion of fishing activities, many commercially 
valuable fisheries are found in waters beyond states’ EEZs that were previously 
impossible or uneconomic to reach. These include shared stocks, which can be fished 
within the jurisdiction of two or more countries; straddling stocks, which move into 
international waters; and highly migratory species, which are primarily in international 
waters (Asche and Smith 2010). To regulate fisheries like tuna that fit into these 
categories, UNCLOS developed the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
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Migratory Fish Stocks in 1995 (also known as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)). 
Under the UNFSA, RFMOs are the primary mechanism through which states interact to 
achieve resource conservation and management of stocks. There are currently five tuna 
RFMOs (see Figure 1.5) in place. Other regional configurations in place for governance 
of transboundary fisheries like tuna include large marine ecosystems (LMEs) supported 
by the Global Environmental Facility and, at a more functional level the EU Common 
Fisheries Policy and treaty based agreements such as the Palau Agreement in the Pacific. 
 
Figure 1.5 Global tuna RFMOs (Source: Majkowski 2010) 
The implementation of regulatory frameworks to devise tuna conservation and 
management measures presents the foundation of state-centred fisheries governance. 
However, more recently sustainability governance of tuna shows the involvement of an 
increasing number of non-state actors, both related to the market and related to civil 
society, applying other governance strategies and instruments. To examine this we turn to 
the concept of global production networks (GPNs) and the idea of governance 
innovations within the tuna GPN. 
1.3 Tuna Global Production Network  
The globalisation of the tuna industry has meant a wide variety of actors across different 
sectors are involved in the organisation and governance of tuna production and 
consumption processes. The GPN approach has its theoretical grounding in the global 
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commodity chain and global value chain frameworks. The global commodity chain 
framework focus on the dynamics of firms generating market power and consists of “sets 
of interorganisational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking 
households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy” (Gereffi, 
Korzeniewicz et al. 1994: 2). Through the global commodity chain framework, buyers are 
recognised as key drivers in the formation of globalised production and distribution paths. 
While acknowledging interorganisational networks as a central aspect of analysis, the 
global commodity chain framework has been criticised for not adequately identifying the 
variety of network forms that have been subsequently identified as critical to governance 
(Feenstra 1998; Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005).  
Developed from the global commodity chain framework, global value chain analysis 
focuses in general terms on the relationship between vertical coordination and firm 
strategies for ‘upgrading’ products or the production process that enhance rewards and/or 
reduces exposure to risks for a chain actor (Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008; Bolwig, Ponte et al. 
2010). The focus of this approach on upgrading has incorporated the role of non-firm 
actors into global value chain analysis. However, while acknowledging the “multitude of 
factors that affect the evolution of the global economy” (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005: 
99), the focus of the GVC framework is deliberately confined to firms and their 
transactional relationships within the value chain. Global value chain researchers 
recognise that other actors are involved but they mostly are viewed as external forces. 
Although there may be some justification for this in terms of its theoretical simplicity and 
practical application, global value chain analysis has also been criticised for becoming too 
narrow a focus (Bair 2005). Criticism of both global commodity chain and global value 
chain approaches led to calls for a reinvigoration of research more central to global 
commodity chain analysis but taking into account wider political-economic relations of 
production and consumption. GPN analysis emerged as a way of including these wider 
relations by focusing on the complex network structures that influence production, 
distribution and consumption (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Coe and Hess 2007; Coe, 
Dicken et al. 2008; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008; Levy 2008). The network metaphor is 
used to capture the multi-stranded connections between firms and extra-firm groups of 
actors. And the term production is adopted in preference to commodity, to make explicit 
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that analysis will incorporate social processes and interaction between network actors, 
and not just follow the flow of the product (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002). 
Before examining governance within the tuna GPN, it is important to get a brief overview 
of the tuna production chain or network. Figure 1.6 illustrates a basic production chain for 
tuna fisheries, which forms the core of the tuna GPN. In its simplest sense, tuna 
production involves capture of raw materials from the different fisheries (longline, pole 
and line and purse seine), coordinating transhipment of catches into carriers to be taken to 
ports for sale and delivery to tuna processors. For fresh tuna, tuna is either kept whole or 
cut into loins and chilled or frozen depending on the market it is going to. For canning-
grade tuna, the tuna is loined, cooked and canned. The processed tuna is exported via 
traders, importers/wholesalers and distributors to the target market, which may be 
supermarkets or the food service industry. In terms of canned tuna, supermarkets 
dominate retail sales globally, with an increasing volume of canned tuna products being 
produced by processors under direct contract to retailers and sold under supermarkets’ 
own labels (i.e. private labels) (Hamilton, Lewis et al. 2011).  
Therefore, the production chain side of GPNs comprise diverse types of organisations, 
often in quite different industries and institutions including tuna producers (fishers), 
multinational processors, traders active in futures and options markets, and large-scale 
retailers. Collectively these are referred to as firm actors. In the GPN literature, the focus 
is often on the role ‘lead firms’ play in the governance of the production network. These 
are the firms that undertake the branding and marketing of a product and often its design. 
In the case of tuna, this role can fall on a number of firms within a tuna GPN and could 
include: a branded company, like John West; a larger ‘parent’ company like Tri Marine, 
providing tuna for its subsidiary companies; or a supermarket controlling supply of own-
brand tuna.  
However, GPNs are not only comprised of firm actors but also non-firm actors like state 
and civil society organisations. When it comes to sustainability governance innovations, 
these actors have an integral role to play. Not only are these external, non-firm actors ‘out 
there’ affecting the broader societal, economic and cultural environments in which firms 
operate, they also interact with firms and production systems directly in ways that affect 
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and influence how governance takes place throughout a supply chain (Raj-Reichert 2012). 
The following section will look at sustainability governance innovations in the context of 
GPNs. It will first introduce the concept of governance within GPNs and then move on to 
looking specifically at the concept and dimensions of governance innovations.  
 
Figure 1.6 Basic representation of global tuna production chain (Adapted from SFP 
2010) 
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1.4 Analysing Global Production Network Governance 
Academic literature and policy circles have examined governance extensively since the 
1990s, when it emerged as a buzzword following the World Bank introduction of the 
concept of ‘good governance’. Traditionally it was synonymous with government. 
However, following from people questioning the hegemony of state actors and command 
and control styles of governing, the term has acquired a new meaning. In their analysis of 
‘new’ policy instruments, Jordon and colleagues described governance as having now 
achieved a “paradigmatic orthodoxy” in (British) political science (2005: 1). While 
according to Kooiman “[w]e are still in a period of creative disorder concerning 
governance” (2003: 5), as there is no universally accepted definition, there is overall 
agreement that it refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries 
between and within public and private sectors have become blurred (Stoker 1998). This 
blurring has broadened governance research from its previous focus on government-
centric decision making, to stress the important role that other non-state actors are playing 
in steering processes of decision making and, in the case of this thesis, practices of 
production and consumption (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005).  
1.4.1 Governance and Global Production Networks 
Despite differences in terminology, as well as in focus between different researchers, 
there is a growing consensus around the idea that one of the most useful keys to 
understanding sustainability governance is the concept of the network. A wide literature 
has emerged on theories and empirical studies of network governance (e.g. Kooiman 
2005; Young 2006; Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Gibbs 2008; Mahon, McConney et al. 
2008; Eden 2009). This thesis uses the framework of global production networks to 
analyse and understand sustainability governance of global tuna production and 
consumption. When it comes to understanding how governance of a globalised industry 
like tuna is affected by broader interactions than those immediately concerned with 
production and consumption, the global commodity chain and global value chain 
frameworks are limited. Their focus is on inter-firm coordination and relationships, and 
actors like NGOs and states remain analytically an external influence. Capturing the 
central roles these groups are playing has moved the analysis beyond what are 
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“essentially vertical and linear” hierarchical relations between firms connected within 
global commodity chain. Through the GPN approach, the interactions between producers, 
traders, retailers, consumers, as well as non-firm actors like state bodies and NGOs, are 
explicit and open to critical investigation.  
The literature on GPNs has at its theoretical core analyses of firm-state relations 
(Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Coe, Dicken et al. 2008). Central to this is the 
assumption that every element in a GPN is both tangibly grounded to specific locations 
(through fixed assets of production) and grounded in less tangible ways (e.g. through the 
localised social relationships and distinctive institutions and cultural practices) (Coe, 
Dicken et al. 2008). In the GPN literature, this grounding of parts of the production 
process has led to a substantial focus on the idea of embeddedness, in particular that all 
GPNs are embedded within multi-scalar state regulatory systems. Therefore, the 
recognition that all the elements in GPNs are regulated within some kind of state structure 
means that analysis of governance in GPNs necessarily must encompass state-led 
regulations.  
Other non-firm actors like NGOs are also recognised in the literature, with Coe and his 
colleagues stating that “(i)n some GPNs, of course, notably agro-food industries, natural 
resources, energy, clothing and textiles, they [NGOs] are extremely prominent and have a 
significant influence on corporate behaviour” (2008: 287). However, the role and 
influence of NGOs in GPN governance and market practices is not sufficiently well 
integrated into GPN research. Where NGOs have begun to play a role and get recognition 
in the GPN literature is in analyses of ethical aspects of consumption and production. 
This is apparent in an accumulating body of literature addressing labour organisation and 
ethical consumption (e.g. Barrientos and Smith 2007a; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008; 
Barrientos, Gereffi et al. 2011). However, while some of this research touches up on 
sustainability, sustainability governance in the context not only of NGOs but also of firm 
and non-firm state actors remains an under-researched aspect of GPN research.  
The research in this thesis takes the overarching framework of GPN governance to look 
explicitly at sustainability governance and the governance innovations that firm and non-
firm actors engage with. Taking the GPN approach to look at sustainability governance 
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and governance innovations will complement the sizable literature on environmental 
network governance and international and global governance (e.g. Kooiman 2005; Young 
2006; Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Gibbs 2008; Mahon, McConney et al. 2008; Eden 
2009). In the context of GPNs, this broader concept of network governance allows us to 
look at governance innovations through examining how different groups of firm and non-
firm (NGO and state) actors are engaging with sustainability, the instruments they are 
producing and how they interact to steer toward transformative change. In the GPN 
literature, innovation has been considered in the context of product innovation and 
technological upgrading (e.g. Ernst 2002), but hardly from an environmental and 
sustainability standpoint. The following section will first introduce the concept of a 
governance innovation, before looking at the analytical dimensions of governance 
innovations being developed to target sustainability in the tuna GPN.  
1.4.2 Dimensions of Governance Innovations 
The concept of innovation in the context of sustainability, also called ‘eco-innovation’, 
has been treated in the literature largely from a technical standpoint, with research 
focussing on technical transitions and on particular instruments of innovation (Hellström 
2007; Ekins 2010). For instance, Rennings (1998) described eco-innovations as being 
either technical, organisational, social or institutional. The innovations correspond to: 
‘curative and preventative’ technologies; management instruments like eco-audits; 
changing social practices, such as consumer consumption patterns; and improving 
environmental decision-making. What each of the types of innovation has in common is 
that they are targeting change through producing new technological or regulatory 
instruments.  
However, in this thesis innovation is broader than just the instruments themselves and 
encompasses the new constellations of actors engaging in the production and uptake of 
the new instruments. Therefore in the context of tuna, governance innovations for 
sustainability are the combinations of instruments and actors working to incorporate 
sustainability into processes of production and consumption. To examine governance 
innovation, four key components have been distinguished: (1) the different framings of 
sustainability that actors use to justify the instruments used; (2) the governance 
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instruments themselves; (3) the governance actor constellations, emerging through 
combinations of state, market and NGO actors; and (4) the power dynamics between the 
groups of actors that shape production and uptake of the governance innovations. 
1.4.3 Framing Sustainability 
Section 1.2.2 explained the sustainability issues in tuna fisheries and the tuna industry. In 
describing the problems of over-exploitation of fisheries, bycatch and IUU fishing, 
sustainability becomes an issue that is both social and ecological. The vulnerability of 
fisheries to international markets also means sustainability is an economic issue. 
Therefore, fisheries governance for sustainability has moved on from being something 
dealt with simply in terms of the biology of stock assessments, to incorporate broader 
social and economic dimensions. The combined ecological, social and economic 
dimensions of sustainability are widely acknowledged. However, in spite of this 
economic importance, the GPN approach has not dealt with sustainability of natural 
resources to a great extent. It has been touched upon in Murphy’s (2009) analysis of 
market internationalisation in Bolivia’s wood products sector and in Bridge’s (2008) 
exploration of the oil GPN but no recognition has been given to the importance of 
framing. Nonetheless, how governance actors choose to frame sustainability is a critical 
aspect of GPN sustainability governance strategies.  
On the one hand, state-based approaches to governance have framed sustainability as a 
management issue, taking a science-based approach to formulate and introduce laws and 
regulations to manage fisheries exploitation. On the other hand, market-based approaches 
are framing sustainability around encouraging industry actors to conduct sustainable 
practice and consumers to make sustainable market choices. In some cases, like 
certification and ecolabelling, this centres on principles of sustainability that specific 
labels promote. For instance, the MSC promotes ecological sustainability, emphasising 
harvest strategies, habitat protection and producing fish within their maximum sustainable 
yield. In other cases, specific sustainability concerns, like IUU fishing, are the point of 
entry and NGOs engage with state and industry actors through lobbying for monitoring, 
control and surveillance systems and traceability systems. 
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1.4.4 Instruments 
As indicated, innovative instruments are at the core of governance innovation. In GPN 
theory instruments have not been given attention explicitly. However, when looking at 
tackling governance for sustainability, instruments become a fundamental dimension. 
Examination of instruments for environmental regulation have been viewed from both the 
perspective of coming from state actors or coming from non-state actors (e.g. Hobbs, 
Bailey et al. 2005; Jordan, Wurzel et al. 2005). Hemmelskamp (2005) looks explicitly at 
state policy instruments, distinguishing between market and non-market instruments. He 
describes non-market instruments as commands/bans that differentiate between 
admissible and non-admissible use of the environment. Conversely, when describing 
market instruments like access agreements, levies and privatisation of environmental 
resources, he notes that they indirectly control environmental processes through the 
market. Jordan et al.’s (2005) explanation of ‘new environmental policy instruments’ 
shifted beyond the assumption that instruments are purely the domain of state actors by 
introducing a typology of instruments (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 Typology of new environmental policy instruments in relation to fisheries 
(adapted from Jordan, Wurzel et al. 2005: 483) 
 The State Speciﬁes the Goal to be 
Achieved 
The State Does Not Specify 
the Goals to be Achieved 
The state speciﬁes how 
the goal is to be 
achieved 
Regulation (for example catch limits 
associated with a particular fishing 
gear type); ﬁscal incentives (for 
example, subsidising less destructive 
fishing activities) 
Technology based on 
regulatory standards (for 
example, best available 
technology) 
Non-state actors 
specify how the goal is 
to be achieved 
Most negotiated voluntary 
agreements between state and public 
bodies; some market-based 
instruments (for example 
privatisation of resources); some 
regulations (for example, 
environmental quality objectives) 
Most negotiated 
environmental management 
systems; market-based 
instruments; eco-labels 
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In fisheries governance, innovative instruments are those that target production and 
consumption practices and come through both state- and market-led strategies. For 
instance, state-led innovations can have both regulatory and technical dimensions. 
Regulatory innovations come through the implementation of new regulatory instruments 
that tackle issues of fisheries sustainability. New regulations for sustainable fisheries 
management are generating novel ways of allocating and monitoring resource use. For 
instance, in some fisheries, rights-based fisheries management is used to limit access and 
create use rights to portions of the available resources. Placing controls on input, output 
or spatial access and in some cases privatising resources by granting property rights 
through allocation of resources and days at sea (e.g. Charles 2002; Grafton, Arnason et al. 
2006). Incorporated into regulatory innovations are technical innovations for fisheries 
management, such as instruments to increase capacity for monitoring, control and 
surveillance of fishery resources. This is particularly the case in management aimed at 
tackling the problem of IUU fishing.  
When the state does not set the goals or how the goals are to be achieved, different 
instruments are applied for ameliorating sustainability issues. For instance, 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) are used to develop a plan for tackling 
issues that are not covered by fisheries legislation. Within the plan are targets and details 
of the management actions that will be taken to achieve the targets (ISO 2000). Private 
standards, certification and ecolabelling are widely used for auditing environmental 
performance to produce improvement in production and in some cases fisheries 
management practices. Through the consumer-facing ecolabel, the aim is also to produce 
social innovation by generating consumer demand for certified seafood. The popularity of 
private standards for sustainability has invoked competition among the different 
certification systems. In some cases, this competition has been viewed in a positive light 
as leading to ratcheting up of standards (Cashore, Auld et al. 2007). In other cases 
however, research has pointed to the use of private standards for ‘green-washing’, with 
companies adopting progressively less stringent standards, leading to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ (Bitzer, Francken et al. 2008). Beyond certification and ecolabelling, other 
market-based instruments are also produced and include seafood guides and more 
recently, consumer-facing traceability systems. The aim of these is to exert pressure on 
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upstream actors to implement more sustainable practices and, thus, reduce fishery over-
exploitation (Konefal 2013).  
However, the use of market-based instruments has raised questions in the literature 
around legitimacy, accountability and transparency of these market-based instruments 
(e.g. Cashore 2002; Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010). With no formal rules on what private 
standards need to cover, these systems rely on transparency and third party auditing to 
verify credibility. While the pitfalls and challenges of market-based instruments are a 
point of discussion, they also facilitate interaction between new constellations of actors 
and represents the ‘governance innovation’.  
1.4.5 Actors 
The production focus of the GPN approach classifies actors as being either firm or non-
firm. Under this, non-firm can include state and NGO actors. Therefore, governance 
within GPNs is the domain of all of state, market and civil society actors. As we saw 
when looking at innovative instruments, combinations of actors are a core aspect of 
governance innovations.  
While conventional modes of governance, where the nation state is the dominant actor, 
are increasingly less adequate on their own (Van Tatenhove and Leroy 2003; Oosterveer 
2005), states remain important for developing and implementing national and 
international rules and regulations. In terms of tuna governance, RFMOs are the most 
visible state regulatory bodies. The RFMO that holds most relevance to this thesis is the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Additional to this RFMO, 
however, are the activities of sub-regional state governance bodies like the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) and Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). The model 
of state-led tuna fisheries governance in the WCPO is therefore characterised by 
institutions at different scales of multilateralism, working both independently and 
interacting with one another to design and implement conservation and management 
measures for transboundary tuna fisheries within the region. The interaction between the 
regional and sub-regional governance bodies is a novel aspect of state-led governance in 
the region.  
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In spite of new models of state-led governance emerging, there continue to be criticism of 
state and RFMO-level governance failure. This has centred largely on the problems 
associated with state actors prioritising resource exploitation over sustainability of the 
stocks (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010). Because of this criticism, greater attention is 
being paid to the role non-state actors can play in fisheries governance. The potential for 
firm and NGO actors to use market-based strategies has become apparent through 
increasing reference to the sustainable seafood movement (Iles 2007; Thrane, Ziegler et 
al. 2009; Parkes, Young et al. 2010). A key feature of the sustainable seafood movement 
has been the shifting role of NGOs. They have changed from predominantly lobbying 
state parties and serving as an adversary to the industry, toward taking on an advisory role 
and forming partnerships with industrial actors. The opportunity for this shift came about 
through the consolidation and concentration in the retail sector, the shift toward 
competition on quality standards, and the increasing use of market-based instruments. 
This all has raised the prominence of these actors in generating governance innovations 
(Mol 2006). Employing market-based governance strategies therefore, represents a shift 
towards new relationships between fish consumers and producers beyond simple market 
exchange (Bush 2010). Less constrained by the statutory limitations of states, both NGOs 
and companies are able to innovate governance in terms of the instruments they use, how 
they use them and for what purpose.  
1.4.6 Power 
New constellations of actors seeking to transform practices of production and 
consumption through governance innovations inevitably introduce power dynamics in the 
tuna GPN. The GPN literature has paid a lot of attention to power and the social relations 
of production and consumption. In particular through looking at the relations between 
industrial and developing countries as fundamentally exploitative and conditioned on 
unequal terms of trade (Levy 2008). This follows along the lines of World Systems 
theory, where powerful and wealthy ‘core’ societies dominate and exploit weak and poor 
peripheral societies, creating a power hierarchy (Martínez-Vela 2001).  
The commodification of global tuna resources has made tuna an interesting case for 
examining these sorts of network tensions. European and North American markets source 
21 
 
much of their tuna from the waters of developing countries and/or small-island 
developing states. This therefore sets up these ‘unequal terms of trade’. Research by 
Bonanno and Constance (Bonanno and Constance 1996) on the post-Fordist global 
processes of tuna production in the context the tuna dolphin controversy of the 1980s, 
provides a bridge to understanding the power dynamics associated with the GPN 
approach and tuna. In their analysis, the authors focus their attention on: the role of 
transnational corporations in the restructuring of the tuna fishing industry; the role of 
labour issues associated with the globalisation of tuna production; and the embeddedness 
of supply network dynamics in different places of production and processing. All of these 
themes resonate with the exposure of power dynamics in the GPN literature.  
This thesis takes our understanding of power relations in the tuna GPN forward through 
providing an updated examination of the ways in which sustainability innovations 
influence GPN governance and thus the power relations within the tuna GPN. Through 
the sustainable seafood movement, we see that governance of GPNs is not just about 
economic issues but increasingly also about sustainability. With sustainability moving to 
the centre of the tuna GPN, it is likely that different power relations and dynamics will 
evolve through the different constellations of actors that produce innovations for 
sustainability. 
Through the cases in this thesis I will examine whether the sustainability innovations 
support the GPN literature’s understanding of power dynamics and the inherent inequality 
that characterises GPNs where resource bases are mostly in poor countries while many of 
the main players (or lead firms) have their roots in developed countries. Or, do 
governance innovations around sustainability produce different power configurations in 
the tuna GPN, empowering countries holding the rights to accessing tuna fisheries and 
other non-firm actors to play the key role in articulating sustainability?  
1.5 Research Objective  
This thesis will examine governance innovations to understand what groups of actors are 
producing innovative instruments for sustainability and how these actor-instrument 
constellations impact the dynamics of the tuna GPN. Hence, the central research question 
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is: How do different market- and state-led governance innovations advance the 
governance of sustainable tuna?  
To respond to this question, the research will investigate governance innovations for 
sustainability in tuna fisheries in the WCPO, targeting European and North American 
markets. More specifically, the thesis examines state-led governance innovations in the 
WCPO both through regional/sub-regional bodies and through the interaction between the 
EU and the Pacific Islands countries. And it examines market-led innovations through 
looking at the implementation of private standards for certifying tuna fisheries and the 
firm-NGO development and implementation of consumer-facing traceability systems 
(CFTS).  
In answering the primary research question, the thesis will be able to advance the GPN 
literature in three ways. First, it is empirically novel, providing the first in-depth analysis 
of GPN governance in the context of both seafood production more generally and 
specifically the tuna GPN. As tuna is a transboundary common pool resource, bounded by 
international jurisdiction, it faces different regulatory pressures compared to 
manufactured goods. This presents interesting governance challenges that have not been 
examined in the context of the GPN literature and requires analyses of the activities of 
firms but also of states parties. Additionally, the strength of the sustainable seafood 
movement requires full consideration of NGO and consumer activities as well. Therefore, 
this thesis examines the interactions between these different actors and their points of 
conflict and cooperation to understand their influence on governance innovations within 
the tuna GPN. Second, this is the first study of governance innovation for sustainability. 
Recent analyses of GPNs have started to look at innovating new technologies and 
products (e.g. Ernst 2002; Nathan and Sarkar 2013), but not at innovation in terms of 
sustainability governance strategies. Third, to provide in-depth understanding of different 
innovations, the GPN approach will be supplemented with literature on: regionalism, to 
understand the degree of multilateralism involved in Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPO) tuna governance; EU external regulation, to understand how the EU is seeking 
to influence regulatory practice in the WCPO; and informational governance, to 
understand the steering role that information might play in transforming processes of 
production and consumption practices across the tuna GPN.  
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1.6 Methodology  
1.6.1 Research Strategy and Design: Case Study Research 
To answer the core research question, the research employs a case study research 
strategy. Four case studies were chosen to explore innovative governance strategies for 
sustainability in tuna fisheries. Using case studies for research provides an opportunity to 
explore or describe a phenomenon in real-life context using a variety of data sources. 
Case study research allows a more balanced account of ‘real-life’ events and to explore 
issues from the perspective of multiple actors (Yin 1998; Baxter and Jack 2008).  
The cases in this thesis are examples of governance innovations. Multiple sources of 
evidence were used in each of the cases (triangulation) to ensure that the conclusions 
drawn were based on the explanation that is most in keeping with the facts as they stand 
(Yin 1981, 1998). An advantage of case study research is that as it requires close 
collaboration between the researcher and the participants, it enables participants to tell 
their stories and describe their views of reality allowing the researcher to better 
understand and interpret their actions (Baxter and Jack 2008). 
Case study research can take a single or multiple case study approach. This PhD takes a 
multiple case study approach to explain different aspects of governance innovations for 
sustainability of tuna fisheries. In themselves, these cases only offered a partial 
understanding of governance innovations. Therefore, each of the cases is used to build 
overall insight on how state- and market-led governance innovations function. The 
combination of these four case studies will be used answer the core research question of 
how different market- and state-led governance innovations advance the governance of 
sustainable tuna. This analysis examined the cases in the context of each of the 
dimensions of governance innovations and through that, the overarching picture of 
governance innovations at the GPN systems level.  
1.6.2 Case Study Selection 
Four case studies have been selected that together represent a spectrum of state-/market-
led governance innovations (Figure 1.7). In addition to this, cases were selected according 
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to the following criteria: accessibility of data and information; degree of governance 
innovation; diversity in terms of instruments; relevance for global production networks.  
The first case looks at state-led governance innovations in the WCPO. These innovations 
are arising through new configurations of multilateral governance within the region. 
Therefore, the first case study centres this multilateral governance, paying particular 
attention to the interactions between the different levels of regional and sub-regional 
multilateralism, through the WCPFC and the PNA respectively. In looking at this state-
led governance innovation, this case examines what instruments are emerging to provide 
the regulatory landscape of the tuna GPN. It also gives voice to the position of Pacific 
Island countries, thus addressing how governance innovations for sustainability shape the 
position of Pacific Island countries within the overall tuna GPN.  
In examining both the WCPFC and the PNA, the role that distant water fishing nations 
play in the region is crucial for shaping the governance landscape. One of the primary 
examples of this is the position of the EU in the WCPO region. The EU is a critical actor 
in tuna fisheries globally, as a producer, regulator and consumer. It plays an important 
role in GPN governance, as it will influence both the WCPO regulatory landscape and the 
activities of firm and non-firm actors wishing to engage with the EU market. Therefore, 
the second case looks at the implications that the implementation of the EU’s IUU fishing 
regulation has for the WCPO region. The case examines the extent to which the EU is 
using an innovative instrument that responds to a key sustainability issue to diffuse their 
regulatory footprint beyond Europe and in turn, whether Pacific island countries are 
responsive to this form of external regulation.  
Through using the first two cases to understand state-led governance in the WCPO 
region, the thesis then examines two more market-led sustainability strategies. Firstly, this 
comes through looking at the certification of the PNA skipjack FAD-free tuna fishery. 
Through this case study, we see the use of ecolabelling to respond to sustainability 
concerns around the use of FADs in purse seine skipjack fisheries. Beyond the 
instrument, this case provides an interesting example of the new constellations of actors 
that are engaging in tuna governance innovation. It is an example of a hybrid form of 
governance where the PNA, a state actor, is leading the application of a market strategy to 
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promote sustainability therefore, interacting in the tuna GPN as both a firm and non-firm 
actor. This case study therefore also contributes to understanding state-and market-led 
governance innovations. Additionally, the case provides the opportunity to engage with 
debates on sustainability instruments and the credibility and authority of ecolabelling and 
certification through looking at the interaction between ecolabels, the Earth Island 
Institute’s Dolphin Safe label and the MSC.  
The final case study explores the market’s response to traceability in the tuna GPN and 
the implementation of consumer-facing traceability systems (CFTS). In the context of 
tuna, this case examines the consumer-turn in traceability for responding to rising 
sustainability and legality concerns in tuna fisheries and growing NGO demands for 
information disclosure beyond food safety. The case investigates the various tuna CFTS 
that have been developed for consumers in Northern America and Europe, currently the 
primary markets for these types of systems. Through this research, we look explicitly at 
the interaction of firm and non-firm (NGO) actors to understand what has driven the 
development and implementation of these systems and the implications of this interaction 
on the role of NGOs in GPN governance. 
Reflecting on these four case studies in the context of the broader thesis, Figure 1.7 
illustrates where each of the cases falls on the spectrum of state-led and market-led 
governance.  
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Figure 1.7 Illustration of the thesis case studies on a state-led market-led spectrum 
 
1.6.3 Data Collection Methods  
Typically case study research uses a variety of data from different sources, such as 
documents, interviews and observations (Rowley 2002). In this thesis, the choice of semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, direct observation and analysis of 
documents was guided by research sub-questions generated for each of the cases. This 
occurred in combination with the accessibility of primary sources and the available 
resources.  
Semi-Structured Interviews 
In qualitative research, interviews are a key tool for collecting data. While providing a 
source of expertise, qualitative interviews also allow the interviewer to understand 
interviewees, or informants’ opinions, attitudes, interpretations of events, experiences, 
and feelings. Longhurst (2003: 103) describes that through these interviews, a “self-
conscious, orderly and partially structured interaction” is created. The flexibility of the 
interaction associated with semi-structured interviews provides opportunity for 
interviewees to ‘speak their minds’, and may in turn lead to shifts in focus that might not 
have been anticipated or facilitated in more structured settings. They are therefore a very 
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appropriate method for research seeking to gain in-depth insight into issues that are not 
necessarily widely documented or written about.  
In this research, topic lists were used to address issues to be covered in each interview. 
The topic lists contained general, broader questions and points to ensure overall 
consistency in the interview approach. They also contained some questions more tailored 
to the informant because each one has specific and often different positions and expertise 
I wanted to learn about. The length of the interview varied according to the topics being 
covered and the level of each of the respondents’ engagement. Normally however, they 
lasted for one to one-and-a-half hours. Mostly I recorded the interviews and produced a 
rough transcript of each interview after. In some instances, respondents asked to see these 
transcripts for verification.  
In total, 45 interviews were conducted, in 10 countries over four years (September 2009 - 
February 2014). The majority of informants have a direct relationship with the tuna 
production network, mainly either as representatives of different firms, as officials 
involved in regulation at the national, regional or international level, or as representatives 
of environmental NGOs and certification bodies. The global perspective of this thesis was 
feasible in part due to the interviews conducted. Through benefiting from being in the 
‘information age’, a number of interviews with people in the United States, Australia and 
remote Pacific Island countries were made possible through Skype. A full list of 
interviewees is provided at the end of the thesis (Appendix 1). Because of the relative 
interconnectedness of the tuna global production network, the identity of interviewees 
was kept anonymous. Therefore, the list of interviews have been given a code according 
to the sector within which they work (e.g. Industry, Government, NGO, Fisheries 
Specialist). Three of the interviews were conducted with more than one respondent at the 
same time. They have been categorised collectively however, because individuals were 
almost always were in agreement during the interview.  
Participant Observation 
Throughout the research, I participated in conferences and meetings relevant to the 
subject. For example the 2011 and 2013 European Tuna Conference, and the 2012 and 
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2013 Chatham House Forum on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing. At most of 
these meetings I attended as a regular participant, conducting observations as the 
meetings unfolded and using personal networks to gain more in-depth understanding of 
specific issues as they emerged. However, there were two exceptions to this. Firstly, I 
attended the FAO Committee of Fisheries, 2012, as a reporter. Secondly, I was invited to 
be a member of the Secretariat at the 9
th
 Regular Session of the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission. In this role, I helped the Chair of the Commission 
throughout the 5-day meeting. The WCPFC meeting provided a unique opportunity for 
insight into the Commission, with extended opportunity to observe the activities of the 
Secretariat, as well as the other meeting participants. This fieldwork was particularly 
relevant for the case study on regionalism in the WCPO but also provided a source of 
information and contacts for the study on the implementation of the EU’s IUU 
Regulation, as well as the study of EII and MSC certification of PNA skipjack tuna. I 
took notes during every meeting to provide as a record of both the formal processes and 
the interactions ‘back stage’ and ‘in the corridors’. 
Literature and Document Analysis 
I analysed documents (official governmental documents, NGO publications and white 
papers, newspaper articles) and interview transcripts throughout the research process. 
This was extremely important for corroborating and augmenting evidence from other 
sources (Yin 1998). The analysis reflected and interpreted the findings in relation to the 
research questions, reviews of literature and new insights gained by the data collection 
and analysis process. The analysis did not engage with qualitative content analysis. I did 
this to avoid “plucking chunks” of text out of the context within which they appeared. 
This has been a criticism of quantitative content analysis technique, as it can have a 
tendency to disrupt the narrative flow of what was discussed in interviews or produced in 
the documentation (Bryman 2012: 578). 
1.6.4 Research Validity 
I developed the case study strategy to ensure the quality of the case study research design, 
and ensure internal and external validity. Internal validity involves constructing a 
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plausible causal argument that is sufficient to defend the research conclusions. Therefore, 
the initial step in the research strategy was to construct a clear research framework that 
was both informed by the literature and allowed for comparison between the literature 
and patterns observed from the research. This is described as pattern matching (Yin 
2002). I used the data obtained through observation and literature to check informants’ 
narratives, so I could compare it with previous research. Conducting interviews with 
multiple stakeholders meant I could view the same process or event from different 
perspectives. The range of qualitative methodologies I used facilitated a deep 
understanding of the actors and processes in the networks I was studying and contributed 
to the validity of the study. To maximise both my understanding of the different cases and 
the internal validity of the research, I triangulated the data. Triangulation is a way of 
satisfying a fact in a case study that involved the use of multiple sources of evidence. As a 
method, it comes from the rationale that a robust fact may be considered to have been 
established if three (or more) different sources all coincide (Yin 1998). This was done 
through interpreting the findings of the different cases in the context of different 
theoretical lenses and bodies of literature (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010).  
Taking the interpretation of external validity to be the ability to ensure the theories 
derived from the research are generalisable and not only in the setting of this thesis (Ibid), 
I must recognise a limitation of this study. As the cases chosen for analysis are not the 
only examples of governance innovation in the tuna GPN, there is no certainty the 
conclusions of this thesis would also be valid if other case studies were included, research 
was conducted in other regions, or a different seafood GPN was examined. Nonetheless, 
some external validity can be achieved through the process of connecting the empirical 
observations to theory.  
When considering validity and analysing case study data, a final point of consideration is 
subjectivity and my interpretation of case study findings. As a researcher, my perspective 
is subjective, since I have a degree of pre-existing knowledge before engaging with 
interviewees or as a participant observer. This means that while participating in creating 
the research results, I must remain cognizant that my personal characteristics affect (and 
are affected by) the research. To minimise researcher bias that can arise because of this, I 
presented the preliminary research findings to scientific audiences (within the department 
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and externally at conferences and workshops) for peer debriefing and feedback. Also the 
peer review of respected academic journal of three of the four empirical chapters 
contributed to this. 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is presented in a publication-based format in which four empirical chapters are 
written as scientific articles, to be embedded in this introduction and a final chapter that 
synthesises the findings from the previous chapter to draw general conclusions. Hence, 
the thesis has six chapters. The topic and background of this thesis, as well as the 
objective, research question and methodology have been addressed in this introduction. 
The next chapter examines innovations in multilateral governance by looking at the 
interaction between regional and sub-regional governance platforms in the WCPO. 
Chapter 3 studies the external regulatory strategies of the EU by looking at the 
implementation and uptake of their IUU Regulation in the WCPO. Chapter 4 examines 
the interaction between the EII Dolphin Safe Certification and the MSC’s certification of 
the PNA skipjack fishery to understand how interactions among certification schemes 
impact the uptake of the two ecolabels operating in the same GPN. Chapter 5 analyses 
consumer-facing traceability systems in the tuna GPN to understand what their potential 
is for transforming the production practices of tuna firms in a manner that reflects 
commitments to responsible practice. The final chapter reflects on these case study 
chapters, draws conclusions related to each of the sub-questions and the core question of 
the thesis. It concludes by formulating policy recommendations around governance 
innovations for sustainability and recommendations for further research in this area.  
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 (Sub-)Regionalisation of Tuna Fisheries Governance: The Chapter 2.
Case of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean*  
2.1 Abstract 
Shifting political alliances and new environmental challenges are prompting debate over 
processes of sub-regionalisation and whether the interplay between multiple scales of 
governance leads to positive synergistic outcomes or negative institutional disruption. 
Regional management of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is an 
example where a web of treaties, conventions and institutional frameworks underlie 
international cooperation. Through examining the interplay between the regional Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and sub-regional Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (PNA), this paper explores the extent to which the PNA and WCPFC interact in 
the management of regional transboundary tuna fisheries. The results demonstrate that for 
contested marine resources such as fisheries, international sub-regions can go beyond 
functional units to also present wider opportunities to shift power relations in the favour of 
small island states. Additionally, the presence of sub-regional groups like the PNA has served 
to challenge the performance of the WCPFC, stimulating greater debate and progress within 
the regional body. The paper concludes that the combined work of the PNA and the WCPFC 
puts them ahead on many issues and may represent a testing ground for a functional 
multilateralism based on shared resources and utilising both regional and sub-regional 
governance platforms. 
2.2 Introduction 
The perceived crisis in the effectiveness of multilateral institutions has led to a new round of 
debate over the form and function of environmental international regimes, especially around 
complex environmental problems (Young 2011; Biermann, Abbott et al. 2012; Conca 2012). 
While some have gone so far as to suggest a complete disbandment of international regimes, 
others have focused on processes of sub-regionalisation in response to shifting political 
alliances, and new environmental challenges (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010; Balsiger and 
                                                 
*
 This chapter has been submitted to Maritime Studies as Miller, A.M.M., Bush, S.R., and Van Zwieten, P.A.M. 
(Sub-)regionalisation of tuna fisheries governance: the case of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
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VanDeveer 2012). Questions are being raised as to what the most appropriate region or ‘scale’ 
of governance is, defined not only by a functional spatial extent of a resource or an 
ecosystem, but also by the social relations which produce and reproduce cooperation and 
ultimately governance (Paasi 2004). The process of sub-regionalisation is demanding new 
questions of how multiple scales of governance interplay with each other leading to positive 
synergistic outcomes or negative institutional disruption (Young 2006; Oberthür and Stokke 
2011; Van Leeuwen and Kern 2013), which in turn determines the extent to which conformity 
or conflict of interests can be resolved and lead to governance innovation (Young 2006). 
Regional management of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is 
made up of a web of treaties, conventions and institutional frameworks that underlie regional 
cooperation (see Tsamenyi 1999; Tutangata and Power 2002; Wright, Stacey et al. 2006). The 
main regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) is the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), formed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, two treaty-defined sub-regional bodies that pre-date the 
WCPFC, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) and Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA), are also involved in tuna fisheries management (see Figure 2.1). However, 
unlike regional architectures in other environmental governance regimes, such as the climate 
governance regime (Biermann, Pattberg et al. 2009), these two sub-regional bodies supported 
the formation of the regional WCPFC. The complex set of governance and institutional 
arrangements that manage tuna fisheries in the WCPO have been referred to as some of the 
most sophisticated sets of cooperative tools in the world (Hanich, Teo et al. 2010), providing 
a variety of normative structures from which a range of international and domestic 
conservation and development policies emerge. 
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Figure 2.1 Institutional map of the regional and sub-regional governance regimes in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Adapted from Parris 2010) (Glossary: EEZ – exclusive 
economic zone; FFA: Pacific Islands Forum Fisheires Agency; MSG – Melanesian 
Spearhead Group; PNA – Parties to the Nauru Agreement; TVM – Te Vaka Moana; WCPF – 
West and Central Fisheries Commission) 
Despite being the youngest of the seven RFMOs, the WCPFC has been described, with 
various qualifications, as one of the most successful in terms of regulating oceanic tuna and 
billfish species (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010; Aranda, Murua et al. 2012). However, its 
critics maintain that many of the conservation and management measures (CMMs) the RFMO 
has generated are insufficient, and that the institutional practices of the WCPFC lack 
transparency (Parris 2010; Gilman and Kingma 2013). Amidst such debate over the 
effectiveness of the WCPFC, the PNA (made up of Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, 
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Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu), has 
received conspicuous support from academics and NGOs alike for their recent successes in 
agreeing on and implementing conservation and management measures (CMMs), new access 
arrangements around a vessel day scheme (VDS), and the successful Marine Stewardship 
Certification (MSC) certification of free-school purse seine skipjack tuna fishery in 2012. 
Some WCPFC members like the EU have criticised the PNA however, on the basis that the 
emergence of the PNA as a competing sub-regional fisheries management body is limiting 
wider regional coherence. 
Most analysis of governance strategies for tuna fisheries in the region have focused on the 
trade-offs and complementarities between multi-lateral cooperation vs. domestic strategies in 
terms of management and economic development (Parris and Grafton 2006; Barclay and 
Cartwright 2007; Parris 2010). Other questions have focused on models of Pacific regionalism 
that enable cooperation and capacity for effective engagement in the “global ocean 
community” (Tutangata and Power 2002: 883). Less attention has been given to a better 
understanding of the roles of the PNA and WCPFC, how they interact and what influence 
each has over the governance of tuna in the region. If the goal is to create management 
systems that are sensitive to the spatio-temporal complexity of fishery resources (Wilson 
2006), then can the interplay between regional and sub-regional management platforms lead 
to innovative management outcomes? What is the relationship between regional and sub-
regional bodies? Do sub-regional groupings like the PNA present a means of stimulating 
innovation and change towards greater effectiveness at the RFMO level, do they make them 
less effective, or is there a combination of both?  
We explore how the PNA, as a sub-regional body, has been able to be more experimental in 
developing tuna fisheries CMMs, how durable the outcomes of this experimentation are in 
terms of providing long-term change, and ultimately the extent to which the PNA and 
WCPFC interact in the management of regional transboundary tuna fisheries. The interplay 
between these different scales of environmental governance in the Western and Central 
Pacific tuna fisheries offers a relevant and timely lens to understanding how these two scales 
of governance interact and what influence they have over each other in terms of creating 
innovative and effective management outcomes. More specifically, we ask what implications 
35 
 
a shift toward sub-regional governance for decision-making power over management issues 
might hold for both governance bodies. 
The research is based on attendance at the 9
th
 WCPFC Meeting 2012 where one of the authors 
participated through volunteering with the Secretariat, a review of recent documentation used 
at the WCPFC and a series of key informant interviews with actors active in the WCPO tuna 
fisheries. The paper begins with an introduction of key questions asked around regional 
environmental governance. We then turn to a discussion of the emergence of (sub-)regional 
governance of fisheries and the relevance of spatial and functional fragmentation in the 
context of trans-boundary tuna fisheries before going into a detailed description of the multi-
level architecture of fisheries governance in the WCPO. Our analysis then focuses on the 
tensions that exist between the WCPFC and PNA in setting fishing reference points, 
administering CMMs and balancing the interests of their respective members. Finally, we 
return to the implications of sub-regionalism in the WCPO and what implication it holds for 
governance regimes such as RFMOs aimed at innovative governance for the long-term 
sustainability of trans-boundary and high seas tuna fisheries. 
2.3 Fisheries Regionalism 
2.3.1 Emergence in Fisheries Governance 
In resource governance terms, regionalisation is often referred to a politico-administrative 
process of establishing spatially defined scales of management that devolve decision-making 
and create more responsive and adaptive management decisions (Symes 2005; Balsiger and 
VanDeveer 2012). Although there is often an aspiration to base the scale of a region on the 
geography of a resource, they remain social constructs. The definition of a region can 
therefore either be associated with a moving ‘down and out’ through decentralisation of 
administrative functions and devolution of decision making as for instance in co-management 
arrangements. Or it can be associated with moving ‘up and in’ through centralisation and 
concentration to an aggregate scale as for instance the EU or an RFMO (Oberthür and Stokke 
2011). In contrast, regionalism refers specifically to a political motivation behind 
regionalisation and has long been associated with the creation of new political territories 
(Symes 2012). Examining fisheries regionalism therefore opens up questions about the 
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political and economic rationale for creating functional and geographic scales of management 
on the basis, for example, of resource use sustainability. In the case of fisheries, the strength 
of regionalisation and regionalism vary in how the geography of fishery resources and 
political scales are brought together. 
The realisation of regional cooperation over marine resources began with the lead up to the 
formulation and ratification of UNCLOS, under which ‘global’ trans-boundary fisheries, 
defined by their ecological extent spanning exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the high 
seas, were divided into functionally defined RFMOs (Valencia 1978; Morgan 1989). Since 
then functional approaches to marine regionalisation and governance have based themselves 
on a mix of treaty based agreements, such as the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the 
Palau Agreement in the Pacific (Tsamenyi 1999; Symes 2005), and alternative ecosystem-
based regional configurations, such as large marine ecosystems (LMEs). LMEs, for instance, 
are an attempt to combine geographical scales of the marine environment with functional 
administrative scales of management (Vallega 2001; Fanning, Mahon et al. 2007).  
The 2012 reforms to the EU-CFP raised a heated round of debate about the role of 
regionalisation within European seas. Paralleling discussions of multi-level governance, 
regionalisation in the EU is seen as a process of ‘moving down’, thereby enabling lower level 
authorities to take control of tailor-made management for particular spatial areas, and ‘moving 
out’, referring to the increased involvement of private actors in fisheries management 
(Raakjaer and Hegland 2012). The exact institutional design of regional fisheries management 
in the EU is still under debate, with proposals ranging from sub-EU RFMOs (as distinct from 
UNCLOS defined RFMOs) to nationalisation (Hegland, Ounanian et al. 2012). Ultimately 
this represents a wider double-movement; the creation of common pool management by 
centralising management at the EU level through the CFP and a political process that 
decentralises control to formal (geographical) and functional (administrative) sub-regions 
(Symes 2012). 
In the Western and Central Pacific, the potential for political sub-regionalisation has been 
proposed by Hanich et al. (2010). Under this model the administrative burden imposed on 
Pacific Island Countries by the various supra-national treaties, such as the PNA and WCPFC, 
would be mitigated through joint management by sub-regional groupings of three or four 
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Pacific Island countries. This is nowhere more relevant than in the WCPO where 40 
(WCPFC) member and non-member states make up a mix of states with sovereign interests 
over the resources in their EEZs and states with distant water licences to fish in these EEZs. 
There are also joint interests of all states over the four WCPO high sea pockets, international 
waters enclosed by EEZ’s (see Figure 2.2) (Tsamenyi 1999; Hanich 2009). These interactions 
have led to a complex multi-level interaction, with scientific input from the FFA and 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), of treaties and measures such as the Harmonised 
Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access for Foreign Fishing Vessels, the VDS, the FFA 
Vessel Monitoring Scheme and the Niue Treaty to manage trans-boundary stocks (see Hanich, 
Teo et al. 2010 for detail). Hanich and colleagues argue that a collective (sub-)regional 
strategy would require states to “pursue their own national interests within their vision of a 
collective strategy” under a sub-regional collective management authority (p. 89) that would 
act on behalf of sovereign states to administer licencing or access arrangements in their EEZs.  
These different models emphasise the importance being given to regionalisation and 
regionalism in marine environments, which, as noted by Symes (2005), is made all the more 
complex as the “shifting distribution of fish populations and the dynamic nature of 
ecosystems mean that natural boundaries are both permeable and unstable” (p. 87). And, he 
goes on to argue, “In a maritime context, therefore, regions are bound to be socially 
constructed rather than naturally occurring and their boundaries inevitably reflect a 
compromise between overlapping sets of distributions and ecosystems” (p. 87). This very 
contestation opens up questions on the performance and interplay between different regional 
scales of management. 
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Figure 2.2 WCPFC Area with EEZs. The areas numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the high seas 
pockets. Pockets 1 and 2 are closed to purse seine fishing from 2010 under the WCPFC. 
Pockets 1-4 are closed to all purse seine vessels licensed to fish in the EEZs of the PNA 
2.3.2 Evaluating Regionalisation 
The proposals of both the EU and the governing bodies in the WCPO provide a set of (explicit 
and implicit) normative goals for (sub-)regionalisation: subsidiarity provides more adaptive 
management; decentralisation and participation leads to more effective decisions and 
improved implementation can meet sustainability and development goals of nation states. But 
while (sub-)regionalisation has the potential to create geographically, ecologically and 
administratively effective platforms, there is nothing to say that smaller regional groupings 
would always facilitate improved control of fishery resources or create adequate incentives 
for meaningful cooperation that would lead to more sustainable outcomes. We have identified 
four interrelated factors that can be used to evaluate the specific outcomes of the process of 
(sub-)regionalisation and the interplay between regional levels: scale, the creation of 
39 
 
normative structures, conformity vs. divergence of interests, and incentives for cooperation 
(see Table 2.1). 
Scale refers broadly to the spatially and temporally bounded extents at which a natural or 
social phenomenon is observable (Cash and Moser 2000). In resource management terms it 
also refers to the spatial and temporal extent at which institutions are set and socially or 
politically organised (e.g. local, national, global) – as such they are social constructs open to 
politicisation (e.g. Meadowcroft 2002; Swyngedouw 2004). For example, it helps to identify 
ideological motivation for the definition of a ‘region’: a social and political construct created 
to include and exclude actors from a resource or decision making process through the 
mobilisation of biophysical, political-administrative, socio-economic, or cultural-symbolic 
dimensions (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010). Scale therefore presents an institutional design 
challenge – ensuring that management institutions and the organisations tasked with their 
oversight are set at levels that are concordant with the social, political and ecological extents 
they govern (Cash, Adger et al. 2006). Following Young (2006), one key strategy for ensuring 
concordance, especially when there are multiple scales or regions of governance, is 
institutional interplay, i.e. where governing functions are distributed among regimes located at 
higher and lower levels on the jurisdictional scale (see also Cash, Adger et al. 2006). This 
institutional interplay also covers the potential of upward or downward transfer of governing 
innovations between levels. 
Underscoring the creation of normative structures that govern control over trans-boundary 
fishery resources by states and fishers alike are tensions between resource access, sovereignty 
and economic development. Although functionally specific regional bodies may have a higher 
degree of legitimacy than non-specific bodies, participation and control remain centrally 
political issues – especially when dealing with perceptions of equity and justice (Lebel, 
Garden et al. 2005). The challenge for these regional bodies is therefore to maintain a degree 
of inclusiveness and cooperation while effectively reducing the complexity of addressing 
multiple interests.  
The complexity of regional-level governance requires a balance of multiple state and non-
state parties’ interests. In models of sub-regionalism that move down in scale and out to 
include a wider range of actors, subsidiarity and democratisation of decision-making are core 
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principles (Raakjaer and Hegland 2012). But in many other contexts sub(-national) regions 
may not be feasible or politically desirable, and increased participation may exacerbate 
existing (political) complexity in rule making and implementation. Instead, sub-regionalism 
may also involve a shift of power to a smaller group of actors that reduce participation of 
other parties in order to capture control over fishery resources. Returning to Young (2006), it 
is again the interplay between governing regions or levels that determines the extent to which 
the conformity or divergence in the interests of different actors can be resolved. 
Finally, the distribution of costs and benefits of conservation influence the degree of and 
incentives for cooperation within and between particular regions. The common assumption is 
that fisheries (sub-)regionalism is underscored by adequate incentives for cooperation. 
However, as Bailey et al. (2012) note, the theoretical evidence for cooperative governance 
arrangements of fisheries, including tuna fisheries, is in stark contrast to their successful 
implementation. The voluminous literature on cooperation around tuna fisheries in the WCPO 
focuses on how ‘resource rent rivalry’ has been driven by a combination of competition for 
access by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs), the dependency of many Pacific Island 
countries on tuna for national income, and aspirations for domestic social and economic 
development (Campbell 1989; Barclay and Cartwright 2007; Havice 2010; Parris 2010; 
Havice and Reed 2012; Gagern and van den Bergh In Press). Incentives for cooperation 
around tuna, like many other marine fishery regions around the world, are therefore 
underlined by the need for generating domestic wealth from shared resources – which under 
pressure from divisive treaties and aid relations represents an archetypal prisoner’s dilemma. 
The degree to which regional management bodies can establish (re)distribution mechanisms 
of this wealth, and the strength of these mechanisms in the face of strong external pressure 
provides an indicator for on-going cooperation. 
The balance between regional and sub-regional governance in WCPO tuna fisheries opens up 
a discussion on the architecture of effective arrangements through the interplay between these 
different scales of governance. The rest of the paper explores this interplay between the 
WCPFC and the PNA as two regional fisheries governance arrangements, their effectiveness 
in responding to complex fishing practices that operate at different ecological and political 
scales, and the potential of regionalism to act as a driver for innovation in regional and sub-
regional sustainable fisheries governance. 
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Table 2.1 Criteria for analysing (sub-)regionalisation in the WCPO 
Criteria Explanatory variables  
1. Scale  Ideological motivation for ‘region’ formation (regionalism) 
 Mobilisation of biophysical, political-administrative, socio-
economic, or cultural-symbolic dimensions to include/exclude 
actors 
 Upward or downward transfer of governing innovation between 
levels 
2. Creation of 
normative structures 
 Equity, justice, and (perceived) legitimacy 
 Creation of inclusive, cooperative arrangements that reduce 
complexity of multiple interests 
 Interplay of normative structures between jurisdictional levels 
3. Conformity vs. 
divergence of 
interests 
 Diversity of functional areas 
 Degree of institutional-ecological concordance 
 Power relations and discourse 
4. Distribution of costs 
and benefits of 
conservation 
 Incentives for cooperation 
 Degree of cooperation around conservation 
 Creation of mechanisms for (re)distribution of benefits 
2.4 Regionalism in the WCPO 
The WCPFC was established in 2004 after the Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the WCPO was ratified by 17 member 
states. The WCPFC is based on an international fisheries agreement that aims to foster the 
long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the WCPO. 
Reflecting the complexity of multi-lateral platforms, the Commission holds the potential to 
represent the interests of 65 states (as listed in Annex A of the Convention), but until now has 
been limited to 25 members, seven participating territories, five cooperating non-members 
and observers. In addition the WCPFC has three technical subsidiary bodies that meet 
annually, before the full session of the Commission: the Scientific Committee, the Technical 
and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee. Unlike all other oceans and tuna 
RFMOs that predominantly cover fisheries in the high seas, WCPFC covers both coastal 
states’ EEZs and the high seas. This places those states whose EEZs fall in the Convention 
area in a position of power regarding decision-making at the WCPFC but adds further to the 
complexity of this governing body. 
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Three sub-regional groups, that preceded and were responsible for creating the WCPFC, are 
the SPC, the FFA, and the PNA. All three bodies closely coordinate their activities through 
joint participation in regional meetings involving their members and more formal annual 
consultations between the Secretariats. While the SPC plays a more neutral role by providing 
independent scientific stock appraisal information and advice to SC members, the FFA and 
PNA are multi-lateral sub-regional governance bodies that over time have developed different 
levels of advisory and regulatory authority. 
The FFA was established in 1979 in response to changes resulting from the third Law of the 
Sea Conference (see Tsamenyi 1999). The main role of the FFA is as an advisory and support 
body to 17 Pacific Island countries – who are also members of the of the Forum Fisheries 
Committee (FFC) in the WCPFC – targeting sustainable management of fish stocks in their 
states’ EEZs while also maximizing their social and economic benefits. The FFA does not 
have any authority to enforce the decisions of its governing council: all member states 
maintain sovereign control over fisheries in their EEZs and archipelagic waters. Instead, the 
FFA provides support to Pacific Island countries by facilitating capacity building and regional 
cooperation through providing technical and policy advice to its members participating in 
international forums like the PNA and WCPFC (Langley, Wright et al. 2009). The PNA came 
into force in 1982 with the objective of member countries controlling the terms and conditions 
of allowing foreign fishing vessels in their EEZs (Nauru Agreement 1982). Their role 
strengthened in 1992 under the Palau agreement, which set arrangements for regular 
management meetings for tuna stocks and established the role and responsibilities of the PNA 
office. Since its establishment, the PNA has produced a series of measures that have 
reinforced their control over tuna fisheries throughout their EEZs. As summarised by Havice 
(2010), this was first seen in 1994 when the PNA countries reduced foreign purse seine 
licences by 10 per cent and reallocated them to domestic/locally based vessels. In 1995, they 
then developed the FSM (Federated States of Micronesia) Arrangement for Regional Fisheries 
Access, which gave vessels from PNA countries discounted fishing licences and reciprocal 
access to all PNA waters. After the WCPFC was established, the PNA has continued to create 
its own access arrangements and management systems. In 2010, PNA members signed the 
Koror declaration underlined by the PNA Implementation Arrangements, which confirmed 
support for a range of far reaching fisheries management measures. These were: the purse 
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seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), which allocates days to member countries who then 
distribute them to distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) based on their licencing agreements; 
high sea pocket closures as part of EEZ licensing arrangements (see Figure 2.2); 
establishment of Minimum Terms and Conditions for foreign vessels; seasonal closures of the 
use of fish aggregating devices (FAD) (Palau Arrangement 1992); catch retention measures; 
and a regional observer programme for purse seine vessels (Shanks 2010; Havice 2013). The 
PNA also created an independent secretariat to administer control over the Implementation 
Arrangements, most notably the purse seine VDS, and the MSC certification of the free-
school (non-FAD) skipjack tuna fishery that was obtained in 2011. This strengthening of the 
PNA’s regulatory capacity responded in part to the perceived increased power of the DWFNs 
under the WCPFC Convention. 
Until the formation of the WCPFC, the FFA was arguably the dominant sub-regional 
grouping in the WCPO. However, perceived issues of transparency among members 
regarding management strategies for fisheries in the high seas pockets (Figure 2.2) saw the 
PNA increase their independence from the FFA. According to one regional expert, it also 
meant that the PNA emerged in a stronger position to engender change than the FFA. While 
the FFA continues to provide a critical advisory role, focus has shifted to look at the 
relationship between the PNA and WCPFC or DWFNs. 
The PNA is therefore a functionally important sub-region in the WCPO, with a clear mandate 
for management aimed at both domestic economic development and at the sustainability of 
their tuna resources. However, demonstrating a case of upward transfer of governing 
innovations, the PNA is promoting the uptake of innovative management measures at the 
WCPFC level with the aim of increasing the functional scale of governance across all tuna in 
the Western and Central Pacific. Given the unique experience of RFMO formation in the 
WCPO, and the persistence of sub-regional groupings like the PNA, we now turn to a 
comparison of these two scales of governance, exploring the relative success each has had in 
tuna management and their influence on each other’s overall performance. 
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2.5 Comparison of WCPFC and PNA Performance 
The interaction of the WCPFC and the PNA on specific points of fisheries governance is 
illustrative of the tensions, both creative and constraining, between the two regional bodies. 
The following section examines three examples where they have influenced each other’s 
performance in terms of establishing reference points; designing and implementing CMMs 
and the distribution of the conservation burden; and defining spatial jurisdiction through 
changing access arrangements to high seas pockets. 
2.5.1 Reference Points: the Precautionary Approach 
In fisheries, taking a precautionary approach involves management policies and strategies that 
account for the inherent risks of overexploitation and uncertainties in the assessment of states 
and pressures. Guidance on the application of the precautionary management of highly 
migratory and straddling fish stocks was introduced in Annex II of the United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) in 1995. Fundamental to this approach is setting and employing 
two reference points for fisheries management: a limit reference point aimed at constraining 
catch within safe biological limits; and a target reference point aimed at meeting management 
objectives, such as desired biological, social, and economic outcomes.  
The WCPFC provides for the application of the precautionary approach. The Commission is 
currently developing reference points to inform the development of operational objectives and 
performance measures for longer-term management strategies. At the 9
th
 Regular Meeting of 
the WCPFC, members agreed upon limit reference points, according to recommendations 
from the SPC. Special mention was also given to the WCPFC prior to the meeting on their 
application of the precautionary approach in the WCPFC Performance Review, which stated 
“The Commission and Scientific Committee are to be commended on progress made in 
developing limit reference points, particularly for bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin” (WCPFC, 
2012: 157). The WCPFC is ahead of most other tuna RFMOs on this, the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) is the only other RFMO that makes explicit reference to 
the application of the precautionary approach and the use of reference points (de Bruyn, 
Murua et al. 2013). Therefore, compared to most other RFMOs the WCPFC is among the 
leaders in advancing the development of a formalised precautionary approach framework. 
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In spite of the WCPFC’s comparative progress, the PNA are also looking to take the lead 
toward setting both limit and target reference points, should the WCPFC fail to make progress 
with target reference points. The PNA’s concern about the WCPFC’s potential for 
implementing these reference points was highlighted during the MSC certification of the PNA 
free-school skipjack tuna fishery in 2011. One of the conditions of the certification pertained 
specifically to setting both limit and target reference points for skipjack stocks in PNA waters 
within five years of the certification. Initially, there was pressure from non-PNA actors 
engaged with the certification procedure for WCPFC to be responsible for setting these limits. 
However, one PNA official described how they fought this because, “if it became a 
Commission initiative and had to be decided under consensus, all it would take would be for 
one party to block it and we would lose the certification”. Instead, the PNA negotiated that 
either “PNA and/or WCPFC” could take the initiative on setting the reference points. The 
official argued that the PNA would go ahead with setting both reference points, while 
maintaining an option for deferring overall responsibility to the Commission, should they fail 
to reach an agreement.  
The position the PNA takes on this issue is telling for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides 
evidence of the difficulties they have faced in negotiating regional measures through the 
WCPFC, particularly in terms the conflicts that arise from consensus voting. Secondly, it 
demonstrates a degree of PNA dependency on the WCPFC, should they fail to agree among 
themselves on applying limits to their shared fishing resources. Finally, the condition for 
setting both target and limit reference points came from the MSC certification procedure and 
illustrates the extent to which external market-defined sustainability concepts can steer state-
based decision-making.  
2.5.2 Conservation Burden 
Under the WCPFC, the primary CMM concerning bigeye and yellowfin tuna was agreed on in 
2008 (CMM-2008-01). Broadly speaking, it covers purse seine effort limits both within the 
EEZs of coastal states and in high seas pockets, longline effort limits and seasonal FAD 
closures. However, under Article 30 of the Convention, it underlines “the need to ensure that 
such measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of 
conservation action onto developing States Parties, and territories and possessions” (WCPFC 
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2000: 19). This is reiterated in Paragraph 6 of the CMM where, “Unless otherwise stated, 
nothing in this measure shall prejudice the legitimate rights and obligations of those small 
island developing state members and participating territories in the Convention Area seeking 
to develop their own domestic fisheries” (WCPFC 2008: 3). These clauses attempt to 
accommodate what Hanich (2012) has labelled the ‘conservation burden’ associated with 
small island developing states’ implementation of CMMs.  
Acknowledging the different status of Pacific Island countries concerning the implementation 
of CMMs has been accomplished through the incorporation of a number of exemptions, 
including: 1) no limits on bigeye catch by domestic longline fleets; and 2) exclusion of 
archipelagic waters from CMMs (Parris 2010). These exemption clauses could be problematic 
from a sustainability perspective because they could mean a substantial portion of the tuna 
industry may remain unregulated under the WCPFC and therefore undermine the 
effectiveness of the CMMs. Thus far, the so-called ‘exemptions’-based management 
approach, has not led to measurable improvements in the fishery. In fact, the PNA rapidly 
increased their fishing mortality above their 2004 levels for the years 2005–2007 (Parris 
2010). Concern has specifically been raised around the access of foreign (Philippine) vessels 
to Papua New Guinea’s EEZ, as part of licence agreements that are aiming to develop 
processing capacity, and the poor regulation of domestic fishing activities within their 
archipelagic waters (Hamilton et al. 2012).  
In spite of indications that the PNA fails to act in a way consistent with the sustainable 
management of fish stocks when it comes to the implementation of WCPFC CMMs, outside 
the Commission it is providing a platform for developing and implementing innovative 
management measures for its purse seine fisheries. These include the purse seine VDS, 
seasonal FAD closures and high seas pocket closures. As evidence of PNA’s leadership in this 
regard, the Commission has since adopted both PNA closure measures.  
The result is a trade-off between Pacific Island countries calling for special consideration 
under Article 30, reflecting their conservation burden, while at the same time developing 
some of the most innovative CMMs some of which have been taken up by the WCPFC. At 
the 9
th
 Regular Meeting of the WCPFC 2012, continued reference was made to Article 30 
when negotiating the terms of new CMMs. An example of this was during discussions about 
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expanding the length of seasonal FAD closures for the purse seine fishery. There was firm 
resistance from some of the smallest Pacific Island countries on the basis that this 
discriminated against the purse seine fisheries, which provide their primary source of income. 
They argued that longer closures than those already in place would be economically 
devastating, owing to national dependence on revenue from the sale of purse seine vessel 
days. Citing Article 30 and the conservation burden, they explained the revenue lost from the 
800mt of tuna ‘saved’ through the closures by not being caught, meant they would need 
compensation for additional closures and/or evidence that longliners, that were not included in 
the CMM, were also having effort restrictions placed on them.  
The economic advantage the PNA states currently hold through revenue from the purse seine 
fishery operating in their EEZs provides an incentive to support measures that distribute much 
of the conservation burden onto longline fleets (Hanich 2012). As longline fleets fish 
primarily on the high seas, PNA states do not stand to benefit significantly from their 
activities and therefore, want emphasis to also be placed on managing their effort. This also 
encourages them to oppose conservation measures that do not distinguish between high seas 
and EEZs, or apply new measures over their EEZs. Therefore, on the one hand, the PNA is 
‘feeding’ measures they have developed up to the commission level but on the other hand, 
under Article 30 there is also the option to retain control over the implementation of these 
measures to ensure the conservation burden is not transferred back to them. This reinforces 
the strong negotiating position of the PNA.  
However, there has also been resistance among some WCPFC members over the PNA’s role 
as leader in the sustainable exploitation of its tuna stocks within the WCPFC. This is most 
evident when looking at the VDS. Some DWFNs like the EU have been reticent to fully 
endorse the scheme, on the basis that the PNA is insufficiently transparent about how they are 
allocating vessel days and of evidence that PNA members were overspending their allocation 
of days (Havice 2013). In spite of this, the WCPFC Science Committee has indicated that the 
VDS has had positive impacts on data quality by improving log-sheet data and requiring 100 
per cent observer coverage that has enabled the Committee to improve on its stock 
assessments. This indicates that sub-regional management measures can have indirect benefits 
to regional-level governance.  
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2.5.3 Contested Spatial Jurisdictions   
To date, the legal role of WCPFC is undefined given it has “no legal authority to allocate 
rights to fish in any manner that undermines the sovereign rights or sovereignty of coastal 
states” (WCPFC 2012a: 82). This has created a major tension in connection with wider issues 
of allocation of tuna between Pacific Island countries wishing to develop their domestic 
fishing capacity within their EEZs and the WCPFC, which is also responsible for 
management of fish stocks in the high seas (Langley, Wright et al. 2009). DWFNs want the 
measures agreed to and set out by the WCPFC to apply equally across both the high seas and 
EEZs. They also want to see effort reduction measures in place that would counter any 
expansion of domestic fleets. The PNA have indicated they are amenable to these reductions 
but, as one official stated, “on our terms”. 
Tensions between the PNA and the WCPFC over control of the high seas areas are illustrative 
of an underlying conflict between de facto and de jure definitions of spatial jurisdiction. The 
Convention provides the WCPFC with the remit to manage transboundary stocks across their 
full extent, including both high seas and EEZs in the convention area. In their 2012 CMM for 
bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack tuna, the WCPFC made it clear that “This Measure applies to 
all areas of high seas and EEZs in the Convention Area except where otherwise stated in the 
Measure” (WCPFC 2012b: 5). The PNA maintains ownership over the resources in their 
EEZs, but not in the high seas. However, the PNA is extending control over the practices of 
distant water fleets, from states that are members of the WCPFC, in two distinct ways. Firstly, 
they control these fleets by setting the adherence to CMMs for fishing in their EEZs. 
Secondly, the PNA countries have closed high seas fishing to DWFN vessels that have 
licences to fish in their EEZs, representing a de facto extension of their control beyond their 
spatial jurisdiction. This represents a spatio-legal challenge by the PNA to the de jure control 
exercised by the WCPFC under UNCLOS. 
Under the 3rd Implementing Arrangement of the Nauru Agreement, the PNA agreed to close 
two high seas pockets to purse seining. The WCPFC subsequently adopted the closures 
through the CMM 2008-01, coming into force from January 1, 2010. Explaining “the serious 
impact on the bigeye stock from fishing by distant water longliners and purse seiners in the 
high seas and that the high seas continues to provide a safe haven for IUU fishing” (PNA 
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2010: 2), PNA leaders agreed to the closure of two additional high seas pockets to all purse 
seine vessels licensed to fish in the EEZs of the PNA in 2011 (Figure 2.2). Any licence 
granted to a DWFN to fish in the EEZs of a PNA member means the vessel cannot fish in 
these high seas pockets. On the basis that high seas pocket closures have shown no 
demonstrable decrease in fishing effort, and that in fact effort has been transferred to other 
areas (SPC-OFP 2012), Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia and the EU have opposed this 
conservation and management measure. Thus, when at the 7
th
 Regular Session of the WCPFC 
in 2010, the PNA sought support from WCPFC to mandate the additional closures, it was 
rejected (Ride 2010). 
Further, in the 8
th
 regular session of the WCPFC in March 2012, the Philippines negotiated 
access for 36 boats to Pocket 1 (see Figure 2.2). The position of the Philippines has been that 
the closures have put undue stress on their domestic fisheries and that the decision has led to 
increased fishing effort in its national waters, which is believed to be a spawning ground for 
various tuna species. In exchange, for the Philippine fishing access, the Philippine 
government are supposed to report its domestic and international tuna catch. Filipino vessels 
must also apply for international fishing permits before entering High Seas Pocket 1 and must 
allow 100 per cent regional observer coverage on board their vessels. Although there are 
indications from a Greenpeace patrol that not all Philippine vessels are complying with this 
(Greenpeace 2013a).  
As the body responsible for introducing the closures, the PNA vehemently opposed this re-
opening, insisting that the high seas pockets should remain closed permanently or at least until 
the Commission decides otherwise. However, the permission granted to the Filipino vessels 
still remains largely under the control of the PNA who have affirmed they will only licence 
distant water fishing nation vessels to fish in PNA waters if they voluntarily forego fishing on 
the high seas. Therefore, fishing will only take place by Filipino vessels and maybe a few 
other vessels that do not need access to PNA waters. This means, in spite of the WCPFC 
ruling, fishing access remains primarily under the control of the PNA countries. This 
illustrates the contrast between PNA and WCPFC levels of decision-making and demonstrates 
the resilience of measures implemented and controlled at the sub-regional (PNA) level, 
especially when leverage over fishing access is involved. 
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2.6 Emerging Regionalism in the WCPO 
Whether and how innovation is occurring in the WCPO needs to be understood in the context 
of the on-going interaction between the WCPFC with the PNA and, although not our 
particular focus, the FFA. The WCPFC is different to other RFMOs because of the existence 
of these sub-regional groups, which provide an additional, meso-level of governance. We now 
turn to a discussion of the main factors that are affecting the emergence of (sub-)regional 
fisheries management in the WCPO and the effect emerging regionalism has on the 
innovation of conservation and management measures over trans-boundary fishery resources.  
2.6.1 Not by Scale Alone 
The powerful position the PNA has secured has meant that, unlike many global governance 
regimes, sub-regionalisation enables a process of feeding tested policy strategies upwards for 
regional implementation. The uptake of PNA policies at the WCPFC level indicates that, 
instead of representing a crisis point for multilateralism (Conca 2012), strong sub-regional 
governance has acted in part as a catalyst for regional policy convergence. It also appears to 
demonstrate a degree of scalar concordance; indicating that decisions over management 
measures are being distributed over levels most effective at dealing with the diverse interests 
of the actors involved (Cash, Adger et al. 2006). Additionally, through this convergence, the 
perceived legitimacy of PNA policies is further scrutinised by the wider global community 
associated with the WCPFC. The interplay between the PNA and WCPFC has therefore led to 
positive creative tension, as well as a greater degree of transparency and openness than would 
otherwise have been the case had governance remained at the more exclusive sub-regional 
PNA level.  
The results also indicate that the PNA’s high degree of functional control over the fishery has 
been translated into a political process of fishery regionalisation. Reflecting findings in other 
resource sectors (e.g. Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010), regionalisation has enabled the PNA to 
exclude some groups from decision making over resource access by mobilising biophysical, 
socio-economic and cultural symbolic dimensions of sustainable Pacific Island tuna fisheries. 
This is evident by their success in reinforcing the functional extent of the fishery with a 
perceived pro-active concern in the purse seine fishery (Hanich 2012), strategically using the 
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institutional backing of the WCPFC Article 30, and reinforcing their legitimacy through the 
MSC certification of the PNA free-school skipjack fishery. The result has been the 
convergence of both normative and functional leverage (Symes 2012) of the PNA as a 
negotiating body within the WCPFC. However, it also raises questions about whether these 
arrangements are replicable at similar sub-regional scales within the WCPO and in other 
RFMOs, or if they are specific to the context of the PNA.  
Indeed, the power of cooperation through the PNA’s current position to act as a coherent and 
notably powerful unit when interacting regionally through the WCPFC has not been lost on 
other Pacific Island countries. Two additional sub-regional groupings in the Pacific, the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group Fisheries Technical Advisory Group and the Te Vaka Moana 
arrangement between certain Polynesian states, and a group of countries in Indian Ocean have 
shown interest in replicating the PNA model. The emergence of these new groupings points to 
the value that can be gained from fishery sub-regionalisation, bringing together a single 
functional area and natural phenomena (Symes 2012). However, such groups within the 
WCPO are unlikely to achieve the same kind of leverage with the WCPFC because of the 
smaller proportion of fish under their control and in the Indian Ocean due to the more open 
geography of their EEZs. As we now go on to argue, creating concordance between 
functional, jurisdictional and natural scales can facilitate a process of sub-regionalisation but 
will not automatically lead to successful political and functional integration into larger 
multilateral institutions. 
2.6.2 Mutually Reinforcing Normative Structures 
Although fundamentally different in aim and legal set-up, the normative structures of the 
WCPFC and the PNA have produced a creative interplay for tuna management. The RFMO 
structure is legislated through UNCLOS, which mandates the inclusion of DWFNs. The 
explicit governance objective at this level is therefore not about furthering the interests of 
member states but fulfilling the broader conservation and resource management requirements. 
The RFMO system is therefore designed to create an up and out ‘double movement’ which 
manages the interests of historical fishing rights of port and flag states, rather than a down and 
out movement designed to stimulate functional subsidiarity (cf. Hegland, Ounanian et al. 
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2012). At this level, no project exists to decentralise formal and functional control to sub-
regions because there is no political will of the member countries at the WCPFC level. 
In contrast the PNA has created an opposite ‘double movement’ akin to that seen in the last 
round of the EU CFP reforms (Raakjaer and Hegland 2012); a reduction in the number of 
states involved in the decision making and the promotion of conservation and management 
measures up to the WCPFC. As such, the PNA is structured as an exclusive bottom up 
coalition excluding external actors from governance decisions. Again reflecting a process of 
sub-regionalisation, and in contrast to the WCPFC, the PNA is explicitly working to further 
the interests of its members in the face of pressure of DWFNs seeking access to their 
historically gained rights to tuna resources; and through that capture development benefits, 
equity and justice for members by promoting sustainable tuna fishing. This is illustrated by 
the exclusion of Filipino vessels to the high seas pockets now controlled by the PNA, despite 
the Philippines being a WCPFC member with mandated access. Moreover, allowing countries 
to pursue their own national interests within their vision of a collective strategy of market-
driven sustainability through the MSC certification, provides further evidence of the PNA 
fostering a process of fishery regionalism (cf. Hanich, Teo et al. 2010).  
This strategy of the PNA to have their free school skipjack fishery certified therefore plays an 
important role in supporting its internal normative structures. While the recognition of the 
PNA’s capacity for producing innovative conservation and management strategies can be 
evidenced by the uptake of these measures at the WCPFC level, gaining MSC certification 
also adds further recognition to the powerful position PNA holds globally and increases the 
legitimacy of its governance (See for example Gulbrandsen 2013). Strategically, the 
certification also adds market value to the PNA skipjack tuna, connecting the PNA to 
powerful external markets like the EU and the US, further ensuring member countries’ 
economic stronghold over this part of the tuna resource. This illustrates that as both a market 
actor and sub-regional governance body, the PNA now plays a strong functional role in the 
WCPO governance architecture. 
In spite of the different structures and objectives, both governance bodies focus on 
multilateral engagement to produce cooperative arrangements that reduce the complexity of 
negotiations over and between multiple interests in tuna fisheries. The interplay of these 
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normative structures between levels greatly influences both the (sub-)regionalisation of 
fisheries management and the political regionalism of the PNA and WCPFC. On the one 
hand, the PNA are feeding innovative management measures from the bottom up, where 
shared socioeconomic interests allow the body to ‘speak in one voice’. On the other hand, 
scrutiny of these measures within the WCPFC provides top down oversight and legitimacy. 
Therefore, while these bodies are fulfilling different roles one could not replace the other. 
They reinforce a creative tension through their interplay that would not be possible should 
only one level exist and are as such mutually dependent on each other for management 
innovation.  
2.6.3 Balancing Diversity of Interests and the Conservation Burden 
As a region characterised by small island developing states, the process of sub-regionalisation 
allows for collective authority and strategic capacity to be generated among countries whose 
individual capacity in strategic analysis and strategy development is otherwise limited both 
nationally and when negotiating under a wider regional regime (Hanich 2010). This strategic 
capacity, representing a form of fisheries regionalism, serves to strengthen their position in 
negotiating a more equitable distribution of the conservation burden in international fora like 
the WPCFC. 
In spite of playing an instrumental role in the creation of the WCPFC, its presence as the 
highest governing body within the region has seen the Pacific Island countries consolidate 
their position as a sub-regional group, which is less open to outside, country by country, 
negotiation over access. As opposed to the partnership-oriented approach intended by RFMO 
level governance, the PNA have placed more of a focus on internally controlled 
implementation, treating DWFNs increasingly as licensees. The proactive role of the PNA in 
searching for innovative ways to control the WCPO tuna fishery also provides an indication 
of underlying regional political tensions. As outlined by Aqorau (2009), the PNA’s response 
is a direct challenge to DWFNs that are seen as “intent on vitiating the gains the PNA have 
made through the VDS” (Aqorau 2009: 599). This, in combination with the PNA’s move 
away from the FFA can be seen as an on-going exercise in capturing control over tuna 
fisheries that was lost in previous attempts to reduce licence numbers under the Palau 
agreement and increased power of the DWFNs under the WCPFC Convention. This is 
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illustrated by the PNA’s shift from imposing a cap on vessel numbers to fishing days just after 
the WCPFC emerged, thereby strengthening their management and control over access 
agreements (Havice 2010). Although criticised for its lack of transparency in allocating vessel 
days, and for consistently exceeding the number of days apportioned, the control the PNA 
nations exercise over fishing effort within limits consistent with resource sustainability both 
put in place a stronger identity of the PNA as a management region, while also putting the 
associated countries in a powerful position to secure control over DWFNs represented at the 
WCPFC. 
The PNA’s success in shaping these broader governance processes is still, however, a 
relatively new aspect of the overall WCPO governance architecture. While the PNA itself has 
been around for a long time, it has only really presented a demonstrable challenge to the status 
quo of regional-level governance since 2008. Therefore, the longevity of this kind of 
governance interplay is unknown. While strategic interactions between the different levels 
illustrate the value of sub-regionalisation in the WCPO tuna fisheries governance, it is 
dependent on the PNA retaining their position as a unified group or face fragmentation. For 
instance, this is being challenged by Kiribati’s negotiations with the EU over their fisheries 
partnership agreement. In these negotiations, the EU has insisted that the three year protocol 
granting access to 10 EU fishing vessels (four purse seiners and six longliners), does not 
incorporate the VDS (EU Committee on Fisheries 2013). This agreement would see Kiribati 
essentially defecting from the conditions set out by the VDS. Additionally, by insisting on 
remaining outside the VDS, the EU is maintaining a relatively low access fee that distorts the 
regional market for access to the tuna fishery. This case demonstrates both the strength and 
weakness of fishery regionalism in the PNA, as well as the change in strategy required by 
DWFN members of the WCPFC that have been marginalised through the PNA management 
measures. 
Lessons learned from the reported rift between the PNA and the FFA shows that sub-
regionalism only works when there is cooperation and transparency amongst members.  
Therefore, given the additional importance of DWFNs’ fishing interests, the WCPFC provides 
a critical venue for enforced cooperation amongst its member. This makes governance at the 
regional level far from redundant. The complex mosaic of jurisdictions in the region means 
that the challenges that the FFA, PNA and the WCPFC have faced so far will be compounded 
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over the coming years as they come under increasing pressure to respond to over-fishing and 
over-capacity concerns (Hanich 2010) as well as the rise of other emerging regional groupings 
staking their own claims. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The performance of tuna fisheries governance in the WCPO is increasingly determined by the 
interplay between regional and sub-regional bodies responsible for designing and 
implementing conservation and management measures. Sub-regionalisation appears to be a 
means for overcoming the limitations of large international environmental regimes. However, 
distributing management functions over geographical scales is only likely to be effective if 
there is a mix of political will and multilateralism that can create cooperation for sustainable 
management and reduce competition. In the case of the WCPO, the sub-regional PNA 
supported higher levels of governance through the creation of the WCPFC, but have since 
started to reassert themselves and their governance capacity. The case illustrates that for 
contested marine resources such as fisheries, international sub-regions can go beyond 
functional units to also present wider opportunities to shift power relations in the favour of 
small island states. 
The PNA has emerged in a strong position to innovate management measures that would not 
otherwise be possible at the more inclusive WCPFC level. This strength has led some to 
describe the PNA as a “tuna cartel” with the WCPO becoming the “Saudi Arabia of Tuna” 
(Brian Jeffries quoted in Aqorau 2009: 581). The skipjack fishery most clearly demonstrates 
this ‘cartel’: it illustrates how functional regionalisation can lead to a wider regionalism of 
fisheries management, which in turn can lead to positive interplay between levels of 
governance. MSC certification of the PNA free school tuna fishery provides an added layer of 
legitimacy to the PNA management measures and indirectly the PNA as a fishery region. 
Additionally, the case shows that the functional scale at which the PNA operates, representing 
in its combined EEZ 70 per cent of the tuna stock (PNA 2014), also made MSC certification 
possible. 
Far from complicating the process of governance and decision-making, the presence of sub-
regional groups like the PNA have served to challenge the performance of the WCPFC, 
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stimulating greater debate and progress within the regional body. Few countries and even 
fewer regions have managed to implement successful management measures that can take 
into account the complex interactions of multiple species, gears, boat classes and stakeholders 
to promote sustainable fisheries. The combined work of the PNA and the WCPFC therefore 
puts them ahead on many issues and may represent a testing ground for a functional 
multilateralism based on shared resources and utilising both regional and sub-regional 
governance platforms. 
  
  
 Power Europe: EU and the Illegal, Unreported and Chapter 3.
Unregulated Tuna Fisheries Regulation in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean* 
3.1 Abstract 
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities are widely considered a main 
cause of unsustainable fisheries across the globe. The EU has taken a leading role in the fight 
against IUU fishing, using both its market and normative power to advance its EU IUU 
Regulation (No. 1005/2008) and wider fisheries sustainability agenda outside its territory. 
This paper examines how successful the EU has been in using its market and normative power 
to influence regulatory strategies and frameworks governing tuna fisheries in the Pacific 
Islands region of the Western Pacific Ocean. The results indicate that while the market power 
of the EU remains an influential factor, the diminishing normative power of the EU in WCPO 
is weakening any attempts to implement its IUU fishing regulation and Pacific Island nations 
have promoted their own regulatory agenda. We conclude that the changing asymmetries 
between market and normative power has led to a differentiated geography of regulatory 
uptake, and while market power will remain a dominant strategy for the EU, normative 
power, when exercised should focus on cooperation rather than ‘teaching’ the benefits of an 
EU regulatory approach. 
3.2 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest and most lucrative market for fish (Asche 
and Smith 2010). Whilst domestic fish stocks are in a poor state, with 88 per cent currently 
being overfished (European Commission 2009a), fish consumption throughout Europe 
remains high. The EU has been able to maintain and even expand its levels of consumption by 
sourcing and importing fish from other regions around the globe (NEF 2011). The sheer size 
of the EU market and its history of negotiating international trade agreements has made it one 
                                                 
*
 This chapter has been published as: Miller, A.M.M., Bush, S.R. and Mol, A.P.J. (2013) Power Europe: EU and 
the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Tuna Fisheries Regulation in the West and Central Pacific Ocean. 
Marine Policy Vol. 45, pp. 138-145 
NB Following publication the authors were contacted by a regional expert informing of minor factual 
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of the most powerful seafood trading blocs in the world. The implication of this strong trading 
position is that market access acts as a powerful incentive in affecting so called ‘third country’ 
production and trade policies (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006). With the EU now being a net 
importer of seafood, it is imperative in the interests of EU food security that it maintains 
global market presence.  
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is home to the largest and most valuable 
tuna fishery in the world, making it strategically important to the EU. Building on wider 
concerns over the state of global fish stocks (Pauly, Watson et al. 2005; FAO 2010), the 
sustainability of tuna stocks in the WCPO has come under increased scrutiny by governments 
and civil society groups alike (Langley, Wright et al. 2009; Thüllen, Tolvanen et al. 2009). 
The impact of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing on the sustainability of tuna 
and other species (Schmidt 2004; Metuzals, Baird et al. 2010) has been taken up by the EU as 
a key issue in both domestic and external fisheries governance. IUU fishing also represents an 
economic imperative for the EU with losses estimated to be between US$10-23.5 billion 
globally each year (Agnew, Pearce et al. 2009). In the WCPO, the loss from IUU fishing has 
been estimated to be in the vicinity of 21-46 per cent of reported catch and is valued at 
US$0.8-1.7 billion (Agnew, Pearce et al. 2008). As 57 per cent of the total WCPO catch is 
from the exclusive economic zones of Pacific Island countries (Hanich, Parris et al. 2010), the 
value of IUU fish from these countries is between US$300-700 million, representing a 
considerable loss of foreign earnings (Havice and Campling 2010). IUU fishing has clear 
environmental and economic ramifications and is therefore illustrative of the nexus between 
trade and sustainability interests. 
Despite considerable critique over its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Bretherton and Vogler 
2008; Khalilian, Froese et al. 2010), the EU has also sought to address global threats to 
sustainable fisheries beyond their waters. As part of their commitment to sustainable fisheries 
beyond Europe, the EU ratified its IUU Regulation in 2010 through the Directorate General of 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE, EC Reg No. 1005/2008), with the intention of 
preventing and deterring the import of IUU fish into the European market, and to eliminate 
IUU fishing activities by EU operators and third countries. The global consensus around the 
need to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing could lead to the assumption that uptake of 
the EU’s regulation, the world’s first official regulation designed specifically to deal with 
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IUU fishing, would be ubiquitous. However, to date, that appears not to be the case. Instead, 
IUU fishing regulation is being implemented on a country-by-country basis.  
This paper investigates how successful the EU has been in promoting its IUU regulatory 
agenda to influence regulatory strategies and frameworks in the Pacific Islands region of the 
WCPO. This is done by addressing: 1) how the EU employs its IUU Regulation in the Pacific 
Islands region; 2) what variation is observed in EU influence over the regulatory strategies of 
Pacific Island countries; and 3) whether (and how) power relations between the EU and 
Pacific Island countries might explain differentiation in uptake of the EU’s IUU Regulation.  
The research follows a case study approach to gain an in depth understanding of a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real life context (Yin 2009). The implementation and 
uptake of the EU’s IUU Regulation in the Pacific Islands region functions as a case study for 
the wider phenomenon of EU external regulation. Fieldwork consisted of: document analysis; 
literature review; 12 key informant interviews with EU officials from DG MARE, DG Trade, 
European Parliament and European Council, regional experts, European industry 
representatives and NGOs. Additionally, observations of negotiations and political debate 
were made during the 9th Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
Meeting in December 2012, the Chatham House IUU Fishing Forums in 2012 and 2013, and 
the 2011 and 2013 European Tuna Conference, where many themes related to the EU’s IUU 
Regulation were discussed. 
The following section formulates the research framework adopted, introducing the idea of 
European external regulation and the EU as a market and/or normative power. The extent to 
which the EU IUU Regulation and its implementation in the Pacific Islands region has led to 
regulatory and institutional changes in the region (as a whole and in its constituent countries) 
is then examined. The paper concludes with an analysis of what the case of the EU’s IUU 
Regulation teaches us about the EU’s regulatory influence and power beyond Europe.  
3.3 Power asymmetries in European external regulation 
To understand European external regulation, or the power of the EU to influence domestic 
policies and institutions in third countries beyond the EU borders, two main schools can be 
distinguished, shortly summarised as ‘Market Power’ Europe (Damro 2012) and ‘Normative 
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Power’ Europe (Manners 2002). The analytical framework is built on these two sources of 
executing EU power on domestic regulatory developments in third countries. 
The power of the EU’s market, or Market Power Europe as aptly referred to by Damro 
(2012), means that external actors interested in participating in the European market need to 
follow EU rules to remain active and competitive, or risk facing the (opportunity) costs 
associated with ignoring or violating these market conditions (Bauer, Knill et al. 2007). 
Although a recent term, Market Power Europe builds directly on a broader body of literature 
that stresses the EU’s strategy of governing through its market. 
With increasing integration of global markets, the international mobility of resources, and the 
major significance of the European market for third country exporters, there is pressure on 
external countries to re-design domestic (market) regulations to avoid regulatory burdens as 
put forth by the EU (Knill and Tosun 2009). As argued by Lavenex (2011), in market related 
policies such as competition and environmental or industrial product standards, the EU can 
capitalise on its market power. By providing positive and negative incentives associated with 
sanctions and rewards, the EU aims to manipulate the economic utility of trade by third 
parties, thereby inducing them to adopt their policies, institutions and ideas. This works on the 
basis that if the cost-benefit balance falls in favour of continued interaction with the EU, the 
EU regulations will be upheld and influence domestic practices and institutions in third 
parties. Therefore, external actors relying on EU markets to obtain rewards and avoid 
sanctions, such as the suspension or termination of formal agreements and market access, are 
‘forced’ to apply the EU’s own systems and rules of governance (Schimmelfennig 2012a).  
Damro’s Market Power Europe is a response and counter-argument to a growing body of 
literature on ‘Normative Power Europe’; used to communicate how the EU shapes the world 
order through its ideas and values (Manners 2002). Authors writing on this mode of influence 
argue that power is constructed on a normative basis, which in turn predisposes the EU to 
base its engagement in world politics on the transfer of norms and values (Manners 2002). 
Indeed, the strong presence of the EU in multilateral fora and the leadership role they have 
assumed on global environmental matters appears to support the argument that global 
interests and universal values are at the heart of European foreign policy (Falkner 2007). The 
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notion of the EU as a normative power has informed research on the EU’s role in international 
environmental politics but is yet to be discussed in the context of fisheries governance.  
With respect to IUU fishing, the EU uses its extensive global political networks to actively 
promote rules, norms and practices in line with its IUU Regulation outside its territory. In 
exerting normative power, the EU employs the mechanism of socialisation to ‘teach’ third 
countries the ideas and norms behind the EU’s regulatory strategies and thus persuade them to 
internalise these norms in the belief that they are valid and legitimate (Jetschke and Murray 
2012). Socialisation is one of the key mechanisms through which EU principles are promoted 
externally and thus normative power established (Manners 2011). Whereas strategies based 
on Europe as market power focus on producing defined (economic) incentives and market 
sanctions, normative power Europe works through political/policy networks. The EU engages 
in these networks with political dialogue and co-decision making practices. EU ‘socialisation 
influence’ comes through creating joint or similar regulatory structures with external parties 
(Lavenex 2008); largely through the EU’s presence and role as a key negotiator in global and 
regional multilateral fora, giving the EU voice in external regulatory processes.  
Although Damro (2012: 697) argues that the EU’s identity is “not a particular set of collective 
norms but rather a comparatively large regulated market with institutional features and 
interest group contestation”, he acknowledges that Europe’s external power is not derived 
solely from its market but also through political/normative interaction. Hence, in the empirical 
context of the EU’s IUU Regulation, it could be expected that both market power and 
normative power at work in third countries.  
When analysing market and normative power there is a danger of over-emphasising the role 
of the EU as the main power broker and sole agent of (institutional) change outside its 
territory. But power is always relational and never uni-directional; the external power of the 
EU therefore depends also on third parties. Although it is acknowledged that the geography of 
European external regulatory influence is highly variable with respect to regions, countries, 
organisations, and policies, much research to date is based on the assumption that the 
influence of the EU gradually diminishes with distance from Europe. As summarised by 
Börzel and Risse (2012: 8), the argument is that “the further we move away from Europe, the 
fewer incentives the EU has to offer to promote its policies and institutions and the more it 
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has to rely on mechanisms of persuasion and of communication to make its case”. However, 
this assigns a passive role to third countries and does not sufficiently take into account the 
diversity of power asymmetries the EU faces in different parts of the world, nor the global 
nature of trade. Countries at the receiving end of EU regulations and institutions are not 
simply passive recipients of EU policies, norms and power. They actively influence the 
uptake of EU regulations and engaged in “processes of interpretation [and] incorporation of 
new norms and rules into existing institutions, [as well as] resistance to particular rules and 
regulations” (Börzel and Risse 2012: 8). 
It therefore follows that different power asymmetries between the EU and third countries may 
exist that outweigh assumptions of distance alone. These asymmetries with the EU might be 
larger or smaller depending on whether they are regions or countries, what resources they 
have and their competitive advantage relative to Europe. The degree of asymmetry influences 
how new norms and rules are interpreted and incorporated into existing institutions, as well as 
the level of resistance against particular rules and regulations. Exploring the ensuing 
geographies of which third countries and regions take up and resist EU power and influence, 
by who and with what effect, provides insights about the changing role of EU normative 
and/or market power beyond Europe (on IUU fishing in our case; see Figure 3.1).  
The rest of the paper analyses these changing power asymmetries using the case of EU IUU 
Regulation in the WCPO; a region that covers approximately 30,569,000km² and accounts for 
56 per cent of world tuna catches (WCPFC 2012c). Approximately 57 per cent of these 
WCPO catches are taken from the Pacific Island countries’ exclusive economic zones, the 
remainder from high seas and other coastal states (Hanich, Parris et al. 2010). The region 
holds great economic importance to Europe and the EU has made its presence felt as a market 
and port state, a flag state and a member of the regional fisheries management organisation 
(RFMO), the WCPFC. Through these multiple roles, the EU has been able to diffuse its IUU 
Regulation, making use of its market and normative powers.  
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Figure 3.1 EU external regulatory influence through market and normative power: EU IUU 
and the Pacific Islands region 
3.4 EU IUU Regulation 
The 2010 IUU Regulation (EC Regulation No. 1005/2008) expanded the regulatory capacity 
of the EU, and DG MARE in particular, over fisheries well beyond their own waters. In 
recognition of the global nature of IUU fishing the Regulation is in place to prevent the 
continued import of IUU fish into the EU market, and eliminate IUU fishing activities by EU 
operators and third countries. Under this Regulation, IUU fish are classified as all fishery 
products caught by IUU fishing vessels operating within the jurisdiction of EU Member 
States, in addition to activities carried out by vessels on the high seas or in the waters under 
the jurisdiction of a third (non-EU) countries (European Commission 2009b).  
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The IUU Regulation states that coastal, flag, and port states are expected to satisfy three main 
requirements. First, the EU has introduced a catch certification scheme for ensuring that all 
flag states can certify compliance with coastal state conservation and management measures. 
Under it, flag states must certify that its vessel’s catch is legitimate, and if fish is landed, 
transshipped or processed onshore, then coastal states from which the fish originates will also 
be involved. This is particularly pertinent to the canned tuna industry, where the majority of 
fish is landed for processing outside the EU. A fundamental part of complying with this 
element of the IUU Regulation is that third countries need to assign and notify a domestic 
competent authority, empowered to attest to the veracity of the information contained in catch 
certificates to DG MARE of the European Commission. To receive verification, competent 
authorities have to demonstrate they can manage the registration of vessels under their flag; 
deliver, suspend or withdraw fishing licenses; verify compliance by their vessels with 
conservation and management rules; and validate and verify catch certificates (European 
Commission 2009b). Second, the EU has its own list for vessels that are known to have 
engaged in IUU fishing activities. Finally, the EU has an additional list for non-cooperating 
third countries, under which the IUU Regulation prohibits the importation into the EU of fish 
caught by vessels flying their flag and will also not accept catch certificates that accompany 
these fish (European Commission 2009b; Tsamenyi, Palma et al. 2009). 
The EU sees itself as frontrunner in global IUU regulation and has described its Regulation to 
be a “ground-breaking instrument” (Lövin 2009). However, evidence from Sierra Leone and 
Turkey shows that the EU IUU Regulation contains some serious weaknesses. Most notably, 
despite assurances that an electronic system would be in place in 2008, and further reiterated 
at the 2012 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, dummy catch 
certificates remain in global trade because EU member states do not issue originals to third 
country factories and instead rely on a decentralised system of photocopies (Hosch 2012). 
Public assertions that the IUU Regulation “has offered us the tool to follow the traceability of 
fish products” (Mitolidis 2013) also appear problematic, with one fisheries expert stating that 
the (lack of) traceability is one of the major flaws in the system (Pers. Comm., February, 
2013). Additionally, requirements for third countries to establish competent authorities leave 
the standards for fishery control completely up to the flag state, meaning there are no 
universal (EU) standards to audit country compliance against.  
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Fisheries Commissioner Maria Damanaki stated at the Chatham House meeting on IUU 
fishing in 2013 that the EU did not realise the difficulties it would face in implementing this 
piece of Regulation and observers should not consider the EU as the sole international actor in 
fighting IUU fishing. Nevertheless, the EU has established itself as a global frontrunner in 
regulating IUU fishing and the IUU Regulation remains one of the most influential pieces of 
European policy on the governance of global fisheries, also in third countries and regions.  
3.5 Market power 
From a trade perspective, the EU is able to use its power as a market state to make the 
requirements of its IUU Regulation a pre-condition for any trade agreements. This is of great 
importance in the Pacific Islands region, as European countries the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, France and the Netherlands are the key markets for canned 
tuna, consuming over 40,000mt of tuna; some or all of which comes from the WCPO (Hanich 
2011). There are three main categories of trade agreements in place in the WCPO: the 
economic partnership agreement (EPA), which has been signed on an interim basis by Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) and Fiji (an interim EPA, iEPA); the Generalised System of Preference 
(GSP) with non-least developed countries (non-LDCs) (Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Nauru, Niue, Palau, Marshall Islands and Tonga); and the GSP Everything 
but Arms (GSP-EBA) regulation with the LDCs (Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu 
and Vanuatu, and Timor-Leste) (Campling, Havice et al. 2007; Tindall 2010, Hoebink 2011).  
In order for products to qualify for duty free access associated with the GSP and GSP-EBA 
agreements, however, they must meet Rules of Origin requirements. Tuna must be caught 
within the exporting country’s territorial seas (12 mile zone), or by a fishing vessel owned by 
the exporting country or the EU fleet (Campling, Havice et al. 2007; Tindall 2010). Notably, 
PNG and Fiji were able to seek exemptions from the stringent Rules of Origin requirements 
through their negotiations on the iEPA.  
The addition of compliance with the IUU Regulation to these trade agreements does not 
directly curtail access to the EU market. It does, however, provide the EU with control over 
who is able to trade on their market. This is particularly the case with EU verification of a 
third country’s competent authority, without which access to the EU market is denied. In the 
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Pacific Islands region only PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands have had their competent 
authorities verified. Several of the others (e.g. FSM, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands) have 
presented the Commission’s DG MARE with the necessary documentation, but are apparently 
experiencing difficulties meeting the necessary requirements, in particular their responsibility 
as flag states (Hamilton et al., 2011). For a summary of what agreements the EU have in place 
in the Pacific Islands region, see Table 3.1 and where they are located geographically, see 
Figure 3.2. 
Table 3.1 EU Trade and access agreements with Pacific Island countries 
* Companies who have also got a verified Competent Authority for implementing the EU 
IUU Regulation 
 
 
EU Agreement Terms of agreement Pacific island countries  
Interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
(Trade) 
 Duty free access for 
canned tuna 
 Derogation to the rules of 
origin 
 Compliance with IUU 
Regulation 
PNG* 
Fiji* 
Globalised system of 
preference (Trade) 
 Duty free access for 
canned tuna 
 Compliance with Rules 
of Origin for all fish 
 Compliance with IUU 
Regulation 
Cook Islands 
Nauru 
Niue 
Palau 
Marshall Islands 
Globalised system of 
preference – Everything but 
arms (Trade) 
 Duty free access for 
canned tuna 
 Compliance with Rules 
of Origin for all fish 
 Compliance with IUU 
Regulation 
Kiribati 
Samoa 
Solomon Islands* 
Tuvalu  
Vanuatu 
Timor-Leste 
Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement (Access) 
 Compliance with IUU 
Regulation 
Kiribati 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of trade and access agreements in place in the Pacific Islands region 
Applying market-based mechanisms is one of the EU’s strongest strategies for regulating 
practices in third countries because the benefits of compliance with EU regulations largely 
outweigh the cost of exclusion from the market. The duty free access to the EU market, which 
is offered in the trade agreements between the EU and Pacific Island countries within the 
region (albeit conditional on meeting Rules of Origin requirements in the case of the GSP and 
GSP-EBA arrangements), provides the EU with the leverage needed for using incentive based 
regulation. The EU IUU Regulation establishes a system of conditional access, using potential 
sanctions attached to their trade agreements as an incentive to ensure that states with vested 
interests in trading their tuna on the EU market are compliant. Those states that have signed 
trade agreements with the EU must comply with the Regulation. 
In the case of the iEPA, Fiji provides an example of how applying market conditions through 
their trade agreements can alter domestic policy making. In November 2012, Fiji was one of 
eight countries notified by the EU as being a possible ‘non-compliant third country’ 
(European Commission 2012). The threat of this listing and the access sanctions that are 
implied catalysed the Fijian Attorney General to authorise a new National Plan of Action that 
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they had been working on. One aim of this National Plan of Action was fulfilling EU 
requirements that came out during missions to Fiji. Therefore it is an example of the direct, 
domestic impact the EU IUU Regulation has had on a country tied to the terms of an EU trade 
agreement. Using conditionality through their trade agreements ensures access to the market 
can be controlled before any tuna has even been caught.  
Another market-based mechanism associated with the EU IUU Regulation is the requirement 
of catch certificates. This requirement is for all countries seeking to import to Europe, not 
only for those engaged in beneficial trade agreements. Since the Regulation came into force, 
Commissioner Damanaki reported that 90 of the EU’s trading partners have implemented the 
catch certification scheme (Damanaki 2011). However, only three of these were Pacific Island 
countries – Fiji, Solomon Islands and PNG (those with competent authorities). While the 
Regulation is a voluntary agreement and only countries wishing to trade on the EU market 
need compliance, the EU is using the power of its market to exercise ultimate oversight and 
control over the activities of third countries. This was emphasised by a statement made by the 
Commission, stating that their IUU Regulation is about “making them [third countries] 
understand” that abiding by EU regulatory measures is in their own interest (Mitolidis 2012). 
This threat of exclusion shows how tightly connected the external IUU Regulation is to its 
market. 
However, in spite of criticism being levelled from the region at the EU that catch certification 
presents a huge administrative burden (Damanaki 2013) – something that has been 
acknowledged by the Commission – it is not an unwelcome regulatory device in the region. 
Instead, meeting the EU’s demands for a competent authority is proving more difficult, with 
only three countries having succeeded thus far. This is in spite of the fact that the 
requirements competent authorities need to fulfil – such as vessel registration and licensing, 
compliance with conservation and management rules and validating/verifying catch 
certificates – are things that a number of unverified Pacific Island countries are already doing. 
Yet, the EU is still able to condition that third country authorities meet EU-defined standards 
should they wish to benefit from market access. And the importance of market access for 
Pacific Island countries disciplines them to strive for EU verification of their competent 
authorities. 
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3.6 Normative power 
In addition to using trade agreements to introduce IUU regulation, the EU has further 
advanced their regulatory role through membership of the WCPFC. Their membership came 
about as a result of their participation in the series of Multilateral High Level Conferences, 
convened to draft the Convention. In the WCPFC, the EU is one of the distant water fishing 
nations (others include USA, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, EU). However, while the EU distant 
water tuna fleet has a strong global presence, access to tuna in the exclusive economic zone of 
Pacific Islands countries, granted under Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) has been 
limited. Over time, the EU has had agreements with Solomon Islands, FSM and Kiribati. 
Currently though, they only have an agreement with Kiribati and are in the processes of 
negotiating one with the Cook Islands (See Figure 3.2). In spite of this limited fishing 
capacity in the Pacific Islands region, fisheries officials in DG MARE have described RFMO 
membership as being “politically very important” because they offer a primary way for the 
EU to engage in the implementation of conservation and management measures within the 
region. 
The EU has been described as an “active and regular participant in the work of the [WCPF] 
Commission” (Hamilton, Lewis et al. 2011: 93). While the WCPFC is not the venue for the 
EU to push for implementation of their own IUU Regulation, it does provide an arena in 
which the prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU can be emphasised normatively. 
This has been the case in the implementation of port state measures in particular. Pacific 
Island countries have responded during WCPFC meetings that capacity and resource 
constraints negatively impact the effective implementation of port state measures. The EU’s 
reaction to this was to recommend at the WCPFC meeting in 2010 that the WCPFC use their 
existing funds, bilateral programs and co-operation of developed members and cooperating 
non-members to “assist SIDS [small island developing states] in meeting the requirements of 
port state measures, including in terms of technology for electronic-based data collection and 
reporting” (WCPFC 2010a). As one regional expert explained, while Pacific Island countries 
welcome moves for electronic data collection (Pers. Comm., February, 2013), the EU 
proposal was contingent on allowing inspections of both unlicensed and a proportion of 
licensed foreign fishing vessels in ports. This ran counter to the expressed wishes of the 
region’s Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) that “any port state measure adopted by the 
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Commission should not apply to foreign fishing vessels that are already licensed by the 
relevant port state” (WCPFC 2010b) and thus formed the grounds to reject the EU proposal 
(WCPFC 2011). In spite of the rejection of this proposal, the EU continues to stress the 
importance of port state measures, openly lamenting during the 9
th
 WCPFC meeting, the lack 
of progress that has been made on it thus far under the WCPFC.  
Membership to the WCPFC therefore enables the EU to promote its own regulatory agenda 
and to influence decisions on conservation and management strategies in the region that 
impact both EU’s own fleets and those fleets wishing to export to the EU. However, one 
regional expert expressed concern that the EU’s dominance and ‘obstruction to progress’ 
observed in other RFMOs, is now being used as a strategy in the WCPFC. The EU has also 
been criticised for using the WCPFC as a venue to serve its own interests above all else.  
The normative power of the EU is also questioned on three other levels. Firstly, through the 
EU’s refusal to recognise the management measure of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) – a sub-regional grouping of eight Pacific Island countries – like their high seas pocket 
closures and the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) (for more information see Hanich, Parris et al. 
2010). There are signs that the position of the EU towards the VDS is shifting, as was 
evidenced in the European Parliament’s “Comprehensive European Fisheries Strategy In the 
Pacific Region”, which cited that fisheries access “should be based on the VDS as an 
alternative to the current system [of limiting vessel numbers with an indicative reference 
tonnage].” However, the Parliament’s Strategy paper pointed out that presently the VDS 
“suffers from a lack of transparency and poor results in terms of meeting objectives, with 
reductions always being significantly overshot” (European Parliament Fisheries Committee 
2013: 14). From this, they added the caveat that accepting the use of the VDS was on the 
proviso that “measures are adopted to ensure the transparency of the VDS, improve its 
effectiveness, its implementation by all relevant parties and its compliance with the best 
available scientific advice” (European Parliament Fisheries Committee 2013: 7). The Pacific 
Island countries responded to this by criticising that the Parliament’s Strategy had been 
developed without consultation with any of the Pacific Island countries and their critique of 
the VDS system was “based on inaccurate data” (Atuna 2013a).  
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The second basis for questioning the normative power of the EU comes from the fact that 
regulations are already in place in the WCPO for preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU 
fishing. For example, the FFA has a long established monitoring, control and surveillance 
framework. This includes Port State measures implemented through the FFA ‘Harmonised 
Minimum Terms and Conditions’ and therefore casts doubts over the EU’s insistence to 
implement their own Port State Measures through the WCPFC, where they have a regulatory 
voice. Additional to the FFA’s work within the region, the WCPFC and the PNA have well 
defined monitoring, control and surveillance programmes, which include requirements for full 
observer coverage on all purse seine vessels and for all vessels to be equipped with vessel 
monitoring systems. The WCPFC also already has a register of vessels presumed to have 
conducted IUU fishing activities. With systems already in place for regulating against IUU 
fishing, complying with the EU IUU Regulation is therefore not about adopting EU regulatory 
philosophy, but doing what needs to be done to continue trading on the EU market.  
Finally, the EU’s ability to take a normative stance within the region is met with resistance 
owing to the poor reputation of the EU fishing fleet. This was exemplified when the EU’s 
own IUU fishing activities within the region were brought to light. In October, 2013, the 
Nauru District Court fined a European Union fishing vessel – the Spanish flagged Albacora 
Uno – US$1 million for illegally fishing in Nauru waters (Atuna 2013b). This fine directly 
undermines the normative influence of the EU in regard to IUU fishing measures. Indeed, 
there is open animosity and resistance to the EU at the regional and sub-regional meetings 
when EU delegates promote a normative agenda in the face of a perceived hypocrisy 
stemming from such events. The outcome is a weakening of the capacity for EU regional 
cooperation strategies.  
In spite of these criticisms and concerns, the WCPFC is a key venue for the EU to forge 
alliances with other members of the Commission, especially other distant water fishing 
nations like the USA and Japan. In a region with strong domestic governance structures, these 
alliances are politically important for the EU to consolidate their regulatory presence. They 
also serve the broader ambitions of the EU for its Regulation to be replicated globally. In 
2012 the EU signed agreements with Japan and the USA for coordinated action against IUU 
fishing. This could be indicative of the EU’s regulatory leadership as well as its socialising 
role at the WCPFC. As a senior official in DG MARE argued on two separate occasions, the 
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intention of the EU is “making everyone in the world aware of preventing IUU” (Mitolidis 
2012) and the EU perceives itself as the global authority on IUU regulation: “the EU is more 
advanced than RFMOs, we want to be more advanced than RFMOs, because we want to drive 
the agenda quite frankly” (Mitolidis 2013). Hence, within international fisheries governance 
regimes, the EU encourages third countries to either follow EU regulations or produce their 
own regulation that replicate the EU model.  
The EU is actively positioning itself in an external regulatory leadership role on IUU fishing. 
However, the degree to which this leadership has been welcomed and accepted is mixed, 
weakening the EU’s capacity for socialisation in the Pacific Islands region through 
intergovernmental networks on an issue like IUU fishing. To date, the EU has not 
successfully persuaded all Pacific Island countries to make the EU IUU Regulation the basis 
of the regional IUU fishing regulatory agenda. Instead uptake has been partial and spatially 
dispersed.  
3.7 Geography of EU Influence 
What does the EU promotion of its IUU Regulation, using its market and normative power, 
teach us about EU’s regulatory influence beyond Europe? Overall, what we observe is the 
emergence of a complex geography of influence and resistance emerging from the power 
asymmetries between the EU and Pacific Island countries. It is a reasonable observation that 
with increased distance from Europe, especially when moving from candidate and 
neighbourhood to third countries, the power of the EU to directly transpose its policies 
diminishes (Börzel and Risse 2012; Schimmelfennig 2012b). However, our analysis 
demonstrates that even in one of the most distant regions from the EU, the WCPO, there is 
selective and unequal uptake of EU policy, reflecting a mosaic rather than ubiquitous exercise 
of European power. 
The external regulatory strength of the EU is mostly clearly demonstrated by its market 
power. The EU has been able to exploit its position as the largest tuna market in the world, 
creating power asymmetries in their favour and thus pressuring compliance from market 
dependent suppliers. Faced with exclusion from EU markets, there has been acceptance of the 
catch certification scheme in the WCPO, as demonstrated by those Pacific Island countries 
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seeking (and in some instances gaining) verification of domestic competent authority. But this 
is not a static condition. First, while Europe is the most important tuna market by volume in 
the world at present, it is considered to be a mature market with a stabilising per capita 
consumption of canned tuna (Hamilton, Lewis et al. 2011). Should the EU lose its market 
dominance, its market leverage to directly influence fisheries regulation in the region will 
greatly diminish.  
Secondly, while the EU remains one of the most important markets for WCPO tuna, the 
influence of exclusionary power is not ubiquitous. The complex web of trade flows 
throughout the region appears to offer alternative markets for tuna and therefore undermines 
the EU’s power to operationalise market exclusion. This raises questions about the future of 
the European IUU fishing regulatory influence through market power in the region. But from 
the perspective of Pacific nations this does not necessarily reduce external dominance: 
strategic partnerships between the EU and USA or Japan to combat IUU fishing regulation are 
starting to emerge, and may have greater combined influence over Pacific Island fisheries, 
resulting in a more global and thus influential approach to regulating IUU fishing. 
Thirdly, EU influence through its market power does not work out equally among all Pacific 
Island countries, as becomes clear when analysing (the effect of) trade agreements. Trade 
agreements allow Pacific Island countries to benefit from duty free EU market access for 
certain tuna products, but also enable the EU to enforce conditionality (including on IUU 
fishing) in their trade. However, because the current Rules of Origin requirements only 
benefit countries with processing capacity, and not those wishing to export fresh and frozen 
tuna, an intra-regional divide has emerged. Only PNG and Fiji, as signatories of the iEPA 
under which the derogation to the Rules of Origin is offered, have the requisite incentive to 
comply with EU IUU Regulation. Market power through conditionality in trade agreements is 
therefore a strong mechanism for exerting European regulatory influence over third countries, 
but the ‘reach’ of such a strategy varies from island state to island state.  
The EU’s ability to promote IUU fishing regulation on a more normative basis through the 
WCPFC and at the sub-regional PNA level also shapes the intra-regional geography of EU 
influence. The EU’s active membership of the WCPFC is an opportunity to extend its 
regulatory reach at the regional level and thereby encourage domestic uptake by Pacific 
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Islands countries. However, in practice this form of socialisation has been undermined by 
EU’s poor reputation in the region as a result of: evidence of IUU fishing by the EU (Spanish) 
fleet; the insistence on interfering with fisheries management measures like the VDS; and the 
lack of recognition given to existing regional IUU fishing regulatory platforms. Regional 
negotiations have therefore not led Pacific Island countries to fully endorse EU defined 
regulatory strategies within their waters. The efforts of the EU have been further undermined 
by the strength of sub-regional governance bodies in the region, most notably the PNA. 
Unlike the WCPFC, the PNA has excluded formal policy participation of distant water fishing 
nations like the EU and has proved more effective in establishing management agreements 
than the WCPFC (Hanich, Parris et al. 2010; Havice 2010). Evidence shows that these 
negotiation fora are not simply a conduit for EU normative power, as both the WCPFC and 
PNA have generally proved to be resistant to EU influence. Other distant water fishing 
nations have similar experiences; the USA has faced significant resistance from PNA 
countries during the renegotiation of their Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries in 2013. 
The result of this differentiated influence of Europe through their market and normative 
power has contributed to partial and geographically uneven uptake of the EU IUU Regulation. 
This in turn builds on a basic understanding that EU influence diminishes with distance from 
Europe, by emphasising how differing power asymmetries between the EU and third countries 
shape the impact of EU policy. Take up or resistance of European influence therefore lies as 
much with external (Pacific island) nations and the intra-regional WCPO dynamics, as it does 
with the EU. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, this is particularly relevant in understanding the 
impact of EU IUU Regulation because the global nature of fish markets and trade means that 
influence is more dependent on market access and dependency than it is on distance alone. 
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Figure 3.3 Partial and geographically uneven uptake of EU IUU Regulation through market 
and normative power. Market power influences uptake of EU IUU regulation on a country-
by-country basis. Normative power meets resistance (push-back) from Pacific Island 
countries through interaction with regional governance bodies like WCPFC and PNA. 
It is also important to realise that the EU is not operating alone in addressing the challenges of 
IUU fishing. While the EU was the first to formalise a regulation for the prevention, 
deterrence and elimination of IUU fishing, it is now one among a multitude of bodies, 
generating a global regulatory effort. IUU fishing is now covered under inter alia the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, within the FAO, and in RFMOs. In addition, regional and 
domestic regulation against IUU fishing is present in the Pacific, like the FFA monitoring, 
control and surveillance strategy, the WCPFC vessel register and the requirements for 
observer coverage and VMS on all purse seine vessels fishing in the region. This highlights 
that the EU is competing with other global and national actors to be seen as regulatory 
leaders.  
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The competing regulatory frames both from within the region and from other external actors 
could further shift power in favour of Pacific Island countries and change the ‘mode’ of EU 
influence. For instance, the emergence of the PNA as leaders in conservation and 
management means that the EU’s normative socialisation power may have to rely more on 
‘horizontal’ cooperation than on ‘hierarchical’ teaching and leadership. Such developments 
may not be immediately welcomed by the EU, but over the long term promoting IUU 
regulation might be more successful through cooperative regional partnerships and 
agreements with other distant water fishing nations like Japan and the USA, than by solitary 
EU leadership.  
3.8 Conclusion 
Like any other world power the EU is aiming to extend its regulatory reach beyond its 
territory. Utilising its position as the world’s largest tuna market the EU has been able to exert 
regulatory authority by attaching compliance with their IUU Regulation to their trade 
agreements and conditions of market access. ‘Market Power Europe’ is the main basis for the 
power asymmetry between the EU and Pacific Island countries in EU IUU Regulation uptake. 
The result has been that where market access has been crucial for these external countries, 
they have sought to comply with the EU’s rules, albeit with varying degrees of success.  
In addition to market power the EU has also diffused the implementation of their IUU 
Regulation through normative power, for instance through interactions in the WCPFC. 
Exerting normative power to promote their external regulatory agenda has been less 
successful for the EU and met with considerable, but differentiated, resistance by Pacific 
Island countries. The negative perception of the EU’s sustainable fisheries track record in the 
region and their self-interest based socialisation strategies has weakened the EU’s capacity to 
take a normative stance over sovereign resources of third countries. The EU’s external 
regulatory strategy for fisheries has therefore ‘muddied the waters’ because the EU’s 
perceived behaviour undermines moral superiority it claims over the countries targeted by 
their IUU Regulation. In addition, in a region with strong sub-regional governance structures 
like the PNA, Pacific Island countries have been able to exploit their position in the WCPFC 
as a collective of resource owners, to openly criticise the EU’s normative stance and to ‘push 
back’ against EU demands. This has altered the power asymmetry in their favour. Pacific 
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Island countries, which lack ‘traditional’ market power, have been able to promote their own 
regulatory agenda against traditionally more powerful bodies like the EU.  
These dynamic and differentiated power asymmetries generate in turn a differentiated 
geography of regulatory uptake. The power of the EU lies in its position as a market actor; 
one faced with minimal resistance in pushing its regulatory agenda. With a near global 
consensus on strong IUU fishing regulation, it appears any added value for the EU in 
investing in their normative power over the already resistant sovereign owners of fishery 
resources, is diminishing. While the strategic importance of interacting in multilateral fora 
such as the WCPFC will continue to remain important for the EU, exercising normative 
power on IUU regulation appears better reserved for an increasingly sparse group of countries 
and regions not dependent on the EU export market; and when exercised, should focus on 
cooperation rather than ‘teaching’. 
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 Authority without credibility? Competition and conflict Chapter 4.
between ecolabels in tuna fisheries* 
4.1 Abstract 
Certification is widely seen as an innovative strategy for dealing with environmental problems 
in supply chains. As the number of labels available in the fisheries sector has increased, each 
with its own framing of sustainability, questions are being asked about their credibility. In tuna 
fisheries, contrasting approaches have led to conflict over, among other things, the credibility 
of competing labels. This paper investigates one such conflict between the Dolphin Safe and 
the Marine Stewardship Council certification schemes in the Western and Central Pacific. It 
looks at how key practices like scientific rigour, inclusiveness, transparency/openness, 
impartiality/independence and impact contribute to label credibility and explains the 
importance of authority in understanding how certification schemes maintain influence within 
global production networks. The results demonstrate that despite substantially different levels 
of credibility within these networks, the application of an environmental standard is more 
connected to the authority of the standard setter than the credibility of the label. The paper 
concludes that understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and without 
credibility, offers new insights into the wider dynamics that shape environmental regulation in 
global production networks. 
4.2 Introduction 
Certification is widely seen as an innovative strategy for dealing with sustainability issues in 
supply chains by setting and regulating standards for ecological and social interactions in the 
production process (Mutersbaugh and Klooster 2005; Bratt, Hallstedt et al. 2011). The final 
certificate and/or ecolabel is symbolic of the credibility of the standards they represent, the 
organisation of how these standards (and claims) are defined, codified and verified, and 
ultimately their environmental and social impact (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004; Hatanaka, Bain et 
al. 2005). However, different certification systems make different claims about sustainability, 
depending on their interpretation of sustainable practices. Once in the market, it is assumed 
                                                 
*
 This chapter has been accepted and is in press as: A.M.M. Miller, Bush, S.R. (in press) Authority without 
Credibility? Competition and Conflict Between Ecolabels In Tuna Fisheries. Journal of Cleaner Production. 
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that the credibility of certification systems, and the claims they make, grant them the requisite 
level of authority to govern those involved in the process of production and trade. But what 
happens when the perceived credibility of the labels differ? And what happens if the authority 
granted to a certification system is uncoupled from its credibility?  
In this paper we focus on this relationship between credibility and authority of certification 
systems. Credibility, defined as “the perception and assumption that the operations of an actor 
or agent are trustworthy, responsible, desirable and appropriate” (Boström 2006a: 351), is a 
centrally important factor structuring the inclusion of actors in non-state voluntary governance 
arrangements such as ecolabelling. Authority is related to credibility, in that once a label is 
deemed credible by those-to-be-governed, the standards and institutions used to verify 
compliance to them can exercise power through exclusion (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004). The 
link between authority and credibility is however, not always straightforward. Certification 
systems are positioned within global production networks (GPNs) (Henderson, Dicken et al. 
2002; Coe, Dicken et al. 2008), constituted by economic and political actors that struggle over 
the construction of economic relationships, governance structures, institutional rules and 
norms, and discursive frames that organise translational economic activity (Levy 2008). 
Credibility is derived from social relationships in these networks and is thought to lead 
directly to authority (Boström 2006a; Schepers 2010; Gulbrandsen 2013). The presumption of 
a credibility-authority axis may therefore be challenged if we investigate how different, and 
even competing certification systems impact upon each other’s regulatory capacity, and in 
turn, influence production and consumption processes.  
We explore the relationship between the credibility and authority of certification systems by 
comparing the conflict between the Earth Island Institute’s (EII) Dolphin Safe and Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) certifications in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) 
skipjack tuna fishery. The MSC, widely regarded as the highly credible ‘gold standard’ in 
sustainable fisheries certification (Sutton and Wimpee 2008; Gulbrandsen 2013), certified 
skipjack tuna fisheries in the waters of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) that employ 
a ‘free-school’ purse seining technique: meaning that nets are set around schools of tuna not 
associated with released floating objects called fish attraction devices (FADs) that lead to 
bycatch rates of non-target species and juvenile tuna 8-9 per cent higher than in purse seine 
sets not associated with FADs (Bromhead, Foster et al. 2003). ‘Free school’ or ‘FAD-free’ 
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fishing came to represent a new definition of sustainable purse seining. It was innovative 
because it provided an opportunity for a portion of the WCPO fishery to catch, trade and 
therefore create a new market for sustainably certified purse seine tuna – an industry first. 
However, it has also proven controversial because a return to free school sets contravenes the 
standards of the Earth Island Institute Dolphin Safe ecolabel. This came about due to 
controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean in the 1990s, which saw a ban on the use of free 
school sets because of the risk of associated mass dolphin mortality (Francis, Awbrey et al. 
1992; Baird and Quastel 2011). But while the Dolphin Safe ecolabel is now ubiquitous in the 
industry, with over 450 members including fishing companies and value chain actors (EII 
2007; EII 2011), its relevance in parts of the ocean other than the Eastern Pacific and a lack of 
transparency in decision making and certification is openly questioned (Baird and Quastel 
2011). Despite this, it has emerged as a threat to the credibility and authority of the MSC’s 
certification of free school tuna. 
We examine this case by asking what happens if two labels regulating the same fishery, with 
differing perceived levels of credibility, make conflicting sustainability claims? We do this by 
analysing how the two programmes interact; do they work cooperatively, recognising they 
have different definitions of appropriate that may be usefully complementary, or do they 
compete? Finally, we reflect on what the wider implications inter-label interactions hold for 
the effectiveness of private, voluntary forms of environmental governance such as 
certification.  
The research is based on a case study approach to gain an in-depth understanding of 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin 2009). The case we have chosen is 
in many ways exceptional; the kind of interaction between the incumbent Dolphin Safe 
ecolabel in tuna fisheries, and the challenges it presents to the MSC certification in the PNA. 
But it does offer an example that challenges existing understandings of a specific 
phenomenon, in this case interactions between certification schemes analysed through a 
defined framework of credibility (outlined in the following two sections), and may therefore 
be considered a valid focus of research (Gibbert, Ruigrok et al. 2008). Fieldwork consisted of 
document analysis and key informant interviews, conducted in person or via Skype/telephone, 
with 11 respondents, including the MSC actors engaged in the certification, EII, regional 
experts, industry representatives and NGOs. Additionally, observations were made during the 
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9
th
 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Meeting in December 2012 and the 
European Tuna Conference in 2011 and 2013 where many themes related to MSC certification 
of the PNA were discussed. The results are analysed on two levels. The paper first takes a 
broader look at the wider political economic relations of competition between ecolabels, 
focusing on the discursive and material flows in the tuna GPN. It then moves on to look at the 
finer scale to analyse the operational modes of Dolphin Safe and MSC ecolabels exploring the 
extent to which ecolabelling strategies can maintain label credibility.  
4.3 Sustainability standards in global production networks  
The broader relevance of examining the interaction of standards is best understood in the 
context of global production networks. Analysis at the network level helps in understanding 
how the activities of firms are affected by ‘networked’ international trade regulations and 
normative standards (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002: 5). It also extends to the activities of 
extra-firm networks, encompassing a wide range of non-firm actors like NGOs, government 
agencies, and international organisations. In taking these to be constituent parts of the overall 
production system, the GPN framework provides a means of identifying how firm and/or non-
firm actors interact and sites of contestation and collaboration (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; 
Coe, Dicken et al. 2008). In the context of this research, the GPN framework provides a 
conceptual basis for examining the interaction between two different certification 
programmes, while also recognising that the regulatory practices of each are linked to a wider 
network of firm and non-firm actors.  
Adopting a networked approach builds on other research that has investigated interactions 
between certification schemes. Although relatively sparse, one key focus of this literature has 
been whether competition between standards leads to a ‘ratcheting up’ of sustainability 
standards, or conversely a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ (e.g. Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005; Cashore, Auld 
et al. 2007; Ponte, Gibbon et al. 2011). Some researchers have criticised certification and 
labelling programmes for working off progressively weak compliance criteria, thus lowering 
the bar and allowing companies to ‘greenwash’ their image (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007). 
Others, such as Bitzer et al. (2008) have argued that the proliferation and resulting competition 
among coffee standards creates a danger of older, more stringent sustainability standards like 
Fair Trade and the organic coffee certification being supplanted by newer, less stringent ones. 
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Offering a more positive perspective, Auld (2007) and Guldbrandsen (2010) both describe 
how new initiatives might complement existing programmes and therefore, help broaden the 
scope of issues addressed, as well as the inclusiveness of certification schemes. Overdevest 
(2005), for example, suggests that the co-existence Forest Stewardship Council and 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative schemes in the United States, has seen them “compete to be the 
‘high-road’ scheme” (p. 9). 
The explicit focus of this literature on the interaction between different certification 
programmes and the influence of external, firm and non-firm actors on network dynamics 
offers a useful complement to the GPN framework. As argued by Rosenau (2003), it is within 
these same networks that relational attributes of regulation, such as credibility and authority 
are constantly reproduced. Focusing on the relative positions of and relationships between 
different certification systems, we now define attributes for assessing credibility. 
4.4 Credibility and authority 
Standards require constant reaffirmation of their credibility in order to legitimise them and 
ultimately gain and maintain authority to govern the structure and function of production and 
consumption practices in GPNs. As a relational attribute, credibility is actively produced and 
reproduced, making it the core business of any certification scheme. The key practices for 
building credibility, drawn from a growing literature, include scientific rigour, inclusiveness, 
transparency/openness, impartiality/independence and impact (see Table 4.1) (e.g. Boström 
2006b; Eden 2009; Bush, Toonen et al. 2013). These practices can also be used as indicators 
for assessing credibility.  
The scientific basis of defining principles, standards and assessment criteria are seen as 
fundamental to the credibility of voluntary certification schemes. The incorporation of expert 
scientific knowledge in the definition of principles and standards create what Eden (2009) 
refers to as a ‘credibility alliance’ between science and certification systems; legitimating their 
content as well as the process through which they are created. Scientific knowledge is also 
used by certification systems when principles and standards are operationalised into verifiable 
indicators, and also as technical expertise in the verification or auditing process (Hatanaka and 
Busch 2008). At each step credibility is built and backstopped by the wider scientific 
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institutions of peer review, on which the knowledge about the issues being standardised is 
based, and the presumed independence of scientists and their organisations. As argued by Auld 
and Bull (2003), in the absence of science as an institutionalised part of the standards-setting 
process, ‘technical advice’ is seen as a vehicle for groups to “further their own normative 
perspective on what management practices are best” (p. 48). 
The risk of over-subscribing scientific or expert input is equally a risk to the credibility of a 
certification system. The inclusion of non-scientific actors is also necessary so that 
controversy is met with critical engagement rather than defection, which in turn undermines 
whatever authority is conveyed by these schemes (Boström 2006a). In practice inclusiveness is 
a deliberate strategy by certification systems seeking to incorporate the range of diverse 
interests in a formal structure of deliberation. And once a network is built, the certification 
system can secure credibility by advertising these formalised attempts to create consensus over 
the content and governance in the system (Eden 2009). However, inclusiveness also has its 
risks, especially when creating an open process of innovation undermines a requisite level of 
agreed environmental stringency (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004). The consequence is that any 
changes in the content and procedures of a certification system, in order to respond to new 
problems or recognise the need for further improvement, can bring into question the credibility 
of the certification system. 
Features like transparency/openness and impartiality/independence concern the internal 
governance of the labelling programme, and contribute to what Boström (2006) refers to 
‘input’ legitimacy. They enable the programme to continually demonstrate a capacity to 
practice the ideals that are embodied in their principles and standards. The degree of 
transparency a certification system adopts, and the more accountable it makes itself to external 
scrutiny, the more credibility and legitimacy they are presumed to command (Auld and 
Gulbrandsen 2010). Two types of transparency are commonly recognised. ‘Procedural’ 
transparency, related to the openness of decision making or adjudication processes and 
‘outcome’ transparency, concerning the accessibility of information needed to determine 
whether and how regulation is effective in meeting its goals (Fung, Graham et al. 2007; 
Vermeulen 2007). Impartiality/independence is largely demonstrated by the organisation of 
information and how transparent it is, but also determined by the clear separation of the 
standards, conformity assessment bodies (auditors) and those being certified (Hatanaka, Bain 
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et al. 2005; Mutersbaugh 2005). Both tasks are particularly important for private actors if the 
issues are controversial and/or there is mistrust among the groups involved. 
Credibility is also derived from evidence that the rhetorical goals set by certification standards 
are reflected by material changes in the process of production. Termed ‘output legitimacy’ by 
Boström (2006), measurable impact as a result of compliance provides feedback on the 
salience and precision of the standards, as well as the credibility of those who defined them. 
Impact is also defined in more dynamic terms, such as the capacity of a certification system to 
foster ‘continual improvement’. These may be either operational or day to day improvements, 
as well as long-term ‘strategic’ improvements to the production process, above a specified 
baseline (Ammenberg and Hjelm 2002; Tlusty 2012; Bush, Toonen et al. 2013). For fisheries 
this may relate to stopping fish stock decline by moving fishing pressure from above to below 
maximum sustainable yield, or additional environmental gains related to ecosystem function. 
Credibility is then a function of how well a certification system fosters innovation toward 
meeting sustainability goals over the longer term. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of practices used to assess credibility of certification schemes  
Credibility practices Description 
Scientific rigour  Incorporation of scientific knowledge into definition of 
principles and standards 
 Transparent and independent scientific process underlies 
standard creation and verification 
Inclusiveness  Incorporation of diverse interests in a formal structure of 
deliberation 
 Facilitation of critical engagement rather than defection 
of with expert and non-expert groups 
Transparency/openness  Continual demonstration of capacity to practice the 
ideals that are embodied in their principles and standards 
 Degree of openness of decision making or adjudication 
(procedural transparency) 
 Accessibility of information needed to determine 
whether and how regulation is effective in meeting its 
goals  (outcome transparency) 
Impartiality/independence  Organisation of information and degree of transparency 
 Separation of the standards and those verifying 
standards 
Impact  Measurable impact based on compliance provides 
feedback on the salience and precision of standards 
 Organisational capacity certification system to both 
long-term strategic and short-term operational 
improvements 
 
While these indicators for assessing credibility bear considerable relevance to sustainability 
standards, certification systems also demonstrate authority when decision-making or 
exclusionary power is exercised. Credibility is directly related but different to authority which 
implies a vertical relationship of compliance and subordination (Boström 2006b). Once market 
demand has been created, ‘vertical’ authority can be exercised to leverage cooperation among 
network actors that continue to support a dominant claim around sustainability associated with 
an iconic image or principle in a global production network, through fear of market exclusion 
should they not do so (Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005; Ponte, Gibbon et al. 2011). While we agree 
that authority is directly related to credibility, the potential for dominant network actors to use 
the threat of market exclusion can play a fundamental role in taking up a particular 
certification system and can override the relational, dynamic characteristic of credibility. A 
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caveat here is that while some literatures have focussed on how specific ‘audiences’ within 
networks perceive credibility and authority (Cashore 2002), the attributes described here 
provide a broader overview for understanding credibility at the network level. 
4.5 Credibility and the PNA tuna fishery certification  
4.5.1 The Marine Stewardship Council 
The certification of the free-school, FAD-free purse seine fishery in the waters of the PNA is 
the first MSC certification of an industrial purse seine tuna fishery, described by one key actor 
involved in the certification as the “biggest assessment in MSC history”. The certification was 
stimulated by a partnership between the PNA Secretariat and the Netherlands-based company 
Sustunable BV, which led to the creation of the Pacifical brand. This actor explained their 
decision for choosing MSC over any other certification system was because it “is by far the 
highest standard and it’s ecosystem based”. Their open support reflects their perceived 
credibility of the MSC in what Ponte (2013) labels the wider ‘market for sustainability 
certifications’.  
The credibility of the MSC also comes through its governance structure and the scientific basis 
of its assessment. Its governance structure is comprised of a Board of Trustees, a Technical 
Advisory Board and Stakeholder Council, which facilitates top-down control while 
maintaining expertise on fishery management, marketing, processing and chain of custody 
(Gulbrandsen 2009; Ponte 2012). Third-party certification also lends both credibility and 
authority to the MSC with independent auditors in charge of assessing compliance of fisheries. 
In addition, the assessment process has an in-built objections procedure open to any parties 
involved in the fishery assessment process, and provides an opportunity for concerns about 
certification decisions to be formally lodged, reviewed and resolved by an independent 
adjudicator (MSC 2012a). 
The scientific credibility of the MSC is constituted of three levels: principles, criteria and 
performance indicators (see Ward 2008; MSC 2010). The three principles of the MSC cover 
the status of the stock, the environmental impact and the management of the fishery. Each of 
the principles is further broken down into 31 performance indicators, which represent the 
sustainability of a fishery under assessment and are therefore the fundamental determinants of 
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credibility.
 
Performance indicators are based on three ‘scoring guideposts’: an ‘ideal’ fishery 
would score 100; a ‘best practice’ fishery would score 80; and the conditional level of entry 
into the MSC certification procedure is 60. To become certified, the weighted average of all 
performance indicators must achieve a score of 80 or more for each of the principles. 
Under the PNA assessment, the free-school tuna purse seine fishery gained scores in the 80s 
for each of the three principles of MSC. However, there was considerable opposition from a 
number of organisations, notably the International Sustainable Seafood Foundation (ISSF)
 – a 
global partnership among the tuna industry, scientists and WWF,
 
the European tuna consortia 
Organizacion de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores (OPAGAC) and 
Comité européen interprofessionnel du Thon Tropical (EUROTON). Objections were raised 
on the grounds that the assessment contained serious procedural irregularities and errors along 
with arbitrary and unreasonable scoring (ISSF 2010). This led to an objections hearing in 
2011, the outcome of which upheld the certifying body’s recommendation for certification. 
Through their system of performance indicators, the MSC has an inbuilt framework, which 
requires improvements that need to be made in order to maintain the certificate over 
subsequent reviews. As suggested by reviews conducted by MSC scientists (Agnew, Grieve et 
al. 2006; Cambridge, Martin et al. 2011), meeting the conditions for certification has 
motivated the biggest operational changes in fisheries under assessment – measured in terms 
of institutional development, instances of new knowledge, and operational changes and also 
shows evidence of making environmental gains.  
Following the outcome of the hearing, no further objections were raised. In fact, some even 
altered their positions, expressing their support for the certification, with the ISSF stating that 
the certification “demonstrates how stakeholder engagement in the MSC process can result in 
strengthened conditions that better ensure a fishery meets its sustainability objectives” 
(Jackson cited in ISSF 2012). While it would be unlikely that ISSF would have continued to 
oppose this certification, their endorsement lends weight to the objections procedure, in part 
by allowing grievances to be publically aired and reviewed. Additionally, the use of an 
independent adjudicator further adds to the credibility of the certification, underscoring the 
objectivity and transparency of the procedure. 
One aspect of credibility that the MSC has been deemed to fall short on is inclusiveness 
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(Jacquet and Pauly 2008; Ponte 2012; Bush, Toonen et al. 2013). The cost of certification in 
addition to the high demands placed on a fishery seeking to meet certification requirements 
has excluded many developing country fisheries from this process. This is reflected by the fact 
that developing country fisheries only account for seven per cent of their certifications to date 
(MSC 2013a). The case of the PNA tuna certification is therefore, a significant step as it 
represents not only the first major certification of a large, transboundary fishery, but one that is 
under the jurisdiction of developing countries. The access fees paid to PNA countries by fleets 
wishing to fish in their waters constitute an important source of revenue. For example, access 
fees make up between 20 to 50 per cent of the national income or GDP of the member 
countries Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu (Deiye 
2007). Therefore, this certification could hold key financial rewards for the PNA countries.  
When considering the PNA MSC certification from the perspective of its credibility, it appears 
that the MSC has established a credible case for the certification of skipjack tuna that is based 
on a fundamental shift away from the sustainability claims for industrial tuna fisheries 
embodied in the EII Dolphin Safe ecolabel. It would therefore stand to reason that in European 
and North American markets, demand would drive the trade of MSC-certified skipjack tuna. 
However, according to an industry actor, it has taken the first certified products almost two 
years to reach the market after the certificate was awarded. Following the certification of the 
fishery itself, the final requirement of the MSC before their tuna products can be traded under 
the MSC logo, is that the whole chain of custody must be certified, from boats to retailers. 
This is in place to ensure full traceability of fish caught in purse seine nets set on free-schools 
of tuna and therefore, an assurance that the final product does not contain a mix of certified 
and non-certified tuna. Gaining the chain of custody certification requires only one company 
under the PNA certification to agree to put in place the systems that effectively separates MSC 
from non-MSC fish. This additional layer of certification further increases the credibility of 
the standard, by ensuring chain-level compliance with FAD-free fishing standards. However, 
it has posed a considerable challenge to the PNA and their Pacifical brand. Broadening the 
focus to the production network level indicates that conflicts have surfaced between the PNA 
MSC certification and the EII and are playing a significant role in the hold up of certified fish 
to reach the market.  
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4.5.2 Earth Island Institute Dolphin Safe 
While remaining silent during the certification procedure for the Pacifical skipjack free-school 
fishery, the US-based NGO Earth Island Institute (EII) expressed their concerns that the MSC-
certified tuna has not been certified Dolphin Safe. The EII Dolphin Safe label came about in 
the 1980s when attention was drawn to the practice of setting purse seine nets on dolphins, 
which, in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, are known to associate with tuna. In the 1970s 
and 1980s there were hundreds of thousands of dolphin deaths associated with this fishing 
practice (Hall and Boyer 1986; Baird and Quastel 2011). In response, the environmental NGO 
EII launched negative publicity campaigns and created consumer momentum and a global 
awareness of their Dolphin Safe label. Although the dolphin controversy was rooted in the 
USA, the EII expanded their network to include environmental groups around the world. 
Further downstream, major retailers were also displaying logos ensuring tuna was ‘dolphin 
safe’ or ‘dolphin friendly’ (Brown 2005). This meant the certification had gone beyond the 
canned tuna product to encompass the entire supply chain providing EII with a high degree of 
network power. To date, over 450 companies are certified dolphin-safe, which accounts for 90 
per cent of the market and covers 65 nations (EII 2007; EII 2011). Relative to the MSC, the 
Dolphin Safe label is therefore a highly inclusive standard for fisheries in both developed and 
developing countries.  
The market dominance of the Dolphin Safe label indicates it has become institutionalised 
within the tuna production network. EII first made enormous consumer-based headway with 
their negative publicity campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s, about global industrial fishing 
practices, forcing the industry to engage with their Dolphin Safe labelling programme. This 
started when, in response to the negative publicity they were receiving, StarKist, Bumble Bee 
and Chicken of the Sea – the world’s largest tuna canners at the time – pledged to stop 
sourcing tuna caught in association with dolphins and to put the Dolphin Safe label on their 
cans (Shabecoff 1990). From an industry perspective, the ease with which they could replace 
dolphin unsafe tuna with dolphin safe tuna caught primarily in the Western Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, which together account for more than 30 per cent of total canned tuna on the world 
market, meant they were able to minimise costs associated with meeting EII standards. The 
result was that the tuna production network was transformed, or at least appeared to be, in 
accordance with the standard of Dolphin Safe as defined by EII (Baird and Quastel 2011). 
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This made the dolphin safe label a mainstream industry standard in tuna production networks, 
described by one industry representative as “settled law” and providing EII with enormous 
symbolic power. 
When the dolphin issue was at its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, research on the dolphin-tuna 
interaction and the impact of tuna fisheries (Hall and Boyer 1986; Hall 1998) provided a 
credible basis from which the Dolphin Safe ecolabel was developed. However, with ecolabels 
like the MSC that assess fisheries based on environmental sustainability at the ecosystem-
level, the necessity of the Dolphin Safe label has come under question. This, coupled with the 
lack of a coherent and consistent system of standards and criteria for what the assessment 
procedure is for gaining Dolphin Safe certification has undermined the overall credibility of 
this label (Ward 2008). The process by which a tuna fisher, processor, or canner can become 
certified “Dolphin Safe” is also not entirely clear, raising questions about the transparency of 
the certification procedure. On their website, EII provides their Dolphin Safe tuna policy 
signed by each company, which defines that Dolphin Safe means: 1) no intentional chasing, 
netting or encirclement of dolphins during an entire tuna fishing trip; 2) no use of drift gill nets 
to catch tuna; 3) no accidental killing or serious injury to any dolphins during net sets; 4) no 
mixing of dolphin-safe and dolphin-deadly tuna in individual boat wells (for accidental kill of 
dolphins), or in processing or storage facilities; and 5) each trip in the Eastern Tropical Pacific 
Ocean (ETP) by vessels 400 gross tons and above must have an independent observer on 
board to attest to compliance with the standards (EII 2012a). Since their inception, these 
criteria have been updated and also include a ban on illegal, unreported and unregulated 
vessels and that companies “should not engage in shark finning” (EII 2011: 5). While 
providing a classification of what constitutes Dolphin Safe, no procedural information on the 
certification process itself is given.  
Once a company has signed up to become Dolphin Safe certified it falls under the surveillance 
of EII’s International Monitoring Program. This employs twelve staff members in seven 
countries around the world to “regularly inspect tuna in canneries, at dockside, and aboard 
fishing vessels in order to assure consumers that the tuna they buy is truly dolphin safe” (EII 
2012b). The details of what information is collected under this monitoring programme and the 
extent to which it covers a representative sample of the 300 companies which they currently 
certify remains unclear. Additionally, their credibility has been brought further into question 
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with one environmental NGO stating that EII’s main strategy for monitoring is through “self-
reporting skippers”. This was supported by EII who explained that certified companies are 
requested to produce monthly procurement reports and evidence to show a vessel has not been 
setting nets on dolphins. The lack of transparency under which certifications are made, mean it 
is difficult to see what certification itself entails, how decisions are made within the EII, and 
whether the facility for contesting a certification can be made. This in turn leads to questions 
of accountability to consumers as well as the tuna industry. 
Because there is little reference to or continued monitoring of specific performance indicators, 
the Dolphin Safe certification also appears to engender limited innovation towards 
improvement within the fishery as a whole. In fact, it could be argued that in terms of 
sustainability, it is a victim of its own success. As the most widely recognised ecolabel in 
fisheries to date, many companies have adopted the Dolphin Safe standard as a sufficient 
indication of sustainability. For reasons unknown to scientists, the dolphin-yellowfin tuna 
association, exploited by purse seine fisheries, primarily occurs primarily in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific Ocean. It is therefore much less of an issue for companies sourcing tuna from 
other regions of the world (Hall 1998; Constance and Bonanno 1999). One industry 
certification expert stressed this stating “in the Western and Central Pacific and Indian Oceans 
they just don’t catch dolphins with tuna, it just doesn’t happen, it’s a non-issue”. In addition to 
this, much of the world’s canned tuna is skipjack tuna, which has shown to only rarely 
associate with dolphins (Hall 1998; Fréon and Dagorn 2000; Brown 2005). Therefore, 
complying with the Dolphin Safe standard represents the lowest common denominator of 
sustainability and does not require a company to make any improvements to their practices to 
achieve certification. This creates what Mueller and colleagues (2009) term a ‘legitimacy 
front’ and requires no real changes in practice. While the expansion of the EII Dolphin 
Standard criteria to include a prohibition on shark finning and IUU fishing inclusion does 
reflect an adjustment of the over-arching environmental ambitions, the inclusion of these 
issues is a relatively ad hoc improvement to the Dolphin Safe label. According to more than 
one respondent from the industry, this is regarded as a strategic move to underline the on-
going relevance of EII rather than a clear strategy for promoting sustainable tuna fisheries. 
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4.5.3 Label Authority 
In spite of the limitations of the Dolphin Safe standard with regards to credibility and 
improvement toward sustainability goals, its inclusiveness and network power has allowed EII 
to become an ecolabelling authority within the tuna GPN. This can be seen in the role they 
have played in the MSC PNA certification. Following the assertions by the certifiers that 
under MSC Principal 2 the fishery has “negligible interaction with dolphins” (MSC 2012b), 
Pacifical elected not to submit to EII’s Dolphin Safe label in addition to MSC. This is a 
significant departure from practice in other tuna fisheries, which despite not engaging in purse 
seine fisheries have applied for both certifications. For example, the American Albacore 
Fishing Association have had both their north and south Pacific albacore tuna fisheries MSC 
certified but are still paying to retain their Dolphin Safe status as well. This, in spite of the fact 
that albacore rarely associate with dolphins and pole and line fisheries have no dolphin 
bycatch (Gilman 2011). However, for EII to keep their Dolphin Safe label as the industry 
standard, they need to retain this authority despite the more credible claims made by the PNA 
MSC certification.  
Following Pacifical’s decision not to go for both certifications, EII issued a reminder to the 
tuna companies in their extensive network that Pacifical “is not part of Earth Island’s Dolphin 
Safe program, and cooperating tuna companies should not consider products from Pacifical or 
its affiliates as Dolphin Safe” going on to say that “Under terms of the Dolphin Safe Policy, 
companies should purchase tuna products only from companies that are approved and 
monitored Dolphin Safe companies on the list” (EII 2012c). This approach implies that 
blacklisting companies that affiliate with Pacifical and with 90 per cent of the market covered 
by the Dolphin Safe label poses a serious threat to Pacifical getting their chain of custody 
certified. For the certification to be made, tuna that has been caught in compliance with the 
certification standard has to have passed through each stage of the supply chain. Therefore, 
until a processor and retailer signs up to buying and selling this tuna, it will remain uncertified.  
One retailer that has experienced the negative campaigning style of EII and has been 
mentioned as a potential Pacifical tuna retailer is German supermarket EDEKA. In 2011, 
EDEKA were targeted for selling yellowfin tuna quoted to be ‘dolphin-deadly’ by the German 
counterpart to EII, Gesellschaft zur Rettung der Delphine (GRD) (GRD 2012). They were 
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targeted on multiple levels through the German television and online campaigns and included 
celebrity endorsement, with Rick Barry, director of film The Cove, on dolphin slaughter, 
posting a video on YouTube and on the EII website condemning EDEKA and urging a 
consumer boycott (BuzzMedia Network 2012). By adopting a mediagenic online campaign 
strategy, GRD was able to push the issue beyond German consumers. As a result, in 2012 this 
supermarket changed their buying policy to stop sourcing any yellowfin tuna to avoid further 
dolphin-deadly claims. The symbolic power of the Dolphin Safe label, has afforded EII a 
position of authority within tuna networks, which appears in turn to have conferred legitimacy 
on their labelling programme, as industry and consumers continue to support it. With the 
threat of EII exposing Pacifical as dolphin deadly, there would be understandable reticence 
from companies like EDEKA, who have experienced the full impact of negative campaigning 
on the dolphin issue, to commit to buying Pacifical tuna. One industry specialist explained that 
this threat has contributed to putting up blockages to the chain of custody certification and 
demonstrates the influence EII has on a chain that they are not directly involved with. While 
EII stated that they are not “fighting against MSC” adding that it is feasible to gain both MSC 
certification and sign up to the Dolphin Safe, they have also come out questioning MSC 
credibility in relation to the Pacifical certification, stating that “MSC doesn’t have a dolphin 
policy, they don’t have standards for dolphin safe” (Palmer, cited in ABC Radio Australia 
2012). This negative publicity they are drawing to the MSC certification reflects their efforts 
to remain active within tuna the production network and retain their position of authority when 
faced with more ‘credible’ forms of certification. 
For there to be a fundamental shift toward more robust labelling like MSC throughout the tuna 
GPN, EII would have to lose their position of authority. This would require wider network 
actors to move away from their current position of accepting the Dolphin Safe label as “settled 
law” and act on the questions that are being raised around credibility of the label. The 
reluctance of companies to reject Dolphin Safe stems from the threat of negative publicity, but 
also from a reluctance to change the status quo from which they benefit. The narrow framing 
of sustainability, and widespread redundancy of ‘Dolphin Safe’ in most part of the globe 
means that the cost of remaining ‘ecolabelled’ is minimal as companies do not have to alter 
their fishing practices in order to meet EII standards. In contrast, the broader, ecosystem-level 
requirements of the MSC certification has prompted innovation on the part of the PNA, to 
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shift away from the common practice of FAD fishing and back to setting on free schools of 
tuna. However, the merits of the broader definition of sustainability under MSC is constrained 
by the reputational risk to companies not additionally supporting EII.  
4.6 Discussion: the ‘innovation stalemate’ 
The MSC certification of PNA’s skipjack tuna stands as a landmark case, legitimising FAD-
free fishing in an industrial tuna fishery. Clear differences in the credibility of the MSC and 
EII Dolphin safe standards can be observed when analysed in terms of inclusiveness, 
transparency/openness, scientific rigour, and impartiality/independence (see Table 4.2). The 
MSC is deemed credible because: 1) it has a transparent system of assessment and a well-
defined internal governance structure; 2) promotes traceability of fishing operations through 
the chain of custody certification; and 3) certification is awarded based on rigorous scientific 
assessments from third party, independent auditors. While more broadly, the MSC remains 
problematic in terms of inclusiveness for developing world fisheries, the PNA certification has 
seen the inclusion of small island developing countries. In contrast, EII has demonstrated that 
their Dolphin Safe label is more inclusive, but is widely questioned for: 1) its weak scientific 
basis when applied outside the context of the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean; 2) the lack of 
transparency over and impartiality of the certification assessment and monitoring procedure; 
and 3) the transparency of EII’s internal governance structure; and 4) for promoting limited 
innovation for broader sustainability practices. The MSC certification of FAD-free fisheries in 
the PNA could therefore pose a serious threat to the EII Dolphin Safe label, leading to rapid 
uptake of the MSC-labelled fish within the production network. However, this has not 
immediately eventuated and EII appears to maintain the greater level of authority within the 
tuna production network.  
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Table 4.2 Summarising the differences between MSC and EII Dolphin Safe 
Criteria Marine Stewardship Council EII Dolphin Safe 
Scientific rigour 
 Three level of analysis: 
principles, criteria and 
performance indicators 
 Lack of coherent and consistent 
system of standards and criteria for 
assessment 
Inclusiveness 
 The high cost of certification 
and developing country 
fisheries only 7 percent of 
certified fisheries 
 More than 450 companies certified 
Dolphin Safe 
Transparency/ 
openness 
 Certification methodology 
made public 
 Open public objections 
procedure 
 Chain of custody certification 
for product traceability 
 Poor communication about 
assessment methodology 
 No opportunity for objection 
Impartiality/ 
independence 
 Third party certification with 
independent auditors 
 ‘Self-certifying skippers’ monitoring 
conducted internally 
Impact 
 Promote innovation and 
improvement  
 High market impact  
 Do not promote improvement or 
innovation 
 
Analysing certification systems in terms of credibility alone, fails to draw out the importance 
that the authority of standard setters plays in promoting the uptake of different sustainability 
certification systems. The competition and discursive conflict among these standard setters, 
and the strategic ambitions of other actors in the tuna GPN, such as fishing and processing 
firms, indicates that authority is the dominant quality behind the application of environmental 
standards, and can be maintained independent of credibility. The implication is that while 
private or market-based forms of regulation such as certification draws upon the credibility of 
the content and organisation of their standards, they are ultimately granted authority by those 
with a vested interest in the supply chains they govern. Credibility does not therefore always 
translate into authority if there are fundamental conflicts with the interests of those being 
governed. As Kalfagianni and Pattberg (2013) argue, a certification system like the MSC may 
rank well on most credibility criteria, but can continue to struggle in mainstreaming their 
success in relevant markets. If a certification system is unable to appease the interests of a 
wide group of actors, and therefore gain a requisite level of market coverage, they remain 
vulnerable to existing dominant claims. Alternatively, standards can be deemed to have low 
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credibility, but are able to retain a high degree of network power and control if they maintain 
sufficient authority. 
In support of Boström (2006), the case also highlights that credibility is both relational and 
dynamic. The organisation of the MSC certification procedure, with its public formal 
objections procedure continually seeks approval from a broad audience – including NGOs, 
academics, governments and consultants. However, while there is ongoing debate over the 
effectiveness of this procedure (Christian, Ainley et al. 2013; Gutierrez and Agnew 2013), it is 
dominated by actors with non-commercial interests. Credibility is therefore generated in a 
general sense, but does not necessarily help to extend authority of the MSC label over the 
industry as a whole. In contrast, EII’s Dolphin Safe certification illustrates that authority can 
be maintained independently of credibility in production networks if the interests of 
commercial actors, ultimately those-to-be-governed, are of primary concern. This happens if a 
combination of the following occurs. First, those involved in the production network must 
maintain some benefit from being certified. Cited benefits for changing behaviour include 
improved market access or a price premium (Roheim, Asche et al. 2011). But as illustrated in 
this paper, benefits can also include extending narrow claims such as ‘Dolphin Safe’ to the 
overall sustainability of their fishing practices; allowing a continuation of existing practices 
rather than change towards sustainability. Second, there no inclusive alternative scheme that 
allows them to meet or maintain their commercial interests. As a result, commercial actors 
who have invested in the narrative and organisation of a label with poor credibility may still 
grant authority through their commercial strategy. Third, there may be a short-term incentive 
to cooperate with the label, and therefore reinforce the authority of schemes with weak 
credibility, outweighing the long-term benefits of defecting to an alternative label and 
therefore retracting authority. 
The results also provide insights on how certification schemes operating within a defined GPN 
interact with each other, as well as the outcomes of that interaction. Previous observations of 
either a race-to-the-bottom, mutually cooperation, or ratcheting up associated with competing 
certification schemes do not appear to hold in this case. For instance, Bitzer et al.’s (2008) 
findings that newer coffee standards were less stringent but more pervasive than the original 
Fair Trade and organic standards does not hold in this case. The interaction between the MSC 
and EII has not seen a case of weakening a previously stringent standard to achieve greater 
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market share. Instead, the market is already dominated by the weaker, less credible EII 
Dolphin Safe standard. It has also not been a complementary interaction, with EII benefiting 
from the new(er) MSC certification standards to broaden the scope of issues they address and 
lead to what Gulbrandsen (2010) calls “organizational homogeneity in the certification field” 
(p.176). Finally, it has not led to a positive competitive environment, with both standards-
setting bodies competing for the ‘high road’ and fostering an improvement of standards 
(Cashore, Auld et al. 2007). Instead, this case illustrates a different interaction, whereby the 
less credible, yet incumbent certification system is resisting relinquishing their authority to a 
more credible ‘competitor’. The outcome of this interaction is an active restriction on 
innovation towards more sustainable fishing practices in the wider tuna GPN, leading to what 
can labelled as an innovation stalemate. By retaining authority from a position of weak 
credibility, EII are in effect preventing firms from promoting non-’Dolphin Safe’ sustainable 
certified tuna products in the market, and ultimately inhibiting any wider impact certification 
can have in tuna fisheries. Without a network-level change, that would see industry actors 
remove or substantially modify the scope of EII’s authority, the impact of more credible labels 
that foster innovation such as the MSC may remain limited for tuna. 
The limitations for overcoming the authority of EII stem in part from the position they hold 
within the tuna GPN as an environmental NGO, as well as Dolphin Safe certifier. As an NGO, 
EII has the capacity to lobby and campaign, while at the same time, promote their certification 
scheme. Whereas, the MSC is a standard setting body that regulates the wider global fisheries 
production network, it does not engage directly in advocacy. In the interests of maintaining 
their credibility, the MSC has instead tended to focus indirectly on scientific channels, such as 
submitting papers and responses to peer-reviewed journals. When challenged by Dolphin Safe, 
MSC is faced with a credibility ‘Catch-22’: they maintain their credibility by keeping a 
distance from the debate, but continue to be undermined if they remain silent. In more direct 
terms, their remit is to promote sustainable fishing practice and ultimately encourage the 
certification of other tuna fisheries, but they are not in a position to advocate directly in 
response to the criticism received in the PNA beyond defending the robustness of their 
standard. They are therefore reliant on other actors within the tuna GPN invested in the 
promotion of sustainable practice – including NGOs, media and companies – to advocate on 
their behalf and thus put an end to the innovation stalemate. 
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Understanding this more nuanced role of authority, both with and without credibility, offers 
new insights into the wider dynamics that shape environmental regulation in GPNs. In the 
context of sustainability standards, this opens up an understanding of how, through differences 
in the extent to which actors hold authority and legitimacy, non-firm, non-chain actors can 
influence how these standards are accepted and taken up. Following Levy (2008) and others, 
the results also emphasise that GPNs are not simply arenas for market competition or chains of 
value-adding activities, but rather comprise complex political-economic systems in which 
competition and conflict amongst actors are playing a critical role in distributing authority and 
legitimacy. Literature on GPNs has covered the impacts of standards on network practices but 
this has been in the context of the implementation of social standards, for example labour 
standards and gender, where the focus has been on the role of women in production networks 
(Barrientos and Smith 2007b; Levy 2008; Barrientos 2012). To date, there has been a paucity 
of studies that have looked at sustainability standards in GPNs, let alone the interaction 
between them. Understanding the interaction between firm and/or non-firm actors engaged in 
production and consumption flows, provides a lens through which the interaction between 
standards might influence, both positively and negatively, innovation aiming at more 
sustainable practises. An interesting avenue for further exploration of sustainability standards 
in GPNs, would be to expand into wider analyses how watchdog NGOs, like Greenpeace that 
produce rankings of canned tuna, would compare the performance of certifications like the 
MSC and EII. This would provide another layer to our understanding of non-firm, NGO 
interactions and their impacts on GPNs. 
Despite in many ways being an exceptional case, the MSC-EII interaction in the Western 
Pacific illustrates how the credibility of certification schemes is not only an internal process, 
nor a two-way competition, but rather dependent on actors throughout the whole tuna GPN. In 
this particular case, failure to reconcile the interaction between these two schemes has led to 
what we label an innovation stalemate. While the stalemate appears to be in the advantage of 
the EII Dolphin Safe label, the MSC face a difficult task in its resolution; they have to 
maintain the credibility of their standards, continue their independence, while at the same time 
remaining beholden to other actors in the tuna GPN to challenge the authority of the EII. 
Highlighting and resolving this stalemate places needed attention on how the governance of 
standards are a critical part of understanding, and ultimately measuring, the impact of private 
100 
 
certification schemes. Understanding impact should therefore not only focus on the material 
improvement sustainability standards aim to achieve, but also how interactions and conflicts 
over the definition and implementation of standards hinders innovation towards sustainability. 
  
  
 Consumer-Facing Traceability: a New Turn in Tuna Chapter 5.
Governance* 
5.1 Abstract 
Information disclosure, be it voluntary or mandatory, is playing an increasingly central role in 
global production. The success of traceability in food safety has led to an extension to the 
traceability of other product ‘qualities’, including sustainability and provenance. This has seen 
a shift not only in the information disclosed, but also the audience traceability systems are 
targeting. This is most obvious in the emergence of so-called consumer-facing traceability 
systems (CFTS), operating through a code or a label to provide consumers with access to 
traceable information. Through examining the consumer turn in traceability, this paper 
investigates various tuna CFTS that have been developed for consumers of tuna in Northern 
America and Europe, currently the primary markets for these types of systems. By taking a 
cross-section of tuna-related CFTS, we examine the diversity of CFTS, their drivers and the 
potential of these systems to change the sustainability performance of tuna production. The 
results show that while consumer-facing traceability is for the most part a nascent approach, 
CFTS are being used across the tuna industry, driven by pressure from NGOs, through the 
sustainable seafood movement. The paper concludes that while this approach to traceability is 
producing varied degrees of transformation inside the supply chain, instruments like CFTS are 
bringing new constellations of actors together to tackle issues of sustainable production and 
consumption.  
5.2 Introduction 
Information disclosure, be it voluntary or mandatory, is playing an increasingly central role in 
global production. In food production, this disclosure originally concerned information that 
could provide food safety assurance. Traceability first became commonplace in food systems 
in general, following crises in the food sector like the appearance of BSE (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy) in Europe in the mid-1990s and other outbreaks of meat contamination with 
Salmonella or E. coli, which led to rising public concern about food safety, quality and origins 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is an article in preparation by A.M.M. Miller, S.R. Bush and A.P.J. Mol. 
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(Jensen and Hayes 2006). The idea of food traceability – i.e. the ability to track or trace food – 
deals with the growing complexity of a food chain based on mass production and global 
distribution and consumption.  
While there is presently no one definition of traceability, the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) 9000:2000 guidelines define it as the “ability to trace the history, 
application or location of that which is under consideration” (ISO 2000). This definition 
indicates that for a supply chain to be deemed traceable, firms and other actors at each link in 
the supply chain, record product attributes and process-related activities and allow access to 
these recordings at a future date and in a distant place. Therefore, traceability is not the 
production and processing of information itself, but a tool that makes it possible to recall this 
information on demand (Donnelly and Olsen 2012)  
The success of traceability in food safety, which is now largely a ‘back-of-house’, pre-
competitive aspect of the global agri-food system (Marsden, Lee et al. 2010), has led to an 
extension to the traceability of other product ‘qualities’, including sustainability and 
provenance. The innovation and developments in information and communication technology 
(ICT), the rise of civil society as a legitimate actor in decision-making, and the growing 
demands of society at large to ‘know’ more about how resources are being (sustainably) 
produced and consumed all enable and catalyse this shift (Mol 2008; Eden 2009; Fuchs, 
Kalfagianni et al. 2011). Traceability is therefore argued to present new possibilities for 
transparency and accountability around production and trade, as demanded by regulatory 
authorities, civil society, and consumers (Mol 2013). It is therefore not only the information 
disclosed that is changing in traceability systems but also the audience traceability systems are 
targeting. This is most obvious in the emergence of so-called consumer-facing traceability 
systems (CFTS), operating through a code or a label to provide consumers with access to 
traceable information. 
The shift to consumer facing traceability has been particularly vigorous in the seafood 
industry, which has come under increasing pressure to demonstrate the sustainability of 
fishing and aquaculture practices (Pauly, Christensen et al. 2002; Jacquet and Pauly 2007; 
FAO 2012). One of the most dynamic sub-sectors in the seafood industry is tuna, which has 
been the subject of widespread concerns regarding issues of sustainability and the 
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overexploitation of tuna stocks; illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing (Agnew, 
Pearce et al. 2009; Tsamenyi, Palma et al. 2009); and fraud through intentional mislabelling 
of tuna species (Warner, Timme et al. 2013). In light of these issues in the tuna industry, 
networked information systems operating both in and beyond states are playing an ever-
important role in generating a global informational infrastructure around tuna resources to 
advance increased transparency of production activities and accountability of industry actors. 
However, this also presents companies with the challenge of how to organise information 
systems with capacity to track and trace raw material throughout the supply chain, in order to 
ensure that species and sustainability attributes are communicated to the customer accurately 
(Boyle 2012). Responding to this challenge, and to the demands of regulatory and civil 
society actors for improving the disclosure of information, firm and non-firm actors have been 
activated in the tuna industry to further develop and implement consumer-facing ICT-based 
traceability systems, with the explicit intention to enable consumers to follow purchased tuna 
from ‘fish to dish’ or ‘boat to throat’. 
This paper investigates various tuna CFTS that have been developed for consumers of tuna in 
Northern America and Europe, currently the primary markets for these types of systems. By 
taking a cross-section of tuna-related CFTS, we aim to understand what characterises the 
different systems and what kind of changes in information flows and consumer behaviours 
they promote. The research seeks to answer three questions: 1) what diversity of CFTS are 
currently available; 2) what drives these new CFTS; and 3) what is the potential of these 
systems to change the sustainability performance of tuna production? 
In order to answer these questions, current CFTS in Europe and North America will be 
analysed in terms of the characteristics and design of the systems, the internal and external 
drivers that motivated their development, and their (potential) performance in transforming 
tuna production toward more sustainable practices. The paper has the following structure. The 
next section provides a background to traceability in tuna fisheries, moving on to look at the 
evolution of CFTS. Following this, an explanation of the methodology for selecting the 
CFTS, and the criteria for their analysis. Next, the results section analyses the differences and 
similarities between the different systems. The paper concludes by looking at traceability 
systems in the context of information disclosure and the capacity of CFTS to transform 
systems of production and consumption.  
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5.3 The Progression Toward Consumer-Facing Traceability 
Coff et al. (2008: 6) explain that the consumer turn in traceability in food production systems, 
remains an “aspiration that would facilitate consumers’ understanding of food production 
practices”. In what we have taken to be the evolution of this aspiration, Coff et al. provide a 
description of the different stages of ethical traceability in the food sector and the objectives 
of each stage (Table 5.1). These objectives help to classify and evaluate the goals, 
infrastructure and outcome of traceability as it moves from an instrument for dealing 
primarily with risk management and food safety to a system used to exchange information 
and communication with the consumer. Each of the stages and their objectives represents a 
progression in the traceability systems. 
The first three stages of traceability system development are primarily concerned with non-
competitive or ‘back-of-house’ issues like food safety, surveillance and supply chain 
efficiency, which can be made available when called upon but not immediately visible to 
consumers. The objectives of the fourth stage illustrate a progression from these back-of-
house systems toward the use of traceability in sustainability standards and labelling, 
therefore supporting a degree of consumer-driven demand for tracing information on 
processes of production. During this transition, NGOs take on a greater role in driving 
companies to provide information regarding provenance and quality assurance and in 
challenging the reputational capital of companies. NGOs are therefore, serving as both 
watchdog and partner to ensure that supply chain actors are keeping with sustainability 
targets. 
The final stage of traceability systems in the Coff et al. framework interprets traceability as an 
explicit, external quality of production, on which consumers can base purchasing decisions. 
Reflecting the wider turn to the disclosure of information through supply chains, this stage is 
based on the assumption that consumer demand drives technological and organisational 
innovations necessary to extend information beyond producers, retailers and food authorities 
(Coff et al. 2008). According to Coff and colleagues “Used imaginatively, it [stage five 
traceability systems] could also provide an opportunity for two-way communication along 
food chains, allowing the views of consumer-citizens to be taken into account along the length 
of the chain” (2008: v).  
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In the tuna industry, we are seeing at the moment signs of the shift toward a consumer turn in 
traceability, with the emergence of a number of companies implementing CFTS. These 
systems are intended to communicate information to tuna consumers, to allow them to base 
purchasing decision on more complex issues associated with ethical sourcing. In some 
instances, they also allow consumers to communicate with upstream actors in the tuna supply 
chain. Therefore, these systems seem to reflect the stage five objectives listed in the Coff et al. 
framework. To understand currently existing CFTS themselves, we first need to look at their 
characteristics, the different drivers behind their implementation and how they are 
performing. The analysis of performance will then be used to understand whether current 
CFTS fulfil the objectives of this final ‘consumer-facing’ stage as described above. The 
following section will outline the analytical framework that we generated in order to examine 
these procedural and performance aspects the CFTS.  
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Table 5.1 Key functions of traceability in the seafood sector (adapted from Coff et al. 2008) 
 Objective of traceability in food 
Stage 1 Risk management and food safety 
- Risk assessment 
- Public health recall systems 
Stage 2 Control and verification 
- Surveillance and auditing of producer and retailer activities 
Stage 3 
 
Supply chain management 
- Cost-effective management of the supply chain 
- Computerised stock inventory and ordering systems linked to point of 
sale 
- Just-in-time delivery systems 
- Efficient use of resources (cost minimisation)  
Stage 4 Provenance and quality assurance of products 
- Marketing of health, ethical and other claims 
- Authenticity: identity of the product and the producer 
- Quality assurance of standards at different stages of production and/or 
processing (eg environmental protocols for production) 
- Final product quality assurance 
Stage 5 Information communication to the consumer 
- Transparency of the production history 
- Facilitation of informed food choice through transparency and the 
ability to compare different products 
- Recognition of specific consumers concerns and information 
demands – where such concerns and demands are not static and may 
evolve 
- Public participation – customer services, companies’ ‘care lines’ 
consultation to obtain consumer feedback 
5.4 Analysing CFTS 
Recognising the many different types of traceability system, the research first looked to define 
criteria for identifying the essential features of the traceability systems. To do this, we drew 
on two frameworks that have been developed to examine traceability systems in the food 
industry. The first was Gampl’s (2003) typology for describing the purpose, component parts 
and the inner and outer environment in which traceability systems operate. The second 
framework was developed by van der Voorst (2004) and moved beyond the descriptive 
characteristics of traceability systems to providing insight into analysing the performance of 
systems in multiple sectors of the food industry. Drawing on the descriptive elements of 
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Gampl’s (2003) framework and the analytical, performance-related elements of van der 
Voorst’s (2004) framework, we developed the conceptual model depicted in Figure 5.1. The 
model proposes that to understand the CFTS we need first to look at (1) the descriptive 
characteristics of the systems to both identify the systems and be able to see the broad 
similarities and difference between them; and (2) the drivers behind their implementation, so 
we could understand both what was motivating companies to implement CFTS and to see if 
there are external actors driving the consumer turn in traceability. We then analysed their 
performance to understand the extent to which the systems meet the objectives of the final 
stage in Coff et al’s (2008) framework. The following explains the indicators that we used in 
each of these parts of the conceptual model (summarised in Figure 5.1). 
As CFTS are socio-technical systems, the descriptive characteristics of the traceability 
systems were defined by their social and technical (ICT) dimensions. The social dimension of 
CFTS systems are characterised by: the year the system was introduced; the scale and reach of 
the system; and the organisation of the supply chain i.e. the degree of coordination between 
the stages in the supply chain. The technical dimension focused on vessel-level instruments 
like vessel monitoring systems (VMS), and the consumer-facing instruments behind the 
CFTS, i.e. the use of physical tags that contain identifier data, such as bar codes or radio 
frequency identification tags (RFIDs) that can be scanned, and the information stored. These 
ICT systems then feed into the ‘front of house’ consumer-facing platforms, including another 
layer of socio-technical tools such as can coding, bar coding, ecolabelling, and\or websites.  
Based on the literature, we determined that the drivers for the development and 
implementation of CFTS can be either internally or externally motivated. Internal drivers 
include the motivation of a company and organisation responsible for developing the CFTS to 
introduce such a system for consumer-facing traceability. Specific indicators of internal 
driveness include: the potential competitive advantage and/or market differentiation that such 
a system could offer; whether CFTS can provide an opportunity to mitigate against the 
exposure of risk; whether the systems are able to demonstrate to consumers a companies’ 
engagement with sustainabiltiy strategies, including committements to certification; and 
whether they facilitate enhanced communication of traceable information along the supply 
chain. External drivers concern the influence of actors who are not responsible for producing 
CFTS systems, but instead provide motivation for their ‘internal’ development and 
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organsiation. These are classified into different actor groups like NGOs, state regulators, 
retailers, and consumers. The final driver is the goal of the CFTS, which is the aspect of 
responsible production and consumption that companies were looking to ameliorate. 
Indicators for this include: sustianability; provenance; a counter measure to IUU fishing; and 
fraud.  
The second part of the analysis concerns the performance level of the traceability system. 
Performance here is characterised by verification, depth, responsiveness and scale. To analyse 
the performance of the CFTS, the performance criteria were attributed a qualitative 
assessment and classification rated red, amber, green. The red rating was used to signify that 
the CFTS had obtained the lowest performance for that indicator. The amber rating was used 
for systems that are working toward a measurable positive change under the performance 
indicator. The green rating was used to signify the highest performance level regarding the 
indicator (see Table 5.2). 
First, verification concerns how the information about the supply chain traceability presented 
to consumers is checked and monitored. The more indepenence those verifying information in 
the CFTS have the greater the crediblity it is expected the system will have (Boström 2006b) . 
Therefore, if the information is internally checked it is deemed to have weak verification and 
rated red. Conversely if the supply chain is subject to external third party auditing, it is 
deemed to have higher crediblility and rated green. An amber rating would be a company 
moving toward third party auditing. The process is being developed/contracts arranged but the 
supply chain has not been audited at point of enquiry.  
Second, we analysed the depth of information flowing to the consumers i.e. the how many 
different levels of information are available to the consumer. This is important because the 
level of detail within a traceability system provides an indication of how engaged the 
company is in supplying the consumer with traceability information and thus, the extent to 
which they are adapting their production processes to accommodate the CFTS and the 
responsible practice they are attributed to. If the ICT platform provides only one webpage, 
that gives consumers all available information, this is rated red. If the web platform presents 
the consumer with multiple links to different webpages containing many ‘layers’ of 
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information this is rated as green. Those systems that take consumers to a single webpage but 
have additional information available but only on request, are rated amber.  
The third indicator is the interactivity of the system and its responsiveness to consumers. This 
is qualified by the degree of mutual interaction between the consumer and the producers that 
are part of the CFTS; the greater the interaction between chain actors, and the greater the 
opportunity for exchange, the more interactive the system (Bush 2010). If the information 
flow in the system is mono-directional, providing the consumer with information but no 
opportunity for interaction with upstream actors, the CFTS is rated red. If there is opportunity 
for interaction and feedback between the different levels of the value chain and therefore 
information flows in both directions then it is rated either amber or green. Amber if the 
interaction is with the direct upstream actors (e.g. retailers) and/or brands and green if the 
system enables consumers to interact directly with the fishers.  
The final indicator deals with the scale of market impact of the system. In the absence of 
financial and production volume information, market impacts are assessed according to three 
criteria: whether the systems operate through one-to-one clientele relationship or through 
global sales agreements; what type of fishing practices are employed (pole and line, longline 
or purse seine); and what the final product is (canned, steak, sashimi). Through these three 
criteria, a qualitative judgement is made on whether the reach of the market is niche (and 
rated red), mid-level (rated amber), or mainstream (rated green).  
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual model to evaluate traceability systems with indicators for analysis 
 
Table 5.2 Indicators for analysing performance of the CFTS 
Indicator Red Amber  Green 
Verification Self-audit Starting third party 
auditing 
Third party 
Depth One level Two-three levels Four or more levels 
Interactivity One way Interaction between 
upstream actors 
producing the systems 
and the consumer 
Communication of 
consumers with 
producer 
Market impact Micro/niche Meso/mid-level Macro/mainstream 
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5.5 Case Selection and Data Collection 
Cases were selected through a combination of searches in the public domain (internet) and 
scoping interviews with nine representatives from retailers, trade and industry associations, 
and NGOs. This initial phase of the study aimed to identify the most distinct cases of CFTS in 
tuna. In this initial phase, systems were deemed to be ‘consumer-facing’ if they had an 
electronic component to them allowing data to be managed and accessed by consumers at 
distance. The electronic traceability systems were either web-based and accessible over the 
internet, or module-based, with specialised software and occasionally hardware that is 
installed in computer networks at various points along the supply chain (Magera and Beaton 
2009). 
Cases were then selected according to the scale of production, with the aim of a representative 
cross-section of the different types of systems that engage with ICT to produce a consumer-
facing platform. In addition, product diversity was a criteria, including canned tuna products 
and fresh/frozen tuna, sold either as loins, steaks or for the sushi/sashimi market. At the 
market end, cases were selected targeting North America (USA and Canada) and Europe, as 
these are the regions where the majority of CFTS were operational.  
Using these criteria six consumer-facing systems were selected: John West can coded tuna, 
Ocean naturals can coded tuna, Pacifical can coded, MSC certified tuna, Norpac Fisheries 
Export bar coded tuna, Solander longline MSC certified tuna and ThisFish bar coded tuna. On 
first inspection, these systems communicate what species of tuna are consumed, where the 
tuna was caught, by whom, and through which method. In the case of canned tuna, multiple 
systems are available. With so much similarity between the proprietary canned tuna systems, 
these were selected as examples of North American and European companies that have 
developed CFTS. At the start of the research, the intention was to also include the Harney 
Sushi restaurant chain that has placed QR codes on their sushi products to provide diners with 
information about the tuna they were consuming. However, as the analysis progressed this 
case proved not to meet the criteria of a CFTS, it was more of an information platform than 
traceability instrument and was therefore not included in the analysis.  
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In order to make a detailed qualitative comparison between the six CFTS, we developed an 
interview topic list based on the indicators that we developed for analysing CFTS system 
features, drivers and performance (Figure 5.1). Using this list, 14 semi-structured (primarily 
telephone/Skype) interviews were conducted with actors responsible for implementing the 
traceability systems. For the most part, this included the supply chain manager but in some 
instances, third parties were responsible for implementing the system and were therefore also 
called upon. To supplement the interviews, we investigated the online component of the 
CFTS, using the criteria as the basis for analysis.  
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Traceability System Characteristics 
In order to have a picture of the different systems, their differences and similarities, the first 
stage of the analysis was to describe the socio-technical dimensions of the traceability 
systems. On the social level, we looked at when the systems were created, the scale, structure 
and reach of the companies or organisations implementing them and on a technical level, we 
examined the technology behind the CFTS, at the level of the vessel and the consumer-facing 
element (Table 5.2).  
Social Dimensions 
In all cases, consumer-facing traceability proved to be a recent development in the tuna 
industry for demonstrating ‘responsible’ tuna production. With the exception of Norpac, each 
of the systems has been in place for less than five years. This indicates that traceability for 
providing assurance of good practice is a recent addition to the sustainability discourse. Yet, if 
we look at the diversity of companies in this analysis, it is gaining in momentum and 
importance.  
Following form this, when looking at the scale and reach of the systems, the results clearly 
show that tuna CFTS are not the domain on particular type of supply chain. For instance, two 
out of six systems are implemented by brands – Ocean Naturals and John West – that are 
owned by Tri Marine and Thai Union respectively. Both of these holding companies are 
global companies trading tuna through a number of different brands. The traceability systems 
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are not being used on all of their brands however, which highlights that CFTS are not 
indicative of company-wide traceability but are instead almost a ‘niche’ product among a 
wider, more opaque production system. In contrast, Norpac and Pacifical are ‘primary 
systems’, meaning that the company managing the traceability system was not a subsidiary of 
a larger organisation but the sole manager of the system. These traceability systems are 
therefore more representative of company-wide practice. Through their CFTS, these 
companies can assure that all tuna they produce fit their system of traceability. The Solander 
system provides an alternative model whereby the supply chain is wholly owned by Solander 
but the CFTS has come about through interaction with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) and is a subsidiary to their other fish trade operations. This state-industry 
interaction is a pilot programme and provides an example of the convergence of state and 
market strategies over a common issue like traceability.  
Four of these companies, John West, Ocean Naturals, Norpac and Solander – all large-scale 
industrial operators – are vertically integrated; they are responsible for their own fleets, 
processing and exporting. The others are not vertically integrated, sourcing tuna from 
different companies and fishers. The fact that the actors operating on the largest scale are 
vertically integrated could indicate a limitation of CFTS, as tracing tuna through the supply 
chain of one company is more straightforward than for a company that is sourcing, processing 
and trading tuna through different channels.  
In looking at the social dimensions of the system, the outlier is the ThisFish CFTS. ThisFish 
is an NGO that is facilitating the consumer-facing platform for selling fish and is therefore not 
recognised as a company per se and thus is not classified as a primary/subsidiary system or as 
vertically integrated or not. This model of CFTS provides an example of a non-proprietary 
system that has greater freedom of operation, but which is also dependent on and limited by 
buy-in from companies to continue operation.  
Finally, variation also exists in terms of the scale and market reach of the operations of the 
organisations. Four of the systems trade internationally and operate on a large scale; one 
operates locally – ThisFish – and work on a micro scale. Ocean Naturals operates solely 
within the US but works on a large scale, selling to Wal-Mart, among other large retailers and 
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its parent company, Tri Marine, is a global company. This variation shows the extent to which 
traceability is being used to capture good practice within the industry.  
Technical Dimensions 
At the vessel level, VMS are in place on all boats apart from ThisFish associated vessels. 
Although, through work with EcoTrust, ThisFish vessels are equipped with a specific ‘smart 
box’ which provides similar information to that captured under the VMS and a hydraulics-
stimulated camera system to serve as an electronic observer. Additionally, vessels operating 
under Pacifical and Ocean Naturals (Tri Marine) also have 100 per cent on-board observer 
coverage. This is a legal requirement for purse seine vessels fishing in waters of countries that 
are signatories to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, which is where both 
companies source their tuna. Observers also operate on a small proportion of John West and 
Solander vessels. On some Norpac vessels, RFID systems are being trialled for individual 
fish/batch identification but this is not standard practice yet. The results indicate that while the 
technology exists and the value of on-board observers for verifying catch information is 
known, there is no consistency in the approach to assuring this very first stage of traceability.  
For the consumer-facing element of the systems, three of the companies – John West, 
Pacifical and Ocean Naturals – produce canned tuna with lot codes on the can. Consumers can 
enter these codes into the companies’ websites to get information about the tuna they are 
eating. For all three companies this includes information on vessel and vessel captain and for 
John West the batch in which the fish was caught. Pacifical tuna, which is not traded as a 
branded product but under the private label of retailers, is also MSC certified and therefore 
provides an additional layer of traceability that assures customers that the product they are 
consuming has full chain of custody certification. In the other cases, tuna is traded 
unprocessed, or as loins, and different ICT is used, providing different information about the 
tuna. ThisFish offers each consumer who purchase individual fish, a scannable bar code 
informing them who caught the fish, when, where and how. Additionally, ThisFish has an 
online platform through which consumers can connect to and ‘chat’ with the fishers whose 
fish they have purchased. Norpac also provides bar coded tuna, which informs on the species 
of tuna, the vessel and where the fish was caught. At present however, this information is only 
available at the retailer level. While the capacity exists within Norpac to extend the 
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traceability system to shop floor consumers, retailers have elected not to put it on their 
packaging. Finally, Solander sells their tuna to Anova, a global seafood company selling in 
US and Europe. The ‘traceable’ tuna they sell is currently MSC certified and thus sold with 
the ecolabel that ensures a certified chain of custody. Solander fish will also soon be sold with 
a bar code that will provide additional traceability information through a company called 
Traceall (independent of the MSC certification) and will inform consumers of the vessel, 
vessel captain, trip, boat, and potentially date of catch or date of landing (at the discretion of 
the retailer).  
The diversity of these consumer-facing elements illustrates two things. On the hand, it shows 
that the CFTS market is complex. There is no one system that stands out as the most popular 
strategy for consumer-facing traceability. However, on the other hand, the diversity shows a 
positive trend toward innovation for demonstrating commitments to responsible production. 
The market response to demonstrating sustainable practice has to date primarily occurred 
through certification and ecolabelling. The CFTS illustrate there is room for new instruments 
to be incorporated into production and consumption processes. 
5.6.2 Drivers 
Goals of the Systems 
Sustainability featured in all cases as a key goal for developing CFTS (Table 5.2), although 
Norpac – the oldest of the systems – was developed initially with the primary goal of 
improving business management, rather than demonstrating responsible fishing practices. The 
fact that sustainability was not seen as a main driver, illustrates that incorporating traceability 
in relation to sustainability of industrial practices was not a priority as recently as 2007. This 
is reiterated by the fact that since 2007, the Norpac system has become a model for 
advocating the potential value of traceability systems for responsible practice. Provenance 
also featured as an important goal behind CFTS. For instance, ThisFish placed emphasis on 
the value of their traceability system for provenance and getting consumers to “connect to the 
fisherman” who caught the fish they buy. For Pacifical provenance is key for promoting the 
Pacific Island countries where its tuna originates. Additionaly, companies considered 
responding to IUU fishing a main goal. Norpac states on its website that the “internally 
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developed Traceability System was in response to the industry’s need to prevent IUU 
fishing”. The FFA also mentioned IUU fishing as a key justification behind its partnership 
with Solander. The aim of the Traceall traceability project has been to contribute to FFA 
efforts to develop a region-wide catch documentation scheme. This has the knock-on effect of 
helping fisheries management operations more broadly. In spite of increased media and 
government attention, respondents did not mention seafood fraud as an issue they were 
aiming to deal with explicitly through these traceability systems. 
Internal Drivers 
Competitive advantage is a common internal driver for all companies to develop CFTS (Table 
5.2). The consumer-facing element of these systems provides a way for companies to convey 
to consumers that their tuna production practices are ‘responsible’. In the case of smaller 
operations like ThisFish, selling fish that can be traced to a particular fisher is done with the 
expressed intention of “rewarding fishers” through product mark-up and providing them with 
market and value chain information to maximise the efficiency of their production. In the 
larger, branded canned tuna companies, respondents explained that CFTS offer a competitive 
advantage over other non-coded brands, but do not include a price premium on the ‘traceable’ 
cans.  
Other internal drivers included certification, proof of good practice and risk mitigation. The 
relation of CFTS to certification was a key driver for both Pacifical and Solander tuna, which 
are now MSC certified. MSC certification is cited as a means for ensuring access to North 
American and European markets, where large supermarket and restaurant chains have 
committed to selling only certified sustainable seafood by 2015 (Bush, Belton et al. 2013). In 
the Solander case, MSC certification provides them with the means to trade with Anova 
Seafood and thus access the EU market. A number of respondents also explained that a driver 
behind their traceability system was to provide physical evidence to consumers of the validity 
of the broader practices of sustainable production of their companies. They explained that 
through their traceability systems, they could show that they caught fish using lower impact 
fishing methods, or from healthy stocks. Finally, the canned tuna companies cited risk 
mitigation as one of the primary internal drivers for their CFTS. With a number of 
respondents referring to recent Greenpeace canned tuna league-tables (e.g. Greenpeace 2011; 
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Greenpeace 2013b), CFTS has been described as a form of insurance against the threat of 
exposure by NGOs.  
External Drivers 
The sustainable seafood movement has been increasingly playing a role in influencing 
processes of production and consumption (Iles 2007; Konefal 2013). The results support this, 
as canned tuna companies cited NGOs as one of the key external drivers behind their 
traceability system (Table 5.2). Beyond being solely concerned with risk mitigation, in North 
America especially and increasingly in Europe, NGOs are partnering with retailers and big 
brands. According to one industry actor, “In the US it’s quite prevalent that all the major 
retailers that sell canned tuna have some form of NGO partner that advises them on their 
seafood procurement that includes tuna … There’s typically a traceability element to that 
[partnership], if they are advising their partners on procurement.”  
In four cases companies also cited retailers as an external driver. In Northern Europe in 
particular and in North America, traceability is of growing concern. Scandals such as the 
European horse meat scandal have drawn attention to issues of traceability, leading to 
renewed efforts on the part of retailers to reassure consumers that products can be traceable. 
However, as one leading global retailer explained, in terms of traceability supermarkets are a 
“worst case scenario”. The magnitude of products available and the complexity of their 
supply chains mean full product traceability is very difficult. Retailers have cited 
commitments to traceability on their websites and in their corporate social responsibility 
reports but due to this complexity, they do not promote in-house consumer-facing traceability, 
as is the case of Norpac. Instead, they place pressure on upstream actors to demonstrate 
traceability. Therefore, retailers might prefer a company that has an explicit consumer-facing 
traceability system in place as compared to a competitor without such a system.  
In contrast to the rest of the CFTS, the ‘external’ driver behind the development of the 
ThisFish system was demand by fishers. A mixture of fluctuating prices, predicted increases 
in government regulation and the costs associated with complying with monitoring 
requirements drove fishers to initiate the programme with the Canadian NGO, Ecotrust. The 
aim was to “marry material traceability with social networking” and “get ahead of the curve” 
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in terms of government requirements, while branding themselves in a consumer-friendly way. 
Additionally, through the online platform fishers are able to gauge consumer interest, offering 
potential to adapt production practices if necessary. 
None of the representatives of the systems cited consumers as a direct driver for the 
introduction of their CFTS. Consumers have not gone unnoticed as they provide the end-point 
for sale and are thus being used by NGOs for leverage, but they are not seen to drive CFTS. 
One environmental campaigning NGO exemplified this during an interview by stating, “We 
use consumers opportunistically to some extent. We are seeking to establish champions and a 
race to the top to demonstrate they [companies] will be left behind and losing easy market 
share or competitive advantage if they don’t join in the race”.  
5.6.3 Traceability Performance  
The previous section demonstrated that the diversity of the CFTS in terms of the scale, 
structure and reach of the companies and organisations implementing them, and in terms of 
the technical dimensions of the systems themselves. In order to look at their performance, we 
now go on to analyse each of the systems using the four CFTS performance indicators, and 
rating them according to red, amber and green colour code (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4).  
Verifiability 
The results show a variety of verification arrangements in place across the CFTS. At one end 
of the spectrum, the two MSC certified systems are audited under the MSC chain of custody 
certification programme. This is in place to ensure whole-chain traceability of fish caught 
from the certified fishery, to ensure that fishing practices are in accordance with the terms of 
the certification and thus that the final product does not contain a mix of certified and non-
certified tuna. This led us to rate both Pacifical and Solander as green. In addition, the 
Solander albacore longline fishery will gain further independent verification through the 
Traceall system when it is operational. The Norpac system is also externally verified by the 
NGO FishWise.  
Conversely, ThisFish conducts only an internal monitoring of the system. As a ‘fisher driven’ 
system, the decision for internal monitoring was made so as not to incur greater cost. The fact 
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that the system is implemented by an NGO gives greater legitimacy to fishers. However, not 
opting for third-party verification may lead to problems in the market because, while ThisFish 
are independent of the fishers themselves, they manage the CFTS and are therefore not an 
independent auditing body. John West describes that it runs “internal checks” on supply 
chains but the level of vigour behind these checks is not transparent. In light of these 
verification arrangements both systems received a red classification. Ocean Naturals received 
an orange classification because, while they have an internal chain of custody, they are 
working toward external chain of custody auditing.  
Depth and responsiveness 
Looking at both the depth and responsiveness of these systems provides an understanding of 
the degree of information that is flowing to consumers and the extent to which the systems are 
responsive to consumers. This indicates whether or not companies and organisations 
responsible for the CFTS have to adapt their production practices to accommodate traceability 
demands.  
Four of the systems only provide consumers with one level of information: when consumers 
scan their (bar/can) code they come to a page of information about the origins of their tuna 
product but that is where the information delivery stops. In contrast, with ThisFish there are 
multiple layers of information available which are gradually revealed based on the depth of 
knowledge desired by the consumer once they have filled in their tracing code on the website. 
This includes detailed catch information, such as date of landing, and the fishing and handling 
methods used, with opportunity to find out more about the fishery from which it came and the 
fisheries management for that fishery. There is also a link to the fisher, their logbook and a 
discussion board where consumers can connect directly with the fishery whose fish they have 
purchased. This feature makes the ThisFish system highly interactive and the only example of 
a green rated system.  
Amber rated systems provide consumers with the opportunity of connecting with downstream 
actors responsible for implementing the CFTS. Ocean Naturals has a pop-up window on their 
website where the consumer can connect directly to the marketing manager. This option runs 
throughout the Ocean Naturals website, not just through their traceability platform and the 
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degree to which it is responsive to the questions of consumers is unclear. In the case of 
Pacifical and Solander, the MSC certification provides an additional, information stream 
providing detailed traceability information. However, this is only available to consumers 
should they seek it additionally. At the other, red end of the spectrum, the CFTS of John West 
are not directly responsive to consumers. The websites only offer a one-way downstream flow 
of information, with no capacity for upstream interaction. Norpac has not been evaluated with 
respect to responsiveness because the shop-floor consumer is not yet a part of the CFTS. 
Scale of Market Impact 
The final element of the analysis of performance is market impact. Those systems classified 
green are mainstream companies like John West, Pacifical, and Ocean Naturals that are 
producing and selling tuna globally on a large scale. This is particularly the case for John 
West. They are also sourcing from an industrial fishery, using purse seines, which capture 
nearly 62 per cent of the 4.2 million tons of tuna caught globally every year (ISSF 2014). In 
contrast Solander and Norpac were rated amber because they are producing and selling 
fresh/frozen tuna globally and sourcing from industrial fisheries but using longlines which 
contribute to around 15 per cent of the global tuna catch (Allen, Joseph et al. 2010), 
considerably less than purse seines.  
The only CFTS to be rated red was ThisFish because of the relatively limited scope the 
system currently has selling to restaurants and retailers However this does not say anything 
about their potential market penetration. The system can in principle be expanded to include a 
wider range of products and markets. There remains considerable potential to expand the 
impact of the ThisFish system, but it currently constitutes more niche North American market. 
This is particularly the case for tuna, which currently makes up a very small proportion of the 
fish that are traced through the ThisFish platform. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
John West Europe Norpac Ocean Naturals Pacifical Solander ThisFish
Year system was founded 2011 2004 2013 2011 2012 2010
Primary system/subsidiary Subsidiary Primary system Subsidiary Primary system Primary system N/A
System manager Yes Yes Yes Yes Co-managed Yes
Number of links that tuna can 
be traced to
5 - 6 (with cold storage) 4 7 3 5+ Depends
Vertically integrated Yes Yes Yes
No (but employing 
vertically integrated 
companies)
Yes N/A
Scale (micro/macro) Macro Macro Macro Macro Meso Micro
Market reach Global Global US Global Global Canadian
Traceable unit (fisher or boat or 
fish)
Batch, Vessel and fisher Individual fish Vessel and fisher Vessel and fisher
Vessel under MSC, 
moving to individual fish 
under Traceall system
Individual fish
Tuna only? No No Yes Yes No No
Product Branded Canned tuna Fresh/frozen tuna Branded Canned tuna Private label canned tuna Fresh/frozen tuna Fresh/frozen tuna
Vessel level Instruments
VMS, Paper log books, 
Working on batch-based 
bar-coding system, some 
observer coverage
VMS, RFID (not fleet-
wide)
VMS, onboard observers
VMS, onboard 
observers
7-8% observer coverage, 
VMS, log sheet data, full 
dockside landing 
recording 
Boat 'smart boxes'
Consumer-facing instruments Can code, Some ecolabel Bar code Can code
Can code, Website 
platform, Ecolabel
Bar code
Website platform, Bar 
code
Goal of the system Sustainability
To start: Enhanced business 
management. Now: 
preventing IUU fishing
Sustainability
Sustainability and 
provenance. Soon to be 
SA800 certified for good 
labour practice
IUU fishing and 
sustainability
Provenance
External drivers/governance
NGOs and as a result 
retailers
To start: None. Now: NGO 
and retailer commitments
NGOs and retailers NGOs and retailers Retailers and consumers
Government pressures, 
Fishers
Internal drivers/governance
Competitive advantage, 
Risk mitigation, 
Documentation for 
sustainability 
commitments, Future 
certification
Competitive advantage, 
Chain of communication, 
Market differentiation 
Competitive advantage, 
Risk mitigation, 
Documentation for 
sustainability commitments, 
Resource security
Competitive advantage, 
Risk mitigation, 
Certification, 
Documentation for 
sustainability 
commitment, Resource 
security, Tourism
Competitive advantage, 
Chain of communication, 
Certification
Competitive advantage, 
Chain of 
communication, Market 
differentiation 
Verification Internal checks
Audits by FishWise and 
MRAG
Internal auditing, working 
toward 3rd party
Third party verification of 
MSC
MSC chain of custody 
and Traceall will provide 
a traceability audit
Self-auditing 
Levels/depth of information 
provided by ICT system
One level One level One level One level One level Four (or more) levels 
Interactivity
None - one way 
information flow 
Retailers have a direct line to 
Norpac but shop-floor 
consumers are not yet 
involved in the traceability 
system
Pop-up window on site to 
connect to the marketing 
director
None - one way 
information flow 
None - one way 
information flow 
Interactive - information 
flow both ways through 
interactive message 
board facility
Scale of market impact Macro/mainstream Meso/mid-level Macro/mainstream Macro/mainstream Meso/mid-level Micro/niche
Drivers
Traceability 
system 
characteristics
Performance
Table 5.3 Summary of the CFTS features, the drivers behind their implementation and their performance 
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Table 5.4 Performance of the CFTS according to their scaled categorisation of red, 
amber and green 
 
5.7 Discussion 
This paper has provided an initial look into CFTS in North American and European 
markets. This is a very new development in the tuna market and reflects the attention 
being given to principles like transparency and accountability within the sustainable 
seafood movement (Iles 2007; Bush, Toonen et al. 2013). All of the CFTS 
investigated in this study have opened up facets of tuna production to consumers. In 
so doing, they have reached the fifth stage of traceability systems by providing 
‘Information communication to the consumer’. However, through compiling the 
different performance indicators for Table 5.4, it is clear that the systems approach 
this stage from very different development trajectories. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that each of the CFTS are preforming well in at least one category, but likewise 
are challenged in at least one area as well. None of the systems maintain a green 
rating across all indicators, neither are any rated red in every category. Therefore, 
each of the system is constrained in ways that are preventing them from meeting all of 
the objectives of the fifth stage of traceability systems. 
According to Coff and colleagues (2008), a CFTS fulfilling the objectives of this 
stage demonstrate transparency of the production history of a product, which allows 
consumers to compare different products on production qualities. It must also respond 
to consumer concerns and information demands, demonstrating a capacity for public 
participation. With reference to these objectives, three bottlenecks emerge around 
transparency, public participation and market spread, that are hindering the tuna 
CFTS from meeting all of the objectives.  
John	
West	
Norpac Ocean	
Naturals
Pacifical Solander ThisFish
Verification
Depth
Responsiveness
Market	impact
Lowest rating 
Mid rating 
Highest rating 
 N/A 
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The first bottleneck relates to transparency, which Coff and his colleagues cite in two 
of their objectives for stage five traceability systems. But they do not elaborate what 
transparency means beyond ‘production history’ and ‘informed consumer choice’. We 
argue that transparency can be elaborated in more detail based on what Mol (2013) 
has discerned as ‘consumer transparency’ and ‘public transparency’. Consumer 
transparency is the disclosure of information to consumers to support claims around 
sustainability of production and articulated in information systems aimed at price 
premiums and niche market competitiveness. For the most part, tuna CFTS appear to 
provide this level of transparency and fulfil at least one of the aims of price premiums 
and/or niche market competitiveness. However, the John West CFTS has relatively 
weak transparency given verification remains internal, which – in conjunction with 
having only limited observer coverage on board their vessels – creates any substantive 
understanding of production processes highly problematic. Providing consumers with 
only one level of information and no possibility to respond to upstream chain actors 
about the information they receive further limits the degree of transparency evident in 
their CFTS. Therefore, while the system offers a degree of consumer transparency, it 
does not meet the Coff et al.’s objective of facilitating informed consumer choice.  
Public transparency relates to the use of CFTS to mitigate the risk of public exposure 
by the media and NGOs. If we look at the drivers behind CFTS, the larger companies 
all cite risk mitigation as one major internal driver behind installing CFTS. However, 
as the John West case demonstrates, the existence of a CFTS does not mean full 
transparency. In fact, rather than mitigating risk, without reforming their internal 
structures these systems could leave companies vulnerable to further reputational risk, 
should the validity of their traceability claims be scrutinised. This creates a dilemma 
for these larger companies: in choosing traceability as an instrument for 
demonstrating their commitment to responsible sourcing they have also increased the 
expectation on transparency. Therefore, for these companies to live up to new, self-
defined conditions of transparency they would have to change their modes of 
operation, through for example increased vessel-level reporting and monitoring and 
allowing external auditing of their CFTS. 
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With the exception of ThisFish, all systems analysed in this paper received a red or 
amber rating for their responsiveness and the depth of information provided to 
consumers. This indicates that public participation is another bottleneck. It therefore 
appears that CFTS offer a consumer-facing instrument and endorse the need for 
traceability of production processes, but offer little chance for public participation that 
would respond to consumer concerns. To meaningfully fulfil the objective of public 
participation, companies would have to use these systems to inform consumers about 
processes of tuna production and open themselves up to consumer engagement. 
However, in a highly competitive market like tuna, only a limited number of 
companies want details of their production practices being made publicly available. 
This raises the question whether CFTS are primarily a marketing tool or a system 
developed by companies to be accountable for practices of production. Through 
CFTS, companies have the means to endorse traceability, a core theme of the 
sustainable seafood movement, while demonstrating no discernible change in their 
production practices.  
However, looked at in another way, the mainstream producers like John West and 
Ocean Natural have a large consumer base and therefore have the potential to engage 
a wider number of consumers and citizens with issues of fisheries sustainability. 
While ThisFish is an example of a responsive system able to provide both multiple 
layers of information and customer feedback, it is also a relatively small/niche 
system. This makes public participation easier compared with the globally trading 
companies like John West and Ocean Naturals. This indicates that while the ThisFish 
system has the potential to transform its own production practices to meet the 
requirements of their traceability system, the bottleneck they could face is that their 
transformative capacity remains limited to the niche market they cover. This indicates 
a trade-off between achieving greater public participation and reaching the 
mainstream market. 
The final limitation CFTS are facing concerns the extent to which they are penetrating 
the global market. Coff and colleagues did not cite this explicitly as an objective of 
this final stage for ethical traceability system. However, one of their objectives is that 
CFTS provide the ability to compare different products (Coff et al. 2008). Therefore, 
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market spread can relate to both the global reach of a product as we have discussed 
previously and the degree to which different markets offer a range of tuna products 
with CFTS to give consumers choice.  
This objective of providing consumers with the ability to compare different products 
remains a system-wide limitation. As a relatively new concept in tuna production and 
consumption, CFTS are yet to be widespread in the market. At present, the systems 
rarely overlap in the market. This means that while companies with a CFTS might 
have the competitive edge over a competitor with no CFTS, we have not reached the 
point where shop-floor/dockside comparisons between systems targeting the same 
(niche/mainstream, fresh/frozen/canned) market are possible.  
These bottlenecks constrain CFTS in achieving all the objectives for providing 
information to consumers. Nonetheless, to varying extents, each of the traceability 
systems are moving towards Coff et al.’s ‘stage five’ of consumer facing traceability. 
However, what the framework does not draw out is that by tackling issues of 
sustainable production and consumption, traceability systems do not only facilitate the 
flow of information from producers to consumers in order for them to make more 
informed purchasing decisions. They also facilitate interaction between a wider range 
of actors in the production network, such as states (in the case of both Solander and 
Pacfical), retailers and critically, environmental NGOs. This supports results in the 
wider literature on informational governance that indicate that environmental decision 
making is being transformed by informational processes, technologies and institutions 
leading to multi-actor, and in the case of tuna, transnational forms of environmental 
governance (Mol 2006, 2008; Toonen 2013). Informational demands are therefore 
shaped through networked collaboration with a wide range of public and private 
actors. 
In looking at consumer-facing traceability in the context of fisheries and 
sustainability, as a platform for broader, network-level interaction we see there is 
opportunity to extended Coff et al.’s framework beyond ‘stage five’. This fifth stage 
does not really mention very strongly or explicitly the possibilities of consumers 
communicating back to upstream supply chain actors and with that influencing the 
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tuna production network. Hence, a potential stage six for ethical traceability could 
resemble how the two-way interactions that CFTS facilitate can contribute to the 
reshaping of global tuna consumption and production. This is not to say that stage six 
CFTS have or would lead to more informed consumers that would demand higher 
quality information from industry and seek to interact with supply chain actors. Our 
results indicate that this is in fact not what drives the development of these systems. 
What it does show however and is worth investigating further, is the potential these 
systems have for governance innovation; bringing previously disconnected 
constellations of actors together who can drive information disclosure through the 
development and implementation of CFTS, with the common goal of responding to 
issues around sustainability in tuna production. 
Therefore, the next step for analysis goes beyond examining the bottlenecks for 
providing consumers with information, to look at how demands for information both 
within and external to the production chain are impacting global production 
dynamics. This ‘governance by disclosure’ sees information as central to how actors 
build strategic compromises and coalitions of actors seeking to transform production 
and consumption processes toward sustainability (Gupta 2010; Levy 2011). 
Inevitably, these interactions are influenced by the capacity of actors to meet 
information demands and could produce what Mol (2008) calls “informational 
peripheries.” This refers to information-poor environments where information 
disclosure is constrained by economic, political, organisational and cultural factors. 
The lack of capacity for information disclosure in some parts of the world could mean 
this sort of governance innovation will present a barrier to poorer producers. 
Alternatively, should traceability through CFTS become more commonplace and 
information made more available to fishers in these ‘peripheries’, it could help to 
overcome such barriers by providing new flows of information leading to 
empowerment. Therefore, for tuna CFTS to transform production and consumption 
processes, innovative instruments that target sustainability need also to be accessible 
in these peripheries.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
This paper is the first to address the diversity of CFTS, its drivers and the potential of 
these systems to change the sustainability performance of tuna production. Through 
the paper we can see diversity across the CFTS. In terms of their market, they exist 
for both fresh/frozen and canned tuna, spanning global and niche markets. Therefore, 
while they are not widely implemented, they do occur throughout the global tuna 
production network. Technologically there is more coherence, as information is 
presented in all systems as either a bar or can code. However, through the codes 
consumers are presented with information that is diverse in its detail and capacity for 
response.  
In terms of the drivers behind CFTS, understanding that mitigating against 
reputational risk is a key internal driver and that NGOs are a key external driver, 
brings the central role the sustainable seafood movement into focus. Through 
responding to information demands from this movement, CFTS are providing a key 
point of interaction between different groups of actors engaging in sustainability of 
tuna production and consumption.  
However, from the cases examined we can see that for the most part, the systems 
analysed illustrate that consumer-facing traceability is a nascent approach that is 
producing varied degrees of transformation inside the supply chain. On the one hand, 
there are those that are part of the globalised companies like John West and Ocean 
Naturals, responding to global pressures around traceability. On the other hand, there 
are systems like ThisFish that are more consumer-oriented. This leaves the door open 
for further expansion within the industry but with the caveat that such expansion does 
not automatically lead to more sustainable production practices.  
Looking outside the tuna supply chain, the engagement of actors such as NGOs and 
retailers in traceability dialogues highlights a broader shift in the sustainable seafood 
movement toward the use of market-based approaches to fisheries governance. This 
illustrates how, through instruments like CFTS new constellations of actors can 
interact to tackle issues of sustainable production and consumption. Therefore, CFTS 
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should also be valued from the numbers of global actors and institutions engaging 
with producing, having access to and making use of information. 
This paper focused on European and North-American markets, but the largest 
challenges for CFTS are of course to be found outside these market. What does the 
shift toward CFTS means in the context of increased demand from developed 
countries for sustainability standards in general (e.g. Ward and Phillips 2009; Lay 
2013; Leadbitter and Benguerel 2013)? This would engage with potential ‘North-
South’ divides that are emerging as developed country markets are expecting 
increasingly standardised and differentiated seafood products, which thus precludes 
some of the smaller scale, often developing country fishers from their markets. A 
phase shift in the North American and European markets for heightened information 
disclosure and the application of ICTs could present a further barrier to trade to 
developing country producers. On the other hand, it would be interesting to examine 
the potential for CFTS to present an opportunity in markets like Japan where 
assurance around legality is a key concern among consumers. 
 
  
 Conclusion Chapter 6.
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have looked at governance innovations for sustainability in 
tuna fisheries. Increased catch rates to meet rising consumer demand have resulted in 
an estimated one-third of global tuna stocks being classified as overexploited, 37.5 
per cent fully exploited, leaving only 29 per cent non-fully exploited (FAO 2012). 
However, tuna fisheries are among the most highly capitalised and valuable fisheries 
in the world (Campling 2012) and their exploitation will continue for the foreseeable 
future. This means the sustainability of tuna stocks is a pressing global issue that has 
received attention from a wide range of societal actors.  
Due to the highly mobile nature of tuna, as well as the international composition of 
the fishing fleets, management has occurred at an intergovernmental level through 
regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). However, there has been 
extensive criticism about the inability of these state-based institutions to govern 
fisheries sustainably. In their assessment of all RFMOs, Cullis-Susuki and Pauly 
reported widespread failure of RFMOs stating that “The priority of RFMOs – or at 
least of their member countries – has been first and foremost to guide the exploitation 
of fish stocks” (2010: 7).  
The failure of states to govern tuna stocks has shifted attention to market-based 
sustainable tuna management, with certification and ecolabelling promoted as the 
leading strategy. However, there has also been criticism of market-based strategies 
like ecolabelling because inter alia: their limited market coverage and impact; their 
accountability only to market dynamics; and their selective coverage of sustainability 
issues. Therefore, the market also does not offer stand-alone solutions. Instead, 
strategies are needed that incorporate both state and market interests and those of the 
wider community involved in tuna conservation and management.  
Through this thesis, I have examined some of the governance innovations that 
different groups of actors are producing in response to these problems. To understand 
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the interconnectivity of the different innovative strategies, the cases have been 
analysed in the broader context of the tuna global production network (GPN) of which 
they are a part. In returning to Coe et al.’s definition that GPNs are centred on “the 
nexus of interconnected functions, operations and transactions through which a 
specific product or service is produced, distributed and consumed” (2008: 274), we 
can see that the cases in this thesis involved different GPNs, and that the governance 
actors and innovations are not restricted to a single GPN. Therefore, as the cases are 
not being used comparatively, this conclusion makes general reference to ‘the tuna 
GPN’ to encompass all the actors and activities of tuna production and consumption. 
Within the tuna GPN sub-networks of actors involved in the production of tuna are 
linked with those involved in its governance. Each case combined these sub-networks 
of actors and analysed how they influenced each other and as a result, the wider 
architecture of the tuna industry. In addition, literature on regionalism, EU external 
regulation and informational governance provided specific analytical focus on 
governance themes drawn out through the empirical research, and supplemented the 
GPN framework.  
The central research question of this thesis was: How do different market- and state-
led governance innovations advance the governance of sustainable tuna? This final 
chapter answers this research question and formulates the conclusions of this thesis. 
In section two, I will focus on the individual case studies to answer the research 
question. Section three examines the dimensions of the governance innovations to 
answer the central research question. Building from this, section four will go beyond 
governance innovations to look at the wider role of sustainability governance in the 
tuna GPN and the contribution of this research to theory on GPN governance. Section 
five concludes with some policy recommendations and areas for future research.  
6.2 Key Research Findings 
6.2.1 State-Led Innovations for Sustainable Tuna Governance 
As tuna is a transboundary and highly migratory fish stock, state-led governance 
demands go beyond individual nation states to regional and in the case of the Western 
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and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), sub-regional governance bodies. Additionally, 
the globalisation of the tuna industry, coupled with the introduction of regional 
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) has seen distant water fishing nations, 
like the EU, playing a role in governance of external fisheries. This section will first 
consider the innovative governance arrangement emerging from the interaction of the 
West and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA) and second, look at the governance role the EU is playing in 
the region, through their Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing 
Regulation.  
To understand governance arrangements within the WCPO, the analysis in Chapter 2 
used the regionalism literature to examine the complex web of treaties, conventions 
and institutional frameworks operating in there (Tsamenyi, Palma et al. 2009). The 
results illustrate the driving role the PNA has adopted in developing and 
implementing innovative conservation and management measures in the WCPO. It 
has introduced measures explicitly targeting sustainability, mainly in purse seine 
fisheries, including: high seas pocket closures; new access arrangements around the 
purse seine vessel day scheme (VDS); and successful Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) certification of fish aggregating device (FAD)-free purse seine fisheries. Some 
of these measures have been adopted at the regional, WCPFC level. Through seeding 
the WCPFC with some of their management measures, the analysis shows that 
international sub-regions can go beyond functional units to provide opportunities for 
regionalism. Additionally, the PNA is using their involvement in the WCPFC to 
challenge the WCPFC’s performance. This has stimulated greater debate and progress 
within the regional body. In return, PNA measures are subject to greater scrutiny from 
the wider WCPFC, which in turn holds the potential to make these measures more 
robust. While the sub-regional – regional dynamic is not entirely harmonious, the 
measures produced by an interaction between the PNA and the WCPFC are 
effectively an innovation to state-led models of sustainability governance.  
Broadening the focus of state-led governance to actors beyond the WCPO, the thesis 
examined the EU’s IUU Regulation in the WCPO. As the first official and legally 
binding IUU fishing regulation, this regulation stands as a landmark innovation in 
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state-led fisheries governance targeting a key sustainability issue. The examination of 
the implementation and uptake of this regulation in Chapter 3 used the concepts of 
‘Market Power Europe’ and ‘Normative Power Europe’. From the empirical work, 
our analysis shows that the EU is primarily using its position as the world’s largest 
tuna market to ensure uptake of their IUU Regulation by attaching compliance with it 
to their trade agreements as a condition of market access. Therefore, in the case of the 
EU’s IUU regulation, its position as a market actor – ‘Market Power Europe’ – gives 
the EU the power to make countries wishing to trade on their market follow their 
standards.  
However, looking at market power alone assumes that the traditionally more powerful 
bodies like the EU will always win over the less powerful. It does not provide room 
for resistance and other forms of political negotiation. In contrast, this case 
demonstrated that strong sub-regional governance structures like the PNA can provide 
collective ‘counter-power’ to an economically strong actor like the EU. Pacific island 
countries have been able to exploit their position in the WCPFC as a collective of 
resource owners to criticise the EU’s normative stance and to ‘push back’ against EU 
demands, thus resisting wholesale acceptance of a EU IUU regulatory agenda. 
Therefore, as opposed to the power afforded to the EU through its market, in the 
WCPO regional governance fora, the political power asymmetry falls in the Pacific 
Island countries’ favour.  
The implication of these dynamics for sustainability is not straightforward. On the one 
hand, the EU’s IUU Regulation represents a much-needed response to the global 
problem of stock depletion through IUU fishing. However, as a tool that primarily 
serves their market interests, there will and has been resistance to it from countries 
with limited interest in the EU market. Therefore, the impact of the EU IUU 
Regulation as an innovative governance instrument will be limited in fostering 
regional sustainable production practices if uptake remains selective.  
In the WCPO, state-led strategies are providing a vital source of governance 
innovation. Both the EU and actors in the WCPO are working independently and 
inter-dependently on innovations that are shaping the governance landscape within 
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the region. This confounds the claims that state-led strategies are failing and unable to 
stimulate innovations in governance. However, state-led governance innovations for 
sustainable tuna production and consumption are only part of the picture. At the GPN 
level it is necessary to also examine the contribution of non-state (firm and NGO) 
actors.  
6.2.2 Market-Led Innovations for Sustainable Tuna Governance 
The use of certification and standards for sustainability represents a significant 
development in the market-led governance of the tuna GPN. Certification is no longer 
considered a new tool for sustainability in fisheries. In fact, the certification landscape 
is becoming increasingly crowded with multiple certification bodies currently 
available (e.g. Jacquet and Pauly 2007; Parkes, Young et al. 2010). Therefore, the 
interaction between standards becomes an important aspect of this form of market-led 
governance. In Chapter 4, this interaction was analysed through looking at 
certification credibility and authority to understand which impacts the uptake of one 
ecolabel over another. Through examining the interaction between the Earth Island 
Institute (EII) and the MSC we found that over and above credibility, authority was 
the definitive factor in determining the uptake of one ecolabel over another by firm 
actors. By analysing the apparent tension between credibility and authority, Chapter 4 
provided insights into the ways in which certification schemes operating within a 
GPN interact with each other and how this can promote or stifle governance 
innovation.  
Understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and without credibility, 
in the context of sustainability standards opens up an understanding of how, in the 
case of MSC and EII, their interaction restricted governance innovation in the GPN 
towards more sustainable fishing practices. By retaining authority from a position of 
weak credibility, EII are in effect preventing firms from promoting non-‘Dolphin 
Safe’ sustainable certified tuna products in the market, and ultimately inhibiting any 
wider impact certification can have in tuna fisheries. We called this situation an 
‘innovation stalemate’, whereby the less credible (yet incumbent) certification system 
is resisting relinquishing their authority to a more credible ‘competitor’. This 
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understanding of authority presents a new dimension of power in GPNs. One in which 
environmental NGOs are no longer the more traditionally recognised underdog but a 
dominant actor influencing GPN governance.  
The final case of market-led governance innovation in the tuna GPN examined in this 
thesis was the use of consumer facing traceability systems (CFTS) by tuna firms. The 
analysis in Chapter 5 showed that dominant GPN firms have started to incorporate 
CFTS into their production processes. This insinuates a consumer-turn in the tuna 
GPN, and a new phase in sustainable fisheries governance in which traceability goes 
beyond ‘surveillance’ to provide a tool for demonstrating responsible fishing 
production practices. From our analysis in Chapter 5, of six CFTS all have opened up 
facets of tuna production to consumers but from very different development 
trajectories. This is demonstrated by the fact that each of the CFTS are preforming 
well in some ways but challenged in others. The different systems face bottlenecks 
around the issues of transparency, public participation and market reach, which is 
limiting their transformative potential.  
A central aspect of the study of CFTS was the role of information disclosure through 
CFTS. While information and communication technology (ICT) has been recognised 
in the GPN literature as playing a central role in shaping and transforming global 
networks, it has tended to be treated as an inherent aspect of GPNs. It underlies the 
development and maintenance of network connections, rather than providing systems 
with the potential to transform GPN governance. Chapter 5’s exploration of CFTS 
demonstrated that through innovations in ICT, sustainability information generation, 
transmission and use within global tuna production is increasingly commonplace, 
with a greater number of network actors engaging in processes of information 
provision and information consumption.  
In each of the cases of market-led governance, we can see NGOs playing a central 
role in governance innovation. In the case of certification, NGOs are producing the 
standards that firm actors and in the case of the PNA, state actors, are trying to fulfil. 
With the CFTS, the NGOs are engaging with lead firms either as a partner or 
watchdog, providing an external driver behind their CFTS. Therefore, market-led 
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governance innovations necessarily encompass NGO activity and not just firm actors. 
The incorporation of NGOs as driver behind a number of the governance innovations 
underscores the difficulty of categorising the governance innovation landscape is 
being state- or market-led. 
6.2.3 Blurred Boundaries 
GPN governance analyses have traditionally looked at governance as being either 
state-led or market/lead-firm-led. These have placed production at the core of their 
understanding of governance, looking to state-led governance to explain the socio-
political context in which production is occurring (Levy 2008) and looking at market 
actors to understand intra-firm governance. However, the cases in this thesis indicate 
that this state- and market-led distinction is inadequate for understanding 
sustainability governance in the tuna GPN. Instead, the boundaries between actor 
groups are blurred. State, market and NGO actors are all demonstrating that their 
capacity for governance innovation is not derived from being state- or market-led, but 
is instead generated from their interactions with each other in the context of the tuna 
GPN.  
The first instance of blurred boundaries is evident in the case of the WCPFC and 
PNA. Here state-led measures have direct ramifications on all producers fishing in the 
WCPO, as they must organise their production practices in line with WCPFC and/or 
PNA requirements. States remain a key actor in defining the production processes of 
firm actors, but the PNA MSC certification has drawn in non-state governance that 
has in turn led to innovation in the conservation and management measures being 
employed in the region. The Pacifical brand – the company that was MSC certified – 
is 50 per cent owned by the PNA. This makes the PNA a hybrid organisation, 
interacting within the tuna GPN as both a firm and non-firm actor. It is therefore 
evident that not only firms seek to legitimise their roles in GPNs through certification 
and NGO engagement, but also states; using the certification process as a key element 
of their overarching, in this case sub-regional, governance strategy. 
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The connection between state and market governance also comes through the EU IUU 
Regulation, which directly influences production practices within the tuna GPN. All 
companies trading with the EU have to comply with the Regulation’s catch 
certification requirements and if processing the tuna, have to operate in countries with 
a verified competent authority. The regulation is therefore a state-led market 
regulation, influencing the practices of both state and market actors. 
Finally, while CFTS are primarily being introduced by firm actors, and could 
therefore be classified as market-led, the direct and indirect pressure from NGOs 
provided the main impetus for their development. NGOs have both lobbied for firms 
to demonstrate increased traceability and have formed partnerships with firms to 
develop the traceability instruments themselves. They are therefore acting as both 
watchdog and advisor to drive their sustainability agenda through firm actors. This 
illustrates the role NGOs are playing in producing governance innovations. By 
benefiting from not being confined to the role of state nor market actor, NGOs are 
emerging as a key driver behind governance innovations.  
Looking at the overlap between the different groups of actors at the system’s level, it 
is apparent that none of these innovative arrangements is operating in isolation to the 
others. The boundaries are blurred between the different approaches, meaning it is not 
sufficient to look at whether governance is either market- or state-led, or even to look 
at what the different groups of actors are doing without understanding their 
connection to the other groups in the GPN. Therefore, for governance innovation to 
proliferate, actors should not be defined by the governance role they are assigned, but 
instead be considered as part of a governance innovation network, targeting 
sustainability in GPNs. The following section will focus on the concept of governance 
innovation networks, looking first at what the concept means and then at the 
dimensions that contribute to how they function.  
6.3 Governance Innovation Networks 
This thesis looked at governance innovations for sustainability of tuna in the tuna 
GPN. Innovations for sustainability, also called ‘eco-innovations’, have been 
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described as being either technical, organisational, social or institutional (Rennings 
1998). Technical innovations focus on new ‘curative and preventive’ technologies, 
which in the context of this thesis could relate to the emergent CFTS. Organisational 
innovations relate to management instruments like eco-audits, such as the MSC 
certification process. Social innovations are those that target social practices for 
example changing consumer behaviour and in this thesis come out strongest when 
looking at the overarching activities of the sustainable seafood movement, like their 
drive for certification and traceability. Finally, institutional innovations concern 
improved decision-making through activities like new ways of conducting 
environmental monitoring, like the EU’s IUU Regulation. This latter form of 
innovation touches upon governance but the innovation is still procedural and not 
relational. While each of the cases in this thesis illustrates innovations in line with this 
typology, what we have found is that looking at them individually does not provide an 
understanding of their capacity for galvanising greater innovation at the network 
level.  
However, when expanding focus to the network level we are confronted with the 
perception that a myriad of different actors and instruments are working 
independently on producing sustainability strategies and that nothing is working (e.g. 
Jacquet and Pauly 2007; Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010). This is because most 
research looking sustainability has tended to focus their attention on one instrument or 
type of instrument. Some examples of such analyses and critiques include: whether 
ecolabelling and certification has impacted sustainability; or whether a policy 
instrument like the PNA VDS holds potential to promote sustainable fisheries (e.g. 
Kaiser and Edwards-Jones 2006; Jacquet, Pauly et al. 2010; Christian, Ainley et al. 
2013; Havice 2013). While such research provides valuable insight into such 
individual instruments, it does not provide any insight into broader governance 
processes associated with the development and implementation of a variety of 
innovative instruments on the tuna GPN. When looking at innovation for 
sustainability in tuna fisheries, in the end focusing on a single instrument is therefore 
not adequate to grasp governance innovation; the innovation is the constellation of 
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various interacting actors engaging in the implementation of different innovative 
instruments.  
To theoretically understand governance innovations, we turn to Sywngedouw’s 
(2005) work on innovation through ‘new choreographies of governance’. While not in 
the context of sustainability, Swyngedouw provides useful insight for analysing and 
understanding the shift from either state-led or market-led governance, toward new 
combinations of “hierarchically nested and relationally articulated” actor networks 
(Swyngedouw 2005: 14). He emphasises the inclusion of ‘new’ actors, albeit those 
that “accept playing according to the rules set from within the leading elite networks” 
(Ibid). In the context of this thesis, the rising influence of the sustainable seafood 
movement is indicative of the role that such ‘new’ actors are taking on in relation to 
existing state and market institutions. In the context of tuna, governance innovations 
for sustainability have come from consolidating and enhancing the activities of actors 
introducing innovative instruments. 
Therefore, in this thesis, governance innovations take as their starting point the 
innovative instruments that governance actors are designing and using for enhancing 
the sustainability of tuna production and consumption. The thesis looks at these 
innovations in the context of the tuna GPN from which they are emerging, to 
understand what new ‘choreographies of governance’ are converging around the 
implementation of these instruments.  
Governance innovation should therefore be understood as the combinations of actors 
and instruments that are developed, implemented and taken up in aiming for 
sustainability. These combinations are not operating in isolation but interact in 
various ways, resulting in the reconfiguration of the network; together this is labelled 
the governance innovation network. Hence, in studying governance innovations for 
sustainable tuna, it is essential to examine the relational nature of actors-cum-
instruments and how these combinations constitute a governance innovation network 
that is related to, but different from, the tuna GPN. We now turn to four key 
components that provide analytical clarity to the formation and persistence of 
governance innovation networks: (1) the different framings of sustainability that 
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actors use to justify the instruments used; (2) the instruments themselves; (3) the 
governance arrangements emerging through combinations of state, market and NGO 
actors; and (4) the power dynamics between the groups of actors that shape the 
governance innovation network. This section will look at how each of these 
dimensions of governance innovation provides the basis of understanding governance 
innovation networks. 
6.3.1 Framing Sustainability  
Over and above the production and consumption that characterises GPNs, 
sustainability provides the ‘raison d’être’ for the tuna governance innovation network. 
However, while there is broad acceptance of sustainability concerns around over-
fishing and IUU fishing, it has become apparent through the analyses of each of the 
cases that different actors frame sustainability in highly variable ways. Sustainability 
is both widely used as a basis for governance and poorly understood. As Davison 
aptly puts it, “Many have lamented the slippery, shape-shifting nature of this concept 
and that it has accumulated an absurd number of definitions”(2008: 191). The failure 
of any organisation or institution to acquire a legitimate leadership role over 
sustainability has resulted in a plethora of actors offering their own sustainability 
definitions and metrics (Marshall and Toffel 2005). In production and consumption 
networks, ‘sustainability’ is constructed and contested by the actors involved as both a 
concept and as an objective (Boons and Mendoza 2010). As a result, governance 
innovation network actors have defined norms, regulations and standards that actors 
in the supply chain must adhere to in order to produce a sustainable product 
(Manning, Boons et al. 2012). In the tuna GPN, sustainability is therefore more than 
just an issue of over-fishing or IUU fishing; it is something used strategically to 
justify network actors’ involvement. Therefore, it is important to understand the ways 
that specific sustainability themes are constructed, as they can both differ and overlap 
to shape network practices.  
In addition to the strategies of coastal states, external interests also shape the 
governance of tuna fisheries within the WCPO. For the EU, their entry point to the 
network is both through the WCPFC and through their IUU Regulation. The 
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connection between IUU fishing and sustainability is widely accepted; IUU fishing is 
contributing to widespread but unquantifiable over-exploitation of fish stocks. 
Therefore, IUU fishing provides its own framing of sustainability and provides the 
basis of the normative power the EU is trying to exert in the WCPO. However, as the 
basis of the EU’s regulation is also for protecting their market power, the Regulation 
sees sustainability coupled with maintaining economic, legal and geopolitical control 
as well.  
Moving from the general framing of sustainability as the basis for management 
measures, the PNA has also constructed a specific framing of sustainability through 
the MSC certification of their FAD-free skipjack fishery. Using this certification to 
underscore the sustainability of FAD-free fishing reflects broader activities in 
sustainable seafood movement to frame sustainability around tuna fishing practices. 
This has seen groups advocating pole and line fishing, FAD-free fishing and even the 
potential of ‘eco-FADs’ that minimise bycatch (LDRAC 2012). Among debates 
around these practices, lies the conflict around Dolphin Safe tuna, which has been 
critiqued for framing sustainability around a single issue deemed no longer relevant. 
While the ecolabel landscape has since broadened how it frames sustainability, they 
have not escaped contestation. For instance, the MSC is criticised for interpreting 
sustainability based on ecological sustainability, at the cost of incorporating standards 
on the social aspects of fisheries management, particularly that of the needs of fish 
workers and small-scale fisheries in developing countries (Gulbrandsen 2009). 
Framing sustainability around NGO-defined criteria illustrates the power of the 
sustainable seafood movement for shaping production and consumption processes. 
In the final case, CFTS reflects the growing emphasis placed on traceability in 
discussions around sustainability. Through CFTS, industry actors are constructing a 
new framing of sustainability that speaks to consumers and confers the message that 
sustainable practices cannot come without traceable practices. The traceability 
message fits with dialogues in the wider governance innovation network, as 
traceability underlies both the MSC chain of custody certification and IUU regulation. 
This illustrates that while different actors are producing different instruments that 
respond to an aspect of sustainability that they have decided to focus on, each of the 
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issues are interconnected. Therefore, through examining the different framings of 
sustainability, we are also seeing the foundations of the network beginning to form, 
with actors interacting around the different but connected aspects of sustainability. 
6.3.2 Instruments 
The governance innovation network centres on the instruments that network actors are 
introducing. Without instruments that have some bearing on tackling sustainability 
issues, the actors would remain as GPN actors but not part of the governance 
innovation network. For example, without the PNA feeding innovative management 
measures like the high seas pocket closures and the vessel day scheme up to the 
WCPFC, the innovative governance arrangement of sub-regional and regional 
interaction would not have happened. Equally, the EU’s IUU Regulation is the first 
official instrument that deals with IUU fishing and through it; the EU has the 
opportunity to interact in the governance innovation network. In spite of criticism, 
this Regulation has facilitated interaction among actors throughout the network. 
Likewise, the PNA MSC certification and CFTS provide examples of how, through 
the production and implementation of instruments, new constellations of actors 
interact, which represent the ‘governance innovation’.  
Central to our understanding of instruments in the context of governance innovation 
networks is understanding how different instruments serve not only to respond to 
sustainability issues but also facilitating interactions between network actors. In the 
broader literature and policy domains, debate continues over which is the best 
instrument for achieving sustainability gains. Private standards like certification and 
ecolabelling have been widely reviewed and have drawn criticism over their capacity 
to produce sustainability gains (Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008; Christian, Ainley et al. 
2013). Additionally, as we have already mentioned, state capacity for producing 
innovative instruments for sustainability regulation has also been criticised. However, 
these critiques have tended to focus on specific instruments in isolation, analysing 
their individual capacity for transforming production and consumption practices. 
When considered in the context of the governance innovation network they are part 
of, their capacity to innovate governance practices comes from the interconnections 
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they facilitate between the different actors that are both implementing them and 
benefitting from them. For example, taking the MSC certification as an instrument, 
the innovation it produces is not through the instrument itself, ecolabelling has been 
around for some time now, but through the way that the state (the PNA) is changing 
their role and function within the network as a result of using the MSC certification. 
This the same for the EU IUU Regulation, which is an innovative instrument but its 
capacity to promote interaction with Pacific Island countries to shape and change 
power relations within the network is its governance innovation.  
This perspective also illustrates that through the governance innovation network the 
instruments themselves are feeding back to the network, defining the interests of the 
actors they are bringing together. This changes the assumption that producing and 
implementing innovative instruments is a one-way process. Instead, it is a two way 
process and instruments are not only defined, designed and implemented, they are 
also influencing how actors are coming together. This points to the wider impacts of 
the instruments. In the context of the tuna GPN, these instruments become more 
important for creating debate around issues of sustainability rather than whether or 
not a specific instrument has a positive or negative impact on the fishery itself. 
Through this debate, awareness of the problem and interaction among the wider 
community of governance actors occurs, forming the governance innovation network. 
6.3.3 Actors  
Through looking at both the framing of sustainability and the instruments being 
introduced, we can see new constellations of actors are emerging to form a 
governance innovation network. This governance innovation network is comprised of 
GPN actors that interact through the development and implementation of innovative 
instruments to respond to sustainability issues. State, market and NGO actors have all 
demonstrated that their capacity for governance innovation comes from their 
interactions with each other, making both state-led and market-led governance 
innovations a fundamental element of the network. On the one hand, state actors are 
producing strategies that depend on the market for their uptake. The EU’s IUU 
Regulation for instance, is a market-based regulatory instrument, implemented by 
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state actors but having effect through the market. Furthermore, the MSC certification 
of the PNA skipjack fisheries represents one of the biggest governance innovations 
led by states – the PNA – using and co-opting market innovation for their own 
advancement. This takes it beyond a hybrid form of governance, which would 
insinuate a partnership arrangement between public and private actors, producing a 
joint strategy (Andonova 2010). Instead, in this case the PNA are not just cooperating 
with market actors, they have themselves become a hybrid state-market actor, 
engaging in the governance innovation network in both capacities.  
On the other hand, there is also interconnectivity with the market-led governance 
innovations and the state. For example, some market-led certifications have 
conditions that are dependent on regulatory measures issued and enforced by RFMOs. 
In the MSC assessment process, certification is dependent on being able to 
demonstrate that fisheries are “subject to an effective management system that 
respects local, national and international laws and standards” (MSC 2008: 4). 
Therefore, those seeking to become certified also have to be able to show their source 
fishery is engaged in some form of state-led management system, like RFMOs. This 
has the benefit of providing firm actors along the production chain with an incentive 
to encourage state actors to engage in management that meets MSC sustainability 
criteria. While CFTS themselves do not provide such a clear state-market interaction, 
in Chapter 4 we saw both the PNA and Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) engaging in the process of developing the Pacifical can coded system and the 
Solander MSC certified, Traceall coded systems respectively. Moreover, underlying 
both the MSC and the various CFTS is the strong role NGOs are playing. Through the 
sustainable seafood movement, NGO partnership, campaigning and lobbying is 
providing the critical link between state and firm actors within the governance 
innovation network. 
The interactions between governance actors in governance innovation networks 
therefore feeds into debates around public and private regulation. Traditionally, this 
debate has been viewed and framed as public versus private regulation, originating 
from the idea that states are failing in sustainability governance and that innovation 
(albeit highly criticised) has to come instead from private actors (firms and NGOs). 
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Bridging this divide is the literature on public-private partnership, which emphasizes 
the joint or hybrid governance arrangements of the two sectors (e.g. Gulbrandsen 
2004; Andonova 2010). However, in governance innovation networks, the 
relationship does not appear to be public versus private regulation, nor public-private 
partnerships. Instead it illustrates the diversity in forms and modes of public and 
private mixing in (formal and less formal) governance arrangements. Through this is 
the continuous interaction and mutual influencing of these various sustainability 
governance arrangements, into a governance innovation network. While this might 
paint a picture of harmony and mutual strengthening, interaction among public and 
private governance actors in a variety of arrangements is also the source of contest 
and conflict, which exposes how the network is vulnerable to and shaped by the 
power dynamics between network actors.  
6.3.4 Power 
Power dynamics and the social relations of consumption and production are a critical 
aspect of the global governance innovation network and hence a necessary analytical 
focus. Within the wider literature, power relations concerning global production and 
consumption (often framed in global value chains and global production networks) 
have been analysed in relation to unequal development, often in terms of the ‘North-
South’ divide and the core-periphery relations. Many of these analyses relate back to 
world systems theory. These conceptualisations view relations between industrial and 
developing countries, and within each of the two between core and peripheral actors, 
as fundamentally exploitative and conditioned on unequal terms of trade (Levy 2008). 
The idea is that powerful and wealthy ‘core’ societies and actors dominate and exploit 
weak and poor peripheral societies and sectors, creating a power hierarchy (Martínez-
Vela 2001). 
In one way, the sustainability governance innovations have reinforced some of these 
conventional power relations. For instance, the case of the EU’s implementation of 
their IUU Regulation brings out these unequal power dynamics strongest. Regulating 
through the EU’s market access for countries with weaker markets makes use of and 
simultaneously reinforces this North-South, core-periphery power imbalance. Perhaps 
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a more surprising area in which this is also visible is through the CFTSs. Following 
from discussions in the literature on neoliberal approaches to environmental 
governance (e.g. McCarthy 2004; Guthman 2007), the assumption is that approaches 
like the CFTSs would open up and change private relations in global production 
networks; and that traceability systems would reconfigure relations of production, 
changing conventional North-South, core-periphery network dynamics. However, the 
cost of implementing these traceability systems through, for example, access to and 
financing of technology, poses a major barrier to implementation in developing 
country fisheries. Should CFTSs become the norm in developed country markets like 
Europe and North America, they could prevent smaller scale, developing country 
producers from gaining market access and would therefore reinforce of the core-
periphery power imbalance. This offers an understanding of how market-based 
systems like CFTS are feeding into existing power relations of what we understand in 
GPNs. And it also explains why developing countries can have major difficulties with 
– not to say fiercely oppose – market-based and market-led labelling, certification and 
traceability systems for sustainable production and consumption (Gibbon, Bair et al. 
2008). 
But this study also offers examples of sustainability governance innovation that 
challenge prevailing power relations within GPNs. The regionalisation of governance 
in the WCPO has reconfigured state relations at a sub-regional level and has led to 
greater control and innovation. In the case of the PNA, power asymmetries are 
bringing greater self-determination as well. There has been an underlying assumption 
within the literature that greater control for Pacific Island countries equates to better 
governance for the tuna (Barclay and Cartwright 2007; Hanich 2012). The thesis 
underscores the central role the PNA are playing in governance innovation in the 
WCPO. This has allowed for, stimulated and enabled the PNA to have greater control 
over their tuna resources, also vis-à-vis major external market and regulatory powers 
like the EU and US. Hence, here we witness how sustainability governance 
innovation in a GPN changes, rather than just reinforces, existing unequal power 
balances. However, the existing capacity of the EU to use its market power to instil 
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regulatory standards among some Pacific Islands countries means the power of PNA 
remains also vulnerable to wider network dynamics.  
Finally, the dynamics between the EII and MSC offers a new perspective on network 
power. In classical power analyses on sustainability issues, NGOs play the role of 
underdog. In most studies the power of NGOs is conceptualised as indirect adversarial 
protest power: the power to articulate and raise societal protest against conventional 
production processes. However, our study has found examples of NGO power that 
goes far beyond adversarial protest power. The EII has gained network authority, 
which they use to fulfil their interests and influence GPN network dynamics to an 
extent that was previously more a characteristic of state or lead firm actors. This new 
aspect of power within the governance innovation networks brings us back to 
understanding how the framing of sustainability provides the justification for network 
actors like EII to constitute and retain their power position within the network. 
Therefore, framing sustainability in a way that captures public attention, brings with it 
network power. Hence, to further analyse power relations around sustainability 
governance innovation in contemporary global production networks we need a 
different conceptualisation of power. Conventional ideas of North-South divide or 
core-periphery relations are no longer sufficient to understand and analyse in-depth 
power inequalities and developments. This has been picked up in the Castellian 
(2009) ideas of power in networks, looking at networking power, networked power, 
network-making power and network-power. While beyond the scope of this thesis, 
there would be value in conceptualising and analysing the power dynamics within 
governance innovation networks in this way. The Castellian conceptualisation of 
network programmers and networks switchers would offer a promising way to 
understand how different actors use and acquire power around sustainability 
governance innovations, rather than ideas of core and periphery of more traditional 
GPN analyses. This would contribute to understanding how actors in these networks 
can take different roles to articulate such power. 
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6.3.5 Summary 
Governance innovation networks open our understanding of the capacity of all 
interdependent governance arrangements over production and consumption in the 
tuna GPN, to steer and shape processes of sustainability innovation. The point of 
departure from analyses of governance in GPNs is that governance innovation 
networks do not start from the point of production and look incidentally at 
governance. Instead, the governance innovation network is the starting point and 
understanding the different dimensions of this network informs how production 
practices within GPNs will be shaped.  
Figure 6.1 is a conceptualisation of governance innovation networks and illustrates 
that the GPN forms the ‘base layer’, the point from which the network emerges. 
Through different efforts to both frame and deal with issues surrounding sustainability 
in the tuna GPN, actors produce innovative instruments to influence production and 
consumption practices. These instruments interact with each other and with different 
actors to form actor-instrument arrangements. This interaction leads to a 
reclassification of actor roles away from their assignation as standard state, market 
and NGO. In turn, this reclassification presents us with the need to form different 
concepts of power. For instance, while traditional core-periphery dynamics frequently 
associated with GPNs are in some ways reinforced, new power dynamics are also 
emerging that open up the potential for developing states and NGOs to (re)shape GPN 
practices. Therefore, through governance innovation networks we can understand how 
the interaction between actors and instruments is reconfiguring GPNs when 
sustainability moves to the fore. 
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Figure 6.1 A conceptualisation of a governance innovation network 
6.4 Reflections on theory 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of GPN governance by providing the first 
in-depth analysis of how private standards as well as public regulation are producing 
innovative solutions for governance over sustainability in the tuna GPN. Bringing 
together the different cases, this research has provided insights into the emergence of 
a governance innovation network from a GPN. This advances the GPN literature and 
the broader governance literature in four ways.  
First, while the literature on GPNs focuses on governance, this is the first examination 
of governance innovation in the context of GPNs. The GPN approach provides an 
excellent starting point for examining governance innovation, in that it explicitly 
acknowledges that governance of production and consumption processes goes beyond 
inter-firm governance to “encompass all relevant sets of actors and relationships” 
(Coe, Dicken et al. 2008: 271). Through introducing the concept of governance 
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innovation into the GPN framework, the analysis of innovation in GPNs moves 
beyond looking at the technical innovations in production processes (Ernst 2002). 
Further to this, it also provides a new analytical dimension to governance in GPNs. In 
particular, it draws attention to the importance of non-firm actors like the state and 
NGOs. The literature on GPNs has at its theoretical core analyses of firm-state 
relations (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Coe, Dicken et al. 2008). Additionally, the 
role of NGOs is noted as important in the GPN literature, with Coe and his colleagues 
(2008: 287) stating that “(i)n some GPNs, of course, notably agro-food industries, 
natural resources, energy, clothing and textiles, they [NGOs] are extremely prominent 
and have a significant influence on corporate behaviour”. This is reflected in an 
accumulating body of literature addressing labour organisation and ethical 
consumption (e.g. Barrientos and Smith 2007a; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008; 
Barrientos, Gereffi et al. 2011).  
However, these analyses look specifically at firm-non-firm (state/NGO) interactions. 
Through incorporating the concept of governance innovation, this thesis examines the 
interactions between both firms and non-firms (state and NGO) and the interactions 
between different non-firm actors. In doing so, we are able to underscore the extent to 
which non-firm actors are moving to the core of GPN governance, creating a complex 
mosaic of governance approaches that in turn constitutes the governance innovation 
network.  
The second contribution this thesis makes to GPN research is that it is empirically 
novel. To date, there has been no research on seafood production networks, let alone 
the tuna GPN. The majority of GPN research has looked at manufactured products, 
which are produced in fixed localities. Very little of the literature has examined 
natural resources from a GPN perspective. Murphy’s (2012) analysis of Bolivia’s 
wood products sector touches upon issues of natural resource management in the 
forestry sector and Bridge’s (2008) application of the GPN approach for analysing the 
oil industry goes some way toward an analysis of a (non-renewable) natural resource. 
However, to my knowledge, this thesis provides the first analysis of a transboundary 
natural resource in the context of GPNs.  
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As well as being novel, tuna is an interesting case for GPN governance research. 
Geopolitically, state governance activities need to be understood (sub-)regionally and 
also the activities of tuna firms need to be understood in context of the politics 
between resource owning and resource exploiting countries. In addition to the 
geopolitics in the tuna GPN, however, tuna also proved interesting because central to 
understanding governance of production and consumption within the tuna GPN is 
sustainability, which is an under-researched aspect of the GPN literature (Coe 2012). 
In spite of mounting pressure for production practices to demonstrate sustainability 
credentials, GPN research on sustainability has been extremely limited and is only 
considered broadly in terms of issues like ethical consumption, global environmental 
standards and pollution mitigation (e.g. Angel and Rock 2005; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 
2008; Dicken 2013). Therefore, identifying governance innovation networks presents 
a new understanding of sustainability governance within GPNs and a new component 
for consideration in future GPN research.  
The third contribution relates to the notion of impact, in particular the impact of 
instruments designed for sustainability. The conventional understanding of impact has 
been to analyse how individual innovative instruments have an impact on pre-defined 
sustainability goals, such as stock stability, improved governance (RFMO) processes 
or market penetration. This feeds in to wider debates over measuring impact in the 
more technical literature on sustainable supply chain management (Hervani, Helms et 
al. 2005; Pagell and Wu 2009). MSC for example has generated its own impact 
framework that focuses on exactly these parameters (MSC 2013b). However, this 
thesis highlights how impact goes beyond the tangible goals set by the governance 
actor or along the supply chain, to look at how innovative instruments create 
discussion among a wider range of actors, and in doing so produce different ways of 
thinking about the sustainability issue at hand. This supports the literature on broader 
implications of market-based governance instruments. For instance, De Vos and 
Bush’s (2011), analysis of the Dutch Viswijzer (Good Fish Guide) showed that 
instead of producing signification changes in consumption practices, the greatest 
impact of this market-based tool was facilitating interaction between policy actors 
who previously occupied different ‘social spaces’. Another example comes from 
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Gulbrandsen’s (2009) analysis of the effectiveness of the MSC certification. He 
concluded that certification alone will not bring an end to overfishing and that 
analysing impact needs to look at the intersection of private and public efforts to 
address overfishing and environmental harm resulting from fishing. The research of 
de Vos and Bush and of Gulbrandsen support the findings in this thesis that impact is 
not always the direct result of the instrument but can also come about through the 
interactions of actors engaging in their implementation or uptake.  
The fourth contribution is to the broader literature on governance networks and the 
position of governance innovation networks within this literature. There is a sizable 
literature on environmental network governance as a new mode of governance that 
goes beyond conventional state governance, also with respect to international and 
global governance (e.g. Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Biermann, Pattberg et al. 2009). 
There are those that have focussed on institutional governance through environmental 
and resource regimes and pay particular attention to the ways that supranational 
governance systems steer human-environment relations (e.g. Young 2006, 2010). This 
supranational, jurisdictional framing of governance networks provides a narrow 
perspective of networks that does not fully account for the interplay between states 
and non-state actors, in particular market actors. Alternatively, there are literatures 
that deal explicitly with how state, market and civil society actors engage and interact 
in networks (e.g. Kooiman 2005; Mahon, McConney et al. 2008). In the context of 
fisheries, some have examined sustainability strategies by focusing on particular 
instruments, like the MSC, and their capacity for generating sustainable fisheries 
networks (Gibbs 2008). These networks are important but, as this thesis indicates feed 
into broader network structures. Through the concept of governance innovation 
networks, this thesis takes these theories and perspectives of network governance 
further. The concept of governance innovation networks advances our insights on 
how, when it comes to governance of a transboundary traded resource like tuna, 
interactions between different groups of governance actors, different scales of 
environmental regimes, and specific instruments for sustainability collectively 
influence global governance of production and consumption.  
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6.5 Policy and Research Recommendations  
Having summarised and theoretically reflected on the main findings in this thesis, this 
section translates the results of the research first into policy recommendations for 
different groups of governance actors and second recommendations for further 
research. 
6.5.1 Policy Recommendations 
An overarching finding in this thesis is that all actors are converging on market-based 
strategies. This does mean that market actors are the only ones providing governance 
innovation but that each of the strategies engages the market. If we take for example 
the PNA, this provides an excellent example of non-market actors using market-based 
strategies for governance innovation. Through aligning their conservation discourse 
with a market-based approach and with that of the sustainable seafood movement, the 
PNA is in a good position to demonstrate to a global audience their capacity for (sub-) 
regional governance and garner widespread support. They have engaged collectively 
to increase their strength within the region and become a global governance actor. 
Through the MSC certification, the PNA, as Pacifical, is also seeing direct economic 
benefit associated with a market engagement. This means they are ensuring both 
greater control over their tuna resources and securing market access for their certified 
tuna product in some of the world’s most competitive markets. However, the PNA’s 
market approach is vulnerable to the market interests of powerful external states like 
the EU, US and Japan. For them to continue as a strong actor, it is important the PNA 
remain engaged as a coalition of Pacific Island countries with the WCPFC. Successful 
regional governance requires that PNA measures are co-opted at the regional level, 
where they are subject to further scrutiny and validation and implemented on the 
larger, regional scale. This scenario of interaction between WCPFC and PNA 
provides the best model for governance innovation in the WCPO and the means 
through which both the PNA and WCPFC can continue to be fundamental to the 
governance innovation network.  
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The market is also where the EU is able to generate the greatest regulatory impact. 
Compliance with the EU IUU Regulation is greatest when actors have an interest in 
trading on the EU market. Taking the lead on regulating against IUU fishing, one of 
the world’s leading sustainability concerns, and tying it to their market interests 
secures the EU’s continued role in global fisheries governance. In the interest of the 
wider governance innovation network’s understanding of generating instruments for 
identifying the products of IUU fishing and excluding them from international trade, 
the EU should focus on strengthening this market measure internally, rather than 
seeking to “harmonise” currently very different national systems of IUU regulation 
with their own.  
The thesis indicates widespread endorsement of governance through private standards 
across the tuna GPN, making them a central feature of GPN governance for 
sustainability. However, as the case of EII highlighted, this also means there are many 
competing interests behind this kind of governance innovation. At present, there are 
no legal requirements pertaining to fisheries certification procedures and there is 
limited consumer understanding of what each label means. Therefore, as a system of 
governance, ecolabelling and certification can endorse practices that are of minimal 
benefit to sustainability, as the case of the EII Dolphin Safe certification shows. 
Pushing for greater science-based certification procedures and certification systems 
with transparent internal governance structures and open and responsive auditing 
procedures, offers a model worth endorsing in wider GPNs. At present, the MSC 
process is the closest representation of this kind of best practice model but still has 
only limited presence in the tuna GPN. To raise the presence of MSC in the tuna 
GPN, the whole network needs to push for standards like it and in doing so, needs to 
engage with the certification process to ensure it continues to be a credible standard. 
This is already starting to happen, with calls in European supermarkets for certified 
seafood. This has come through NGOs working with supermarkets and pressuring 
them to increase their sales of certified seafood. Supermarkets are therefore 
demanding certified seafood, which is pushing producers to enter the certification 
process. In the case of MSC certification, it is necessary to demonstrate effective 
management, which for tuna relates to the activities of the relevant RMFO (part of 
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MSC Principle 3). In the PNA MSC certification, this aspect of the certification 
procedure saw commitments being made to setting precautionary reference points and 
harvest control rules at the sub-regional and/or regional level; a first at the time. 
Cycles of network interaction like this make certification a valuable strategy for 
sustainability governance. 
Building on the now-widespread use of certification, CFTS present a critical new step 
in market-led governance strategies for fisheries sustainability. The attention given to 
traceability underscores the acknowledged need for disclosure and therefore openness 
in practices of tuna production. For the information provided through the CFTS to be 
of any use to both the producers and consumers of it, they should adapt in three ways. 
First, the systems need to be more responsive to consumers to allow a connection 
between the information they are providing and what they expect consumers to do 
with it. Like the ThisFish platform, best practice would see consumers have the 
opportunity to respond to the information they receive. Producers therefore need to 
open up their channels of communication and further increase information disclosure. 
Second, to ensure that CFTS hold potential to influence the performance of tuna 
production and consumption, independent auditors should verify them. Finally, for 
this to be a governance innovation across the tuna GPN, CFTS that meet the above 
requirements need to be developed and deployed not only on a niche scale but also 
globally. However, in pushing for traceability at this level, there should be cognizant 
of its potential to act as an exclusionary device to poorer producers. 
6.6 Future Research 
This study on governance innovations for sustainability in the tuna GPN proved 
instructive for identifying that collectively, the actors engaging in sustainability 
strategies are part of a governance innovation network. However, governance 
innovation networks are a new concept and therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
further research into this concept is needed. This is not to say that ‘more information 
is needed’ to understand governance innovation networks but to test the robustness 
and generalizability of this concept in other contexts, it needs further examination.  
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The first factor that needs testing with further research is the extent to which these 
four cases are representative of the whole of a governance innovation network, or 
only part of it. The original reasoning behind choosing the cases in this thesis came 
from wanting to represent a cross-section of state- and market-led governance 
innovations. While the explanation of governance innovation networks has shown 
there to be more nuance to the state-market distinction, the cases chosen are also not 
representative of all possible governance innovations in the tuna GPN. The primary 
example that comes to mind that could be included in further analysing governance 
innovation networks for tuna, is the recent introduction of fisheries improvement 
projects (FIPs). FIPs have emerged in response to concurrent pressures for certified 
seafood and the inclusion of small scale, often developing country, producers in 
certification programmes. FIPs appear to be an innovative instrument that is bringing 
together many network actors, including firms, small-scale producers, NGO and 
retailers. This would make them an ideal case to evaluate in the context of governance 
innovation networks. Not only to see if they ‘fit the mould’ but also to see how they 
would contribute to shaping network dynamics. In particular, they would present an 
opportunity to understand how small-scale, developing world producers would 
interact within the broader network. My expectation is that the inclusion of FIPs 
would further strengthen our understanding of governance innovations, rather than 
produce an alternative understanding of the network.  
Another area for research to expand into within the context of the tuna GPN, would 
be to conduct research into governance innovations for sustainable tuna being 
developed in other parts of the world, for example among actors in the Indian Ocean. 
This would both expand the scope of the governance innovation in this study but 
would also provide opportunity to look at the geographies of different networks, how 
they differ and whether/how they interact. Moreover, empirically the governance 
innovations in this thesis have focused on the tuna GPN targeting North American 
and European markets. There has been no research on governance innovations in the 
tuna markets in emerging economies like China, India and Indonesia. Tuna 
consumption in all of these countries (and others) is increasing and currently, there 
has been only limited attention given to the sustainable governance of production and 
156 
 
consumption within these markets. Research on this would be invaluable to examine 
actor engagement in the tuna GPN operating in these markets, and to inform what 
sustainability strategies within the tuna GPN would have the greatest impact on 
production and consumption practices. Additionally, there has also been no research 
on whether actors from these states are engaging in governance innovation networks. 
Therefore, looking at GPNs in these markets would provide another opportunity for 
testing the governance innovation network concept. 
Moving away from tuna, the question remains whether the concept of governance 
innovation networks apply to the governance innovations that are emerging to address 
sustainability concerns in other commodities like coffee, or in other natural resources, 
such as forestry, water or oil. Looking at governance innovations in these sectors 
would test whether the concept of governance innovation networks can be generalised 
and is not just specific to the cases in this thesis.  
A final area of research would be to look at GPN governance and governance 
innovation networks in the context of literature on informational governance. This 
thesis touched upon informational governance in the analysis of CFTS in Chapter 5. 
However, there is value in further research into the ways in which information is 
shaping the different dimensions of GPNs and governance innovation networks. To 
date, information is of implicit importance in GPNs, particularly in relation to 
globalisation and the rapid uptake of ICTs (Coe and Hess 2002). However, beyond 
being behind innovative technological advances such as the development of CFTS, 
“governance by disclosure” also holds great potential as a means of steering GPN 
production and consumption processes more broadly (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010: 
97). In the context of governance innovation networks, information is also playing a 
centripetal role in shaping the different governance innovations, as it is at the core of 
strategic compromises and coalitions of network actors seeking to transform 
production and consumption processes toward sustainability (Levy 2011). While the 
potential for information to be a central aspect of governance innovation networks is 
clear, as an area of research it is still in its nascence and demands further attention.  
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This could be developed in two ways. First, it would be interesting to apply the idea 
of informational governance methodologically in developing new tools. Through 
creating and using information in new media, researchers could investigate its 
potential for raising the profile of sustainability challenges in tuna production. An 
interesting way to do this would be though videography. Given the ubiquitous 
technologies including online streaming platforms (YouTube, Vimeo, TedTalk etc.) 
that are increasingly available to us, there is room for academia to incorporate them 
into their research design. Second, it would be especially interesting to apply these 
new tools to research focusing on informational demands from the perspective of 
developing country producers, to examine in more depth the notion of governance 
through disclosure. Mol (2008) describes “informational peripheries”, to refer to 
information-poor environments and relates these to economic, political, organisational 
and cultural constraints of informational governance. Therefore, this could provide an 
interesting frame to explore such constraints in the context of tuna governance. It 
would be both theoretically informative but also valuable for understanding where to 
focus efforts to turn these constraints into opportunities for improved governance in 
these ‘peripheries’. Combining this research with the application of new technologies 
could also provide an excellent opportunity for both theoretical and empirical 
development that could contribute to incorporating developing country producers in 
the governance innovation network. 
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Appendix I List of Interviews 
 
INTERVIEWEE DATE   INTERVIEWEE DATE 
NGO 09/12/2009 
 
EUInd 01/11/2012 
IntInd 08/12/2010 
 
IntInd 13/11/2012 
NGO Sep-11 
 
PhInd 20/11/2012 
EUGvt 25/10/2011 
 
IntFS 04/12/2012 
EUGvt 26/10/2011 
 
IntFS 13/02/2013 
EUGvt 26/10/2011 
 
NGO 06/06/2013 
EUGvt 27/10/2011 
 
NGO 05/09/2013 
EUInd 04/11/2011 
 
NGO* 17/09/2013 
EUGvt* 26/11/2011 
 
NGO 19/09/2013 
NGO 07/12/2011 
 
NGO 20/09/2013 
NGO 16/12/2011 
 
NGO 20/09/2013 
EUGvt 18/01/2012 
 
NGO 20/09/2013 
NGO 04/06/2012 
 
USInd 25/09/2013 
NGO 06/06/2012 
 
NGO 27/09/2013 
NGO 06/06/2012 
 
EUInd 04/10/2013 
IntFS 27/06/2012 
 
NGO 14/10/2013 
IntInd 27/06/2012 
 
IntInd 24/10/2013 
IntFS 02/07/2012 
 
IntInd 02/11/2013 
NGO 06/07/2012 
 
EUInd 05/11/2013 
IntInd 17/09/2012 
 
NGO 07/11/2013 
IntInd 19/09/2012 
 
IntFS 12/11/2013 
NGO* 03/09/2012 
 
USInd 27/02/2014 
NGO 05/10/2012       
* Interviews conducted with more than one respondent 
 
  
CODE EXPLANATION
NGO Environmental NGO, including certification bodies
IntFS
International fisheries specialist (RFMOs, Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency, 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement)
xInd
Industry actor from 'x' country
(EUInd, USInd, where PhInd = Phlippines and IntInd = international)
EUGvt EU Government official (Commission, Council and Parilament)
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Summary 
The exploitation of tuna fisheries has been expanding since the 1940s. Between 1940 
and the mid-1960s, the annual world catch of the principal market species of tuna rose 
from about 300,000 tonnes to about 1 million tonnes. Since then it has continued to 
rise to more than 4 million tonnes annually in 2009, with a peak of 6.5 million tonnes 
in 2007. This growth presents sustainability concerns such as: over-capacity of tuna 
fisheries; issues associated with bycatch of juvenile tuna and non-tuna species; and 
the problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity. 
These sustainability concerns associated primarily with purse seine and longline 
fishing mean governance for sustainable management is imperative. Traditionally, 
fisheries governance was the domain of state actors but often they failed to live up 
expectations, leading scholars as well as other stakeholders to question their 
governance capacity. With states facing limitations in their capacity to govern 
fisheries, other actors have moved forward into prominent positions. This has resulted 
in new, innovative governance arrangements emerging that include and engage state, 
market and NGO actors.  
This thesis analyses the capacity of governance innovations to shape practices of 
production and consumption for tuna sustainability. The research takes the 
overarching framework of global production network (GPN) governance to look 
explicitly at sustainability governance and the governance innovations that firm and 
non-firm actors engage with. The analysis is based on the understanding that 
governance innovations take as their starting point innovative instruments, which 
governance actors are designing and using for enhancing the sustainability of tuna 
production and consumption. This analysis examines governance innovations to 
understand what groups of actors are producing innovative instruments for 
sustainability and how these actor-instrument constellations impact the dynamics of 
the tuna GPN. Hence, the central research question is:  
How do different market- and state-led governance innovations advance the 
governance of sustainable tuna?  
This question was addressed through four case studies, each investigating governance 
innovations for sustainability in tuna fisheries in the WCPO, targeting European and 
North American markets. More specifically, it looked at two state-led governance 
innovations in the West and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) both through 
regional/sub-regional bodies and through the interaction between the EU and the 
Pacific Islands countries. And at two market-led innovations through looking at the 
implementation of private standards for certifying tuna fisheries and the firm-NGO 
development and implementation of consumer-facing traceability systems (CFTS).  
Methodologically, the research employed a case study research strategy using semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, direct observation and analysis of 
documents to analyse each of the cases. Research sub-questions were generated for 
each case study and guided the data collection and analysis. The thesis has six 
chapters, one for each of the cases and introduction and conclusion chapters.  
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In Chapter 2, innovations in multilateral governance are presented by looking at the 
interaction between regional and sub-regional governance platforms in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean. Shifting political alliances and new environmental 
challenges are prompting debate over processes of sub-regionalisation and whether 
the interplay between multiple scales of governance leads to positive synergistic 
outcomes or negative institutional disruption. Regional management of tuna fisheries 
in the WCPO is an example where a web of treaties, conventions and institutional 
frameworks underlie international cooperation. Through examining the interplay 
between the regional Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
and sub-regional Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), this Chapter explores the 
extent to which the PNA and WCPFC interact in the management of regional 
transboundary tuna fisheries. The results demonstrate that for contested marine 
resources such as fisheries, international sub-regions can go beyond functional units 
to also present wider opportunities to shift power relations in the favour of small 
island states. Additionally, the presence of sub-regional groups like the PNA has 
served to challenge the performance of the WCPFC, stimulating greater debate and 
progress within the regional body. The Chapter concludes that the combined work of 
the PNA and the WCPFC puts them ahead on many issues and may represent a testing 
ground for a functional multilateralism based on shared resources and utilising both 
regional and sub-regional governance platforms. 
The case study in Chapter 3 examines the external regulatory strategies of the EU by 
looking at the implementation and uptake of their IUU Regulation in the WCPO. The 
EU has taken a leading role in the fight against IUU fishing, using both its market and 
normative power to advance its EU IUU Regulation (No. 1005/2008) and wider 
fisheries sustainability agenda outside its territory. This chapter examines how 
successful the EU has been in using its market and normative power to influence 
regulatory strategies and frameworks governing tuna fisheries in the Pacific Islands 
region of the Western Pacific Ocean. The results indicate that while the market power 
of the EU remains an influential factor, the diminishing normative power of the EU in 
WCPO is weakening any attempts to implement its IUU fishing regulation and Pacific 
Island nations have promoted their own regulatory agenda. We conclude that the 
changing asymmetries between market and normative power has led to a 
differentiated geography of regulatory uptake, and while market power will remain a 
dominant strategy for the EU, normative power, when exercised should focus on 
cooperation rather than ‘teaching’ the benefits of an EU regulatory approach. 
Chapter 4 examines the interaction between the EII Dolphin Safe Certification and the 
MSC’s certification of the PNA skipjack fishery to understand how interactions 
among certification schemes impact the uptake of the two ecolabels operating in the 
same GPN. Certification is widely seen as an innovative strategy for dealing with 
environmental problems in supply chains. As the number of ecolabels available in the 
fisheries sector has increased, each with its own framing of sustainability, questions 
are being asked about their credibility. In tuna fisheries, contrasting approaches have 
led to conflict over, among other things, the credibility of competing ecolabels. This 
chapter investigates one such conflict between the Dolphin Safe and the Marine 
Stewardship Council certification schemes in the WCPO. It looks at how key practices 
like scientific rigour, inclusiveness, transparency/openness, impartiality/independence 
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and impact contribute to label credibility and explains the importance of authority in 
understanding how certification schemes maintain influence within global production 
networks. The results demonstrate that despite substantially different levels of 
credibility within these networks, the application of an environmental standard is more 
connected to the authority of the standard setter than the credibility of the label. The 
paper concludes that understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and 
without credibility, offers new insights into the wider dynamics that shape 
environmental regulation in global production networks. 
Chapter 5 analyses consumer-facing traceability systems in the tuna GPN to 
understand what their potential is for transforming the production practices of tuna 
firms in a manner that reflects commitments to responsible practice. Information 
disclosure, be it voluntary or mandatory, is playing an increasingly central role in 
global production. The success of traceability in food safety has led to an extension to 
the traceability of other product ‘qualities’, including sustainability and provenance. 
This has seen a shift not only in the information disclosed, but also the audience 
traceability systems are targeting. This is most obvious in the emergence of so-called 
CFTS, operating through a code or a label to provide consumers with access to 
traceable information. Through examining the consumer turn in traceability, this 
paper investigates various tuna CFTS that have been developed for consumers of tuna 
in Northern America and Europe, currently the primary markets for these types of 
systems. By taking a cross-section of tuna-related CFTS, we examine the diversity of 
CFTS, their drivers and the potential of these systems to change the sustainability 
performance of tuna production. The results show that while consumer-facing 
traceability is for the most part a nascent approach, CFTS are being used across the 
tuna industry, driven by pressure from NGOs, through the sustainable seafood 
movement. The paper concludes that while this approach to traceability is producing 
varied degrees of transformation inside the supply chain, instruments like CFTS are 
bringing new constellations of actors together to tackle issues of sustainable 
production and consumption.  
The final chapter reflects on these case study chapters and draws conclusions related 
to the core question of the thesis. The conclusions suggest that while GPN governance 
analyses have traditionally looked at governance as being either state-led or 
market/lead-firm-led, the cases in this thesis indicate that this state- and market-led 
distinction is inadequate for understanding sustainability governance in the tuna GPN. 
Instead, the boundaries between actor groups are blurred. State, market and NGO 
actors are all demonstrating that their capacity for governance innovation is not 
derived from being state- or market-led, but is instead generated from their 
interactions with each other in the context of the tuna GPN. Therefore, for governance 
innovation to proliferate, actors should not be defined by the governance role they are 
assigned, but instead be considered as part of a governance innovation network, 
targeting sustainability in GPNs. The point of departure from analyses of governance 
in GPNs is that governance innovation networks do not start from the point of 
production and look incidentally at governance. Instead, the governance innovation 
network is the starting point and understanding the different dimensions of this 
network informs how production practices within GPNs will be shaped. 
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To date most research looking sustainability has tended to focus their attention on one 
instrument or type of instrument such as a particular policy instrument, or looking at 
ecolabelling as a key market instrument. While such research provides valuable 
insight into such individual instruments, it does not provide any insight into broader 
governance processes associated with the development and implementation of a 
variety of innovative instruments on the tuna GPN. When looking at innovation for 
sustainability in tuna fisheries, in the end focusing on a single instrument is therefore 
not adequate to grasp governance innovation; the innovation is the constellation of 
various interacting actors engaging in the implementation of different innovative 
instruments. In the context of tuna, governance innovations for sustainability have 
come from consolidating and enhancing the activities of actors introducing innovative 
instruments. 
Therefore, in studying governance innovations for sustainable tuna, it is essential to 
examine the relational nature of actors-cum-instruments and how these combinations 
constitute a governance innovation network that is related to, but different from, the 
tuna GPN. To provide analytical clarity to the formation and persistence of 
governance innovation networks, four key components are put forward: (1) the 
different framings of sustainability that actors use to justify the instruments used; (2) 
the instruments themselves; (3) the governance arrangements emerging through 
combinations of state, market and NGO actors; and (4) the power dynamics between 
the groups of actors that shape the governance innovation network.  
To summarise, through different efforts to both frame and deal with issues 
surrounding sustainability in the tuna GPN, actors produce innovative instruments to 
influence production and consumption practices. These instruments interact with each 
other and with different actors to form actor-instrument arrangements. This 
interaction leads to a reclassification of actor roles away from their assignation as 
standard state, market and NGO. In turn, this reclassification presents us with the 
need to form different concepts of power. For instance, while traditional core-
periphery dynamics frequently associated with GPNs are in some ways reinforced, 
new power dynamics are also emerging that open up the potential for developing 
states and NGOs to (re)shape GPN practices. Therefore, through governance 
innovation networks we can understand how the interaction between actors and 
instruments is reconfiguring GPNs when sustainability moves to the fore. 
The Conclusion chapter points to the theoretical contribution of this research to 
development of the global production networks literature, explaining how the research 
provides the first in-depth analysis of how private standards as well as public 
regulation are producing innovative solutions for governance over sustainability in the 
tuna GPN. Through introducing the concept of governance innovation into the GPN 
framework, the analysis of innovation in GPNs moves beyond looking at the technical 
innovations in production processes. 
The thesis concludes by formulating policy recommendations around governance 
innovations for sustainability and recommendations for further research in this area.,  
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Samenvatting 
De tonijnvisserij is aan het uitbreiden sinds de jaren 40 van de vorige eeuw. Tussen 
1940 en halverwege de jaren 60 is de jaarlijkse wereldwijde vangst van de 
belangrijkste tonijnsoorten gestegen van 300.000 ton tot ongeveer 1 miljoen ton. 
Hierna heeft er een continue stijging plaatsgevonden naar meer dan 4 miljoen ton per 
jaar in 2009, met een piek van 6.5 miljoen ton in 2007. Deze groei resulteert in 
duurzaamheidsvraagstukken zoals: overcapaciteit van de tonijnvisserij; kwesties 
rondom de bijvangst van jonge (juveniel) vissoorten; en het probleem van illegale, 
niet-gedocumenteerde en ongereguleerde (IUU) visserijactiviteiten. 
Deze duurzaamheidsvraagstukken, primair geassocieerd bij sleepnet en ‘long line’ 
vangsttechnieken, maken governance voor duurzaam management noodzakelijk. 
Visserij governance was traditioneel het domein van overheidsactoren, maar doordat 
deze vaak niet konden voldoen aan de verwachtingen, twijfelen invloedrijke 
wetenschappers en andere stakeholders aan hun governance capaciteit. Doordat 
overheden als onbetrouwbare actoren worden gezien in visserij governance nemen 
andere actoren in toenemende mate een prominente plaats in. Dit heeft geresulteerd in 
nieuwe, innovatieve governance arrangementen waarbij overheden, marktpartijen en 
NGO actoren betrokken zijn.  
Deze dissertatie analyseert de capaciteit van governance innovaties in het sturen 
richting duurzame productie en consumptie van tonijn. Het onderzoek neemt global 
production network (GPN) governance als alomvattend kader voor de analyse van 
duurzaamheid governance en governance innovaties van zowel bedrijven als niet-
bedrijven. De analyse is gebaseerd op de idee dat governance innovaties innovatieve 
instrumenten als startpunt nemen. Deze instrumenten worden ontworpen en gebruikt 
voor het verbeteren van duurzame productie en consumptie van tonijn. Governance 
innovaties worden onderzocht om te begrijpen welke groepen actoren innovatieve 
instrumenten produceren voor duurzaamheidsdoeleinden en hoe deze actor-instrument 
constellaties de dynamiek van tonijn GPN beïnvloeden. De centrale onderzoeksvraag 
luidt: “Hoe versterken verschillende markt- en overheid-gestuurde governance 
innovaties de governance van duurzame tonijn?”  
Voor het beantwoorden van deze onderzoeksvraag zijn vier case studies geanalyseerd. 
Deze case studies onderzoeken de governance innovaties voor duurzaamheid van 
tonijn uit de Westelijke en Centrale Stille Oceaan (WCPO), gericht op Europese en 
Noord Amerikaanse markten. Twee cases zijn specifiek gericht op overheid-gestuurde 
governance innovaties in de WCPO, door zowel regionale/sub regionale lichamen als 
door de interactie tussen de EU en de eilandstaten in de Stille Oceaan. Twee andere 
cases richten zich op markt-gestuurde innovaties: de implementatie van private 
standaarden voor het certificeren van tonijn visserij en de implementatie van op 
consument gerichte traceerbaarheidssystemen (CFTS) 
Methodologisch past dit onderzoek een case studie benadering toe. Om de cases te 
analyseren is gebruik gemaakt van verschillende methoden: semigestructureerde 
interviews, participerende observatie, directe observatie en document analyse. Voor 
elke case zijn deelonderzoeksvragen gegenereerd en deze waren leidend in de data 
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verzameling en analyse. Deze thesis heeft zes hoofdstukken, een voor elk van de case 
studies, aangevuld met een introductie en conclusie hoofdstuk.  
In hoofdstuk 2 worden innovaties in multilaterale governance gepresenteerd door het 
analyseren van interactie tussen regionale en sub-regionale governance platforms in 
de WCPO. Verschuivende politieke allianties en nieuwe uitdagingen op milieugebied 
stimuleren een debat over processen van sub-regionalisatie en het samenspel tussen de 
verschillende schalen van governance leidt tot positieve synergistische uitkomsten of 
tot negatieve institutionele verstoringen. De regionale West and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) en de sub-regionale Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) interacteren in het management van regionale grensoverschrijdende 
tonijnvisserij. Een analyse van die interactie laat zien dat voor betwiste mariene 
hulpbronnen zoals visserij internationale sub-regionale organisaties kansen bieden 
voor een verschuiving in de machtsbalans in het voordeel van de kleine eilandstaten. 
Bovendien zorgt de aanwezigheid van sub-regionale groepen zoals de PNA ervoor dat 
de prestaties van de WCPFC besproken worden, wat leidt tot het stimuleren van een 
breder debat en vooruitgang binnen dit regionale bestuurslichaam. De conclusie luidt 
dat het gecombineerde werk van de PNA en de WCPFC hen een voorsprong geeft op 
veel onderwerpen en als proeftuin kan fungeren voor een functioneel multilateralisme 
gebaseerd op gedeelde hulpbronnen en gebruikmakend van regionale en sub-regionale 
governance platforms. 
De casus in hoofdstuk 3 betreft de externe regelgeving strategieën van de EU, door te 
kijken naar de implementatie en opname van hun IUU wetgeving in de WCPO. De EU 
heeft een leidende rol op zich genomen in het gevecht tegen IUU visserij, waarbij het 
zowel zijn marktmacht als normatieve macht gebruikt om de EU IUU wetgeving (Nr. 
1005/2008) te versterken en haar visserijduurzaamheidsagenda te verspreiden buiten 
de eigen EU gebieden. In dit hoofdstuk wordt geanalyseerd hoe succesvol de EU is 
geweest in het gebruik maken van zijn marktmacht en normatieve macht om de 
wettelijke raamwerken voor tonijnvisserij te beïnvloeden in de Stille Zuidzee. De 
resultaten laten zien dat hoewel de marktmacht van de EU nog steeds een belangrijke 
factor is, de verminderende normatieve macht van de EU in de WCPO ervoor zorgt 
dat de pogingen om de EU IUU visserijwetgeving geïmplementeerd te krijgen in de 
Stille Oceaan zwakker worden en dat de Stille Oceen eilanden er steeds beter in slagen 
hun eigen wetgevenede agenda te implementeren. We concluderen dat de 
veranderende asymmetrie tussen marktmacht en normatieve macht heeft geleid tot een 
gedifferentieerde geografie van opname van EU richtlijnen; en dat terwijl marktmacht 
een dominante strategie voor de EU blijft, de normatieve macht zich steeds meer moet 
richten op samenwerking in plaats van het ‘onderwijzen’ van de voordelen van een 
EU-achtige wetgevende aanpak. 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de interactie tussen de Earth Island Institute (EII) Dolfin Safe 
Certification en de certificatie van de PNA skipjack visserij door de Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC). Deze vergelijking is opgezet om te begrijpen hoe 
interacties tussen certificatie schema’s een impact hebben op de opname van twee 
keurmerken die in hetzelfde GPN actief zijn. Certificatie wordt veelal gezien als een 
innovatieve strategie voor het omgaan met duurzaamheidsproblemen in de 
productieketen. Doordat er een stijgend aantal keurmerken beschikbaar is in de 
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visserijsector, elk met zijn eigen definitie van duurzaamheid, worden vragen gesteld 
over hun geloofwaardigheid. In de tonijnvisserij zorgen contrasterende aanpakken 
voor conflicten over, onder andere, de geloofwaardigheid van tegenstrijdige 
keurmerken. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een dergelijk conflict onderzocht tussen de EII 
Dolfin Safe en the MSC certificatie schema’s in de WCPO. De analyse kijkt naar hoe 
kenmerken zoals wetenschappelijke strengheid, inclusiviteit, transparantie/openheid, 
onpartijdigheid/onafhankelijkheid, en impact bijdragen aan de geloofwaardigheid van 
de keurmerken en legt uit wat het belang van autoriteit is in het begrijpen hoe 
certificering schema’s invloed behouden in mondiale productie netwerken. De 
resultaten laten zien dat, ondanks substantieel verschillende niveaus van 
geloofwaardigheid in deze netwerken, de toepassing van een milieustandaard meer 
verbonden is met de autoriteit van de standaardgever dan met de geloofwaardigheid 
van het keurmerk. Dit hoofdstuk concludeert dat het begrijpen van de meer 
genuanceerde rol van autoriteit, zowel met als zonder geloofwaardigheid, nieuwe 
inzichten geeft in hoe milieuregulering vorm wordt gegeven in mondiale productie 
netwerken.  
In hoofdstuk 5 worden op consument gerichte traceerbaarheidssystemen (CFTS) in de 
tonijn GPN geanalyseerd om te begrijpen wat hun potentieel is voor de transformatie 
van productiepraktijken van tonijnbedrijven richting duurzaamheid. Het openbaar 
maken van informatie, vrijwillig of verplicht, speelt een steeds centralere rol in 
mondiale productieketens. Het succes van traceerbaarheid in voedselveiligheid heeft 
geleid tot een uitbreiding van de traceerbaarheid van andere ‘productkwaliteiten’, 
waaronder duurzaamheid en herkomst. Deze verschuiving wordt niet alleen gezien in 
de informatie die openbaar wordt gemaakt, maar ook in het publiek waar de 
traceerbaarheidssystemen zich op richten. Dit is het duidelijkst in het ontstaan van 
zogenaamde CFTS, die opereren via een code of keurmerk om consumenten te 
voorzien in toegang tot traceerbare (product en productie) informatie. In dit hoofdstuk 
worden verschillende tonijn CFTS onderzocht die ontwikkeld zijn voor consumenten 
van tonijn in Noord Amerika en Europa, de primaire markten voor deze typen 
systemen. Door het nemen van een cross-sectie van aan tonijn gerelateerde CFTS, 
onderzoeken we de diversiteit van CFTS, de drijvers achter deze CFTS en de 
mogelijkheden van deze systemen om de duurzaamheidspresentaties te veranderen. 
De resultaten laten zien dat terwijl op consument gerichte traceerbaarheid voor het 
grootste gedeelte een beginnende aanpak is, de CFTS steeds meer gebruikt worden in 
de tonijnindustrie, gedreven door druk vanuit NGOs en de ‘duurzame vis’ beweging. 
We concluderen dat dat deze traceerbaarheid resulteert in verschillende gradaties van 
verandering in de productieketen, en dat instrumenten zoals CFTS nieuwe actor 
constellaties samenbrengen die onderwerpen zoals duurzame productie en consumptie 
aanpakken. 
Het afsluitende hoofdstuk reflecteert op deze case studie hoofdstukken en trekt 
conclusies op hoofdlijnen van de thesis. De conclusies suggereren dat, terwijl 
analyses van GPN governance zich oorspronkelijk richten op governance als ofwel 
overheid gestuurd ofwel markt/bedrijven gestuurd, de casussen in deze studie laten 
zien dat dit onderscheid tussen overheids- en markt-gestuurde governance 
ontoereikend is voor het begrijpen van duurzaamheid governance in de tonijn GPN. In 
plaats hiervan worden de grenzen tussen de verschillende actor groepen steeds vager. 
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De capaciteit voor governance innovatie is niet terug te voeren is op overheid- of 
marktgestuurde governance, maar wordt in plaats hiervan gegenereerd door de 
interacties tussen publieke en private actoren in het bereik van de tonijn GPN. Het is 
dus belangrijk voor het verspreiden van governance innovaties dat actoren niet 
gedefinieerd worden aan de hand van de governance rol die zij toegekend hebben 
gekregen, maar gezien worden als onderdeel van een governance innovatie netwerk, 
gericht op duurzaamheid in GPNs. Het vertrekpunt van analyses van governance in 
GPN is dat de governance innovatienetwerken niet beginnen bij de productie en 
alleen incidenteel kijken naar governance. In plaats hiervan moet het governance 
innovatie netwerk het startpunt zijn en moet het begrijpen van verschillende 
dimensies van dit netwerk inzicht geven in hoe productie praktijken binnen GPNs 
worden gevormd.  
Op dit moment richt het meeste duurzaamheidsonderzoek zich op één instrument of 
type instrument, zoals duurzaamheidskeurmerken als het belangrijkste markt 
instrument. Ondanks dat dit soort onderzoek waardevolle inzichten verschaft in zulke 
individuele instrumenten, voegt het geen verdere inzichten toe aan de bredere 
governance processen die geassocieerd worden met het ontwikkelen en 
implementeren van een verscheidenheid aan innovaties in de tonijn GPN. Het richten 
op een individueel instrument is niet adequaat om governance innovatie in de 
tonijnvisserij te begrijpen; de innovatie bestaat uit de constellatie van verschillende 
interacterende actoren die zich verbinden in de implementatie van verschillende 
instrumenten.  
In de studie naar governance innovaties voor duurzame tonijn, is het essentieel om de 
relationele aard van de actoren-cum-instrumenten te onderzoeken en hoe deze 
combinaties een governance innovatienetwerk neerzetten dat gerelateerd is aan, maar 
verschilt van, de tonijn GPN. Om analytische duidelijkheid te brengen in de formatie 
en volharding van governance innovatienetwerken, worden vier componenten naar 
voren gebracht: (1) de verschillende manieren waarop actoren duurzaamheid 
definiëren om de gebruikte instrumenten te rechtvaardigen; (2) de instrumenten zelf; 
(3) de governance arrangementen die tot stand komen door de combinaties van 
overheid, markt en NGO actoren; en (4) de macht dynamieken tussen de groepen 
actoren die het governance innovatie netwerk vorm geven. 
Samenvattend kan worden gesteld dat door verschillende inspanningen rondom zowel 
het definiëren als het omgaan met duurzaamheid in de tonijn GPN actoren 
innovatieve instrumenten produceren die de productie en consumptie praktijken van 
tonijn beïnvloeden. Deze instrumenten interacteren met elkaar en met verschillende 
actoren en vormen actor-instrument arrangementen. Deze interacties leiden tot een 
herclassificatie van actor rollen, voorbij de standaard indeling van overheid, markt en 
NGO. Dit classificatieproces presenteert de noodzaak om verschillende concepten van 
macht te vormen. Bijvoorbeeld, terwijl traditionele kern-periferie dynamieken 
(veelvuldig geassocieerd met GPNs) in sommige gevallen worden versterkt, ontstaan 
er ook nieuwe machtsdynamieken die mogelijkheden creëren voor zich 
ontwikkelende overheden en NGOs om hun GPN praktijken te hervormen. Daarom 
kunnen we door governance innovatienetwerken begrijpen hoe de interactie tussen 
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actoren en instrumenten GPNs anders worden geconfigureerd  als duurzaamheid op 
de voorgrond treedt.  
Het concluderende hoofdstuk wijst op de theoretische bijdrage van dit onderzoek aan 
de ontwikkeling van de mondiale literatuur over productienetwerken, met een eerste 
diepte analyse van hoe private standaarden alsook publieke wetgeving innovatieve 
oplossingen produceren voor governance voor duurzaamheid in de tonijn GPN. Door 
het introduceren van het concept governance innovatie in het GPN raamwerk wordt 
de analyse van innovatie in GPNs breder als alleen het bekijken van technische 
innovaties in het productie proces. 
De thesis concludeert met het formuleren van beleidsaanbevelingen rondom 
governance innovaties voor duurzaamheid en aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek in 
dit gebied.  
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